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Abstract 
This thesis sheds light on the range of strategies that companies can pursue in 
order to deal with human rights concerns in countries where the host government 
is responsible for systematic human rights violations. It does so by the 
comparative analysis of the policies and activities that four companies carried out 
in two countries: (i) Total and Premier Oil in Myanmar and (ii) Talisman and 
Lundin in Sudan. 
The analysis of the cases shows that human rights issues do not only involve 
material conditions that prevent people from enjoying human rights or constitute a 
direct violation of their rights, buy they may also pertain to the way in which 
stakeholders perceive or view a particular situation. The nature of the human 
rights issue is important because it affects the way in which the issue can be 
addressed. The analysis of the cases suggests that the activities carried out by the 
companies to address human rights issues can be separated into five different 
strategies: (1) direct strategies involving concrete action that companies take to 
influence the objective conditions that give rise to human rights issues, (2) 
indirect strategies pertaining to attempts to persuade other actors to take action 
over the conditions that give rise to issues, (3) information strategies involving 
attempts to affect stakeholder views through the provision of information, (4) 
leveraging strategies aimed at affecting stakeholder views through verification 
measures or appeals to authority, and (5) stakeholder engagement strategies 
concerned with attempts to affect stakeholder views by increasing mutual 
understanding between companies and their stakeholders through two-way 
communication. 
The present thesis makes two main contributions. First, it sheds light on the little 
researched area of corporate approaches to human rights. More specifically, it 
makes a theoretical and practical contribution by classifying activities that 
companies have carried out to address human rights issues into five types of 
human rights strategies and identifying factors that affect the choice between the 
different strategies. No previous research exists on the action that companies have 
taken in response to human rights issues. 
Second, the present research draws on and adds value to literature on issues 
management and stakeholder management by contributing to a better 
understanding of the ways in which companies address social issues and 
stakeholder demands. As Wood (1991) observed, there is a lack of research on the 
vehicles or methods of corporate response to society's changing conditions and 
expectations. Previous literature has focussed on the identification of issues and 
stakeholders rather than the behaviours that companies assume to deal with issues 
and stakeholder demands (e.g., Andriof & Waddock, 2002; Berman et al., 1999). 
Key words: business and human rights, corporate social responsibility, issues 
management 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Companies under spotlight 
In 1996, the BBC aired a Saturday night prime time documentary on human rights 
violations associated with the presence of British Petroleum (BP) in Colombia. 
The programme suggested a connection between the company and extra judicial 
arrests, harassment, and killing of labour union activists. The alleged violations 
were perpetrated by the Colombian forces that were providing security for BP's 
operations in the country. The BBC programme replicated the views of the human 
rights activists who were arguing that BP bore responsibility for the violations 
because the company could not have operated in the country without the 
protection of the Colombian military and police. According to the human rights 
activists, the company should have done more to prevent the Colombian army and 
police from committing human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 1998). 
Since the mid-1990s, multinational companies operating in the extractive 
industries have found themselves in situations similar to that of BP in Colombia. 
As will be seen in Chapter 2, an increasing amount of pressure has been put on 
companies to either suspend their operations or to demonstrate constructive 
engagement for reducing their allegedly negative influence on human rights. This 
research investigates the ways in which companies haves sought to address human 
rights concerns under such pressure. The literature review will show that little 
prior research exists in this area (see 3.2). The focus will be on extractive 
10 
companies operating in countries where the government has failed to protect the 
respect for human rights or has itself been involved with human rights violations. 
1.2 Justification of research 
1.2.1 Market-based incentives and regulatory pressure 
Human rights have become increasingly relevant for companies. Companies from 
diverse industries have been named and shamed as to their association with 
human rights violations. The threat of consumer boycotts, under-valued share 
price, and reputational damage make companies sensitive to criticism presented in 
the public arena. Human rights activists have used this sensitiveness by 
scrutinising corporate behaviour and mobilising media coverage for pressuring 
companies to consider their effect on human rights. 
Human rights considerations are also increasingly affecting investment decisions. 
In the United States, assets in ethically or socially screened mutual funds were 
151 billion US dollars in 2003, an 11 % increase from 2001 (Social Investment 
Forum, 2003). In the United Kingdom, the total value of socially responsible 
investment assets rose from £23 billion in 1997 to £225 billion in 2001 (Sparkes, 
2002). The upward trend in socially responsible investment is also demonstrated 
by the launch of market indexes such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index in 
1999 and FTSE4Good in 2001. The indexes provide investment universes based 
on financial criteria and ethical considerations, including specific clauses on 
human rights. 
11 
In addition to market-based incentives, regulatory pressure with regard to the role 
of companies in the promotion and protection of human rights has been 
amounting. Several companies have been sued in the United States and Europe for 
human rights violations perpetrated abroad, as will be seen in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, a number of selective purchasing laws have been enacted by state and 
city governments in the United States and Australia (Amnesty International & the 
Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, 2002: 81-82).1 These laws 
prohibit or sanction business interactions between government bodies and 
companies that operate in countries in which gross human rights violations occur. 
Even though some of the purchasing laws have been disputed at the World Trade 
Organisation because they are seen to form a constraint to free trade, they have 
pushed companies to change their behaviour (Cooper, 1997). 
Moreover, the United Nations has taken steps to identify and clarify standards of 
corporate responsibility with regard to human rights. Notably, it has drafted norms 
for transnational companies and other business enterprises on human rights. If 
approved, the norms will make companies directly accountable for complying 
with a set of human rights standards. The United Nations has also established an 
initiative, the Global Compact, that engages companies in ten principles on human 
rights, labour standards, environmental practices, and anti-corruption. By 2006, 
I State and city governments in the United States and Australia have enacted purchasing laws that 
disfavour companies operating in certain countries such as apartheid-era South Africa and 
MyanmarlBurma. For example, the Massachusetts Burma law issued in 1996 gives a 10% 
preference for bids from companies that avoid investing in Burma, provided that the preference 
does not impair essential purchases or result in inadequate competition. This law was later judged 
unconstitutional by the Massachusetts federal district court, the US Court of Appeals, and the 
12 
more than 2,300 companies had subscribed. Another development that highlights 
the importance given to the topic within the United Nations was the appointment 
of secretary-general's special representative on the issue of human rights and 
business in 2005 (United Nations, 2006). 
As a result of these developments, human rights have become an issue that is 
taken into account in managerial decision-making. According to a survey 
conducted by the Ashridge Centre for Business and Society, 36% of the largest 
500 companies in the world have abandoned a proposed investment and 19% have 
disinvested from a country because of human rights issues (Wilson & Gribben, 
2000). Preliminary results of another study suggest that many of the largest 
companies in the world are aware of their human rights responsibilities and think 
about them in a systematic manner (United Nations, 2006). 
1.2.2 Significance of the extractive industries 
Human rights have been viewed particularly important for companies operating in 
the extractive industries. For example, Daniel Yergin, the author of Prize of Oil 
(1991) and the Chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, believes that 
one of the most important pressures on oil companies in the future will be the 
attention on human rights and ethics (Avery, 1999). Moreover, according to a 
study carried out by John Ruggie, the UN secretary general's special 
representative on business and human rights, extractive companies account for the 
Supreme Court (Amnesty International & the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders 
Forum, 2002: 81-82). 
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two-thirds of alleged corporate human rights violations. They are also responsible 
for the worst violations including complicity in crimes against humanity. The 
extractive sector is therefore unique as to its impact on human rights: "no other 
has so enormous and intrusive a social and environmental footprint" (United 
Nations, 2006). 
Furthermore, because the mobility of extractive companies is limited by the 
location of natural resources, they are more likely than companies in other 
industries to seek ways in which they can address concerns that arise in 
connection with their operations. Indeed, major companies in the oil, gas, and 
mining sectors have made a commitment and taken measures to respect human 
rights. Shell, for example, has expressed its support for human rights in its general 
business principles and introduced a management system to implement its 
commitment (Shell, 1997). 
Despite the developments that have made human rights more relevant for 
companies, little research exists on the activities that companies have carried out 
for addressing human rights concerns. Previous literature has focussed on 
examining the relationship between foreign investment and the state of human 
rights in developing countries (Cragg, 2000; Reed, 2002; Spar, 1998; Spar, 1999) 
and the impact that individual multinational companies have had on human rights 
in a particular country (Idahosa, 2002; Manby, 1999; Wheeler et al., 2002). The 
specific behaviours in the area of human rights have not been investigated. Little 
14 
is therefore known about the ways in which companies have sought to influence 
the condition of human rights. 
1.3 Research topic and questions 
This present thesis seeks to shed light on the range of strategies that companies 
can pursue in order to deal with human rights concerns in countries where the host 
government is responsible for systematic human rights violations. It does so by 
exploring the attributes and determinants of the activities that companies have 
carried out to address human rights concerns. It therefore aims, on the one hand, 
to identify and characterise activities that companies have adopted to influence 
human rights and, on the other hand, to explain why companies have chosen to 
perform particular activities. The research topic can be divided into the following 
three research questions: 
1. What characterises human rights concerns encountered by companies? 
2. What distinguishes the different strategies that companies have developed 
to manage these human rights concerns? 
3. What are the factors that explain strategy selection? 
The focus of the research is on the extractive companies operating in countries 
where the government has failed to secure the respect for human rights or has 
itself been involved in human rights violations. As will be seen in Chapter 2, 
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companies operating in different industries have encountered different types of 
human rights concerns. Because the nature of the human rights concern may affect 
the ways in which companies respond to it, corporate approaches to human rights 
may vary across industries. 
1.4 Methodology 
A case study research design was adopted to investigate the research topic that is 
in line with the main characteristics of case study research: (1) theory is 
developed in a new area of research, (2) why or how questions are asked, (3) the 
researcher holds little control over the events, and (4) the boundaries between the 
phenomenon studied and its context are unclear (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994: 7-9, 
13). 
The main unit of analysis was defined as the policies and activities carried out in 
response to human rights concerns in a country in which the government is 
unable to secure the respect for human rights or itself perpetrates human rights 
violations. The approaches adopted by Total and Premier Oil in Myanm~ as well 
as Talisman Energy and Lundin Oil in Sudan were examined. The four companies 
met the following criteria: (l) they operate in the extractive industries, (2) they 
have attended to human rights concerns in a country in which the government 
perpetrates human rights violations, and (3) data about their behaviour is available 
from diverse sources so that it can be corroborated. 
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Three types of data were used: document material, semi-structured interviews, and 
observation. All the data was analysed in the same way based on the assumption 
that even though the material was acquired from different sources and through 
different methods, it involved subjective interpretations of external reality or more 
abstract ideas (see Ryan & Bernard, 2000; Tesch, 1990). The data was coded in 
line with the procedures recommended by Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 29-53). 
van Maanen's (1979) distinction between first-order and second-order concepts 
was also applied throughout the process of coding to separate the "facts" of the 
case from the process of interpretation and theorising. A variety of measures were 
taken to ensure the reliability of the research methods and validity of the findings 
(see 4.8). 
1.5 Research findings and contribution 
The present research makes two main contributions to existing literature. First, it 
sheds light on the little researched area of corporate approaches to human rights. 
More specifically, it makes a theoretical and practical contribution by classifying 
activities that companies have carried out to address human rights issues into five 
types of human rights strategies and identifying factors that affect the choice 
between the different strategies. As will be seen in the literature review (see 3.2), 
no previous research exists on the action that companies have taken in response to 
human rights issues. 
2 The military government changed the name ofBunna to Myanmar in 1989. Many opponents of 
the military rule and the United States still refer to the country as Bunna. Here, however, the new 
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Second, the present research draws on and adds value to literature on issues 
management and stakeholder management by contributing to a better 
understanding of the ways in which companies address social issues and 
stakeholder demands (see 10.2). As Wood (1991) observed, there is a lack of 
research on the vehicles or methods of corporate response to society's changing 
conditions and expectations. Previous literature has focussed on the identification 
of issues and stakeholders rather than the behaviours that companies assume to 
deal with issues and stakeholder demands (e.g., Andriof & Waddock, 2002; 
Berman et al., 1999). 
Taken as a whole, the findings of the present research provide support for the 
view that issues management and stakeholder management are complementary 
rather than conflicting ways of conceptualising the way in which companies 
accommodate their behaviour to society's values and expectations (Carroll & 
Buchholtz, 1999: 616-617; Wood, 1991). It therefore takes a different view to 
Clarkson (1995) who argued that the concept of stakeholders is superior to other 
concepts and frameworks in the area of corporate social responsibility. In contrast 
to Clarkson, the analysis of the cases shows that the concept of issues is useful in 
interpreting and organising stakeholder expectations because it brings together the 
views and expectations that different stakeholders have about some circumstances 
or developments. 
name Myanmar is used in accordance with the United Nations practice. 
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1.6 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. Chapter one introduces and justifies the 
research topic and questions, explains the research design, and presents the key 
definitions and delimitations of the research. 
Chapter two examines the context in which companies have begun to address 
human rights concerns. The concept of human rights is first introduced and 
defined as the standards enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Universal Declaration). Corporate responsibility for human rights 
is then discussed. Next, the scrutiny placed on companies with regard to their role 
in human rights violations is presented as a recent development relating to 
globalisation and the development of communication technologies that have 
enabled human rights activists to monitor corporate activities in faraway places. 
The chapter then establishes a focus on the extractive industry and identifies 
human rights concerns encountered by companies operating in this industry. 
Chapter three reviews literature that is relevant for conceptualising corporate 
approaches to human rights. It first establishes that little research exists on the 
ways in which companies have addressed human rights concerns and shows that 
prior research in the area of business and human rights has investigated the impact 
of foreign investment on human rights rather than the behaviours that companies 
engage in to influence human rights. Because of the scarcity of research on 
business and human rights, other bodies of literature are examined for exploring 
how issues similar to human rights have been framed. Research in corporate 
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social responsibility, issues management, and stakeholder management are found 
particularly relevant and therefore examined in some detail. 
Chapter four describes the research design and techniques employed for 
investigating the research topic. The reasons for adopting a case study research 
design are first explained. The components of the research design are then 
introduced before the unit and sub-units of analysis, case selection criteria, and the 
two cases selected for the research are presented. The data collection and analysis 
techniques are then described before the interpretation of research findings is 
discussed. The chapter concludes with the establishment of the reliability and 
validity of the research findings. 
Chapter five describes the political, economic, and social situation in Myanmar 
and Sudan and introduces the case study companies and their projects in the two 
countries. The aim of the chapter is to provide a background against which the 
approaches that the case study companies have taken to attend to human rights 
issues in the two countries can be analysed. The chapter proceeds as follows. The 
political, economic, and social situation in Myanmar and Sudan is first described. 
The arrival of foreign investment and its role in the economy of the two countries 
is discussed after which the oil and gas projects under study are then compared 
and contrasted in terms of their physical characteristics, ownership structure, and 
development over time. Finally, a brief profile of the companies is provided . 
• 
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Chapter six describes and explores the characteristics of the human rights 
concerns addressed by the case study companies in Myanmar and Sudan. It will 
be seen that they be categorised into two types of issues based on their ontological 
nature: (1) substantial issues involving material conditions and (2) symbolic issues 
pertaining to views or perceptions held by stakeholders. The chapter is structured 
along this categorisation. Substantial issues addressed by the companies are seen 
to include the behaviour of the army in the pipeline area, social and economic 
situation in the local communities near the pipelines, and high-profile human 
rights incidents in the country. Symbolic issues addressed by the companies 
include the perception held by certain stakeholders that the army still employs 
forced labour3 and commits other human rights violations in the pipeline region as 
well as the legitimacy of the investments. 
Chapter seven investigates the activities that the case study companies assumed to 
address human rights issues in Myanmar and Sudan. Before examining the actual 
activities that the companies have undertaken, the companies' policies on human 
rights and related issues are reviewed for understanding how the companies 
approach to human rights has changed over time. The activities carried out by the 
companies are then categorised into substantial and symbolic approaches. It will 
be seen that substantial approaches can be further divided into direct and indirect 
strategies and symbolic approaches into information, leveraging, and stakeholder 
engagement strategies. Specific activities carried out by the companies are 
3 The tenn "forced or compulsory labour" refers to all work or service which is exacted from any 
person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily (Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, ILO (No. 29), 1930). 
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described under these five categories. The chapter concludes with the examination 
of the interconnectedness of different approaches and strategies. 
Chapter eight sheds light on the variables that affect the way in which companies 
address human rights concerns. Based on the analysis of the cases and existing 
literature on issues and stakeholder management, seven variables are proposed to 
influence the selection of human rights strategy: (1) the perceived ontological 
nature of a human rights issue, (2) the degree of control a company holds over a 
particular issue, (3) the company's intrusiveness into its external environment, (4) 
the power that stakeholders hold relative to the company, (5) the size of the 
company, (6) the availability of collaboration partners, and (7) the perceived fit 
with core activities. 
Chapter nine discusses the relevance of the research findings in the context of 
what companies are generally doing in relation to human rights. It will be seen 
that companies at large have not engaged in the same variety and extent of activity 
as the companies studied for the present research. However, given that companies 
are increasingly recognising their commitment to human rights and showing their 
willingness to take action, the measures taken by the case study companies shed 
light on how a more important number of companies may be addressing human 
rights in the future. 
Finally, chapter ten summarises the research findings and discusses them in the 
context of earlier research. The research findings are first summarised and 
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discussed in relation to previous research for each of the research questions. The 
meaning and contribution of the research findings is then discussed at a more 
general level in relation to the limitations of the power of companies and the 
relationship between companies and non-governmental organisations. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the directions for future research and implications 
for policy and practice. 
1.7 Definitions 
Human rights are generally understood as entitlements that one holds by virtue of 
being a human being (Donnelly, 1998: 18). Since this modem understanding of 
human rights emerged from the struggle for the right to property against the 
monarchic state, various lists of rights have been put forward. For the purpose of 
this research, human rights are defined as the standards specified in the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is the most widely 
recognised collection of human rights standards in the world (see 2.3). 
Strategy is defined as a way to achieve a specific objective (Mintzberg et al., 
1998: 9) rather than the positioning of the company in relation to its competitors 
(Porter, 1985). Strategy is defined in this way to emphasise that the proposed 
model applies to human rights concerns that companies wish to address. 
Accordingly, a human rights strategy is the way in which a company reaches its 
objective of addressing a particular human rights issue. 
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The term issue is used to refer to those human rights concerns that companies seek 
to address. In distinction to a number of issue definitions, it is not assumed that 
issues bear some impact on the company, are somehow controversial, or involve 
expectational gaps (e.g., Reichart, 2003; Wartick & Mahon, 1994; Zyglidopoulos, 
2003). Issues have been defined in this way to distinguish them from more general 
trends and developments in the business environment or to prioritise certain issues 
to others. In contrast, because the focus of the present research is on the activities 
that companies adopt in the area of human rights, issues are seen as any human 
rights concerns that companies have decided to address. 
1.8 Delimitations of scope and key assumptions 
The research focuses on the extractive industries. Even though it is possible that 
companies assume similar approaches to human rights across industries, important 
differences exist between industries. As will be seen in the next chapter, different 
industries have encountered different types of human rights concerns. This is 
important because the nature of the human rights concern may detennine the way 
in which a company attends to it. It is therefore possible that human rights 
approaches vary from one industry to another. 
Prior research in the area of business and human rights has investigated the impact 
of foreign investment on human rights in a particular country (e.g., Spar, 1999; 
also see 3.2). The present thesis does not directly contribute to this earlier 
research. Instead, it identifies a set of approaches and strategies that companies 
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can deploy to attend to human rights concerns; the impact of these strategies is not 
examined. 
The analysis of data was based on the assumption that data is a way to learn about 
human experience rather than the object of analysis (see Ryan & Bernard, 2000; 
Tesch, 1990; also see 4.6). It was therefore possible to analyse evidence obtained 
from document material, interviews, and observation in the same way as 
subjective accounts of reality. Data and method triangulation were applied to 
explore how accounts varied between different data sources (see 4.5.1). 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the present thesis. It first justified the 
research topic and introduced the research questions. It then described the 
methodology used, outlined the structure of the present thesis, presented some key 
definitions, and gave the limitations of the research. In the following chapters, the 
research is described in more detail. 
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2 The role of companies in the 
promotion and protection of human 
rights 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the context in which companies have begun to address 
human rights concerns. The chapter unfolds as follows. The concept of human 
rights is first introduced and defined as the standards enshrined in the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration). 
Companies are then found to be responsible for some aspects of the Universal 
Declaration indirectly through national legislation. The prospect of direct 
corporate liability is also discussed in relation to the extraterritorial application of 
national laws and initiatives advanced by the United Nations. The scrutiny placed 
on companies with regard to their role in human rights abuses is then presented as 
a relatively recent development relating to globalisation and the development of 
communication technology which have increased the reach of human rights 
activists. The chapter finishes with a review of the human rights concerns 
encountered by companies. 
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2.2 Concept of human rights 
The word ''right'' has multiple meanings. When used by philosophers or legal 
theorists, it refers to an entitlement that one has for something and a 
corresponding duty of others to respect this entitlement (Donnelly, 1998: 18-19; 
Raz, 1986: 167; Waldron, 1984). Should someone not respect the entitlement, she 
is violating the right of x to y (Donnelly, 1998: 18). The idea of human rights is 
based on this meaning of the word ''right''. Human rights are entitlements that one 
holds by virtue of being a human being (ibid). It is considered that rights empower 
the right-holder who may assert her rights; this is reflected by the language of 
"exercising" rights (Donnelly, 2003: 8). 
The relationship between rights and duties has incurred some debate among 
philosophers. In his contribution to this debate, Raz (1986: 171) noted that rights 
may ground many duties, not just one corresponding duty. For example, a right to 
personal security is the foundation of several duties including the duty of not to 
harass, rape or torture the right-holder. Raz also observed that duties vary 
according to the circumstances and may change as the circumstances evolve. No 
closed list of rights and corresponding duties can therefore be drawn. 
The philosophical foundation of human rights is subject to an ongoing debate. 
This is illustrated by the discussion on the universality of human rights. There are 
authors who argue that all human beings are entitled to human rights because they 
derive from the nature of man, not from particular society, history, or culture 
(Donnelly, 2003: 10; Sidorsky, 1979: 327). Others, however, take the opposite 
27 
view and assert that all rights arise in specific societal or historical circumstances 
and should therefore not be considered as universal (see Waldron, 1984). 
Similarly, the equality and alienability of human rights has been questioned (see, 
e.g., Crawford, 1988: 329). Even though there is a certain degree of agreement on 
the concept of human rights, the debate on the foundation of human rights is 
likely to continue: 
To say that there is widespread acceptance of the principle of human rights 
on the domestic and international planes is not to say that there is complete 
agreement about the nature of such rights or their substantive scope -
which is to say, their definition. Some of the most basic questions have yet 
to receive conclusive answers. Whether human rights are to be received 
divine, moral, or legal entitlements; whether they are to be validated by 
intuition, custom, social contract theory, principles of distributive justice, 
or as prerequisites for happiness [ ... ] - these and kindred issues are 
matters of ongoing debate and likely to remain so as long as there exist 
contending approaches to public order and scarcities among resources. 
(Weston, 1992 in Steiner & Alston, 2000: 326) 
2.3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The modem understanding of human rights emerged from the struggle between 
the individual property holder and the monarchic state (see, e.g., Muchlinski, 
2001). The right to private property and other rights were subsequently 
documented in various declarations and constitutions such as the Declaration of 
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the Rights of Man and the Citizen (French National Assembly, 27 August 1789) 
that form the basis of the legitimacy of the modem state. In this present research, 
the term human rights refers to the rights enshrined in the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) which is the most 
widely accepted collection of human rights standards in the world. The Universal 
Declaration was unanimously4 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1948 soon after the formation of the United Nations to protect individuals 
against state abuse of which the Nazi regime had been an example (see, e.g., 
Muchlinski, 2001). The Universal Declaration is therefore an essentially political 
document formed in the aftermath of the Second World War (Clohesy, 2004). 
The Universal Declaration forms the basis of international human rights law 
together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (1966). As a 
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, the Universal Declaration is 
not legally binding and its ratification by states is not accompanied by any 
enforcement mechanisms. In contrast, the two covenants which translate 
entitlements listed in the Universal Declaration into specific rights have the force 
of international law as treaties through which states accept certain obligations (see 
Donnelly, 1998: 5). The three documents are together referred to as the 
International Bill of Human Rights. A host of other human rights treaties and 
resolutions or declarations of the General Assembly have further developed the 
content of the rights included in the Bill (Steiner & Alston, 2000: 141). These 
4 Out of the 56 member states that the United Nations had in 1948,48 voted in favour of the 
Universal Declaration and eight abstained (Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the Soviet Union 
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include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1951), the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1969), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1990). Regardless of the introduction of more specific and powerful human 
rights instruments, the Universal Declaration is still constantly invoked as the 
grand statement on human rights (Steiner & Alston, 2000: 143). 
The Universal Declaration has been criticised for practical and political reasons, 
particularly with regard to the indivisibility of the rights. A number of 
governments have, for example, argued that economic and social rights should 
take priority over civil and political rights because the meeting of the latter 
requires a certain level of economic development (see, e.g., Donnelly, 1998: 7; 
Muchlinski, 2001). The indivisibility of the rights has also been questioned in the 
name of "Asian values" that are argued to prioritise community interests and 
public order to individual rights (Steiner & Alston, 2000: 334-5). Accordingly, the 
rhetoric of rights is inherently attached to the values and beliefs that underpin the 
Western liberal tradition which places particular emphasis on the individual, but is 
less relevant for cultures where the individual has a less prominent role. 
Regardless of the criticism, the Universal Declaration is exceptional in that it 
represents consensus among states on a selection of rights that are seen as 
fundamental for the dignity and worth of human beings. This consensus was 
reinforced when the large majority of states renewed their commitment to the 
together with four East European countries and a Soviet republic (Steiner & Alston, 2000: 138). 
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Declaration in the United Nations 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. No 
other document is evoked so regularly to apply pressure on governments and other 
actors to promote social progress and quality of life. The establishment of the 
International Criminal Court in 2002 also showed that there is an increasing 
willingness among states to bring the perpetrators of the worst human rights 
violations to justice. 
2.4 Corporate responsibility under national and 
international human rights laws 
States have traditionally regulated the behaviour of individuals and o'ther actors 
within their territory in accordance with the principle of national sovereignty. 
Companies have been accountable for aspects of the Universal Declaration and 
other international human rights standards only indirectly through laws enacted by 
states. Even then the ultimate accountability for human rights violations has rested 
on states as the entities that have through international treaties made a 
commitment to protect and promote human rights in their territory. If they have 
failed to do so, they have been seen to violate human rights. Recently, however, 
national laws have been applied in such a way that national courts have had 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Multinational companies have therefore encountered 
situations in which they have not only been bound by the laws of the country in 
which they operate, but also by those of other countries. 
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2.4.1 Regulation within borders 
Companies do not have a direct duty to observe international human rights 
standards as expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights. It is states that 
are responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights within their 
territory in line with the principle of national sovereignty and international law. 
Companies are accountable for international human rights norms only indirectly 
through laws introduced at the national level. Similarly to other instruments of 
international law, the Universal Declaration and the Covenants are adopted by 
states that are then expected to implement their commitments to human rights 
standards by enacting and enforcing appropriate laws (Beyond Voluntarism, 2002: 
45, 54; Muchlinski, 2001). Companies are therefore not in a position to violate 
human rights standards as expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights. 
Only states as the duty-bearers of human rights obligations can violate human 
rights under international law. Companies can only break national laws enacted by 
states to implement their human rights obligations. 
The ways in which states interpret, implement, and enforce the rights enshrined in 
the International Bill of Human Rights can vary. As will be seen later in 2.5, this 
has led to a situation where complying with local laws and practice in one country 
may conflict with what is expected in other countries (Cragg, 2000). There is 
therefore an absence of common standards of behaviour for companies that 
operate in more than one country. The situation seems to be particularly 
challenging for multinational companies headquartered in Western countries. 
These companies are now expected to comply with the standards at home when 
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competing with local companies and multinationals from countries such as China, 
Ukraine, and Malaysia that may only adhere to local legislation placing lower and 
th~refore less expensive standards on corporate behaviour. 
As the only bearers of human rights obligations under intemationallaw, states are 
expected to control the activities of individuals and other non-state actors within 
their territory (Muchlinski, 2001; Ratner, 2001). With regard to companies, the 
role of governments is two-fold. First, governments have an obligation to protect 
individuals against human rights abuses perpetrated by companies. As will be 
seen in section 2.6 below, companies have been associated with human rights 
violations particularly in situations where host governments have neglected their 
responsibility to promote and protect human rights, which emphasises the 
controversial role of states as the principal protectors and violators of human 
rights. Second, governments have been held responsible for protecting companies 
against the violation of the rights that companies are seen to possess as legal 
persons. Such rights include the right to property, free speech, fair trial, and 
privacy (Muchlinski, 2001). 
In general, governments have been unwilling to regulate multinational companies 
domiciled in their country. One reason for this unwillingness stems from the 
negative effect of regulation on the competitive position of companies (Forsythe, 
2001; Joseph, 2000; see also Muchlinski, 2001). For example, anti-corruption 
legislation enacted in 1977 in the Unites States put companies incorporated in the 
country at a disadvantage in comparison to companies established elsewhere. 
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Governments have also been reluctant to apply national laws extraterritorially 
because of the possible political effects of such practice. As noted by Muchlinski 
(1999: 111), the extraterritorial application of laws can be seen as a violation of 
the sovereignty of other states or an attempt to impose policies upon other 
countries, practices that can result in diplomatic conflict and retaliation. 
In place of binding regulation introduced at the country level, governments have 
encouraged companies to show their commitment to human rights through the 
adoption of business principles and voluntary codes. The most prestigious 
voluntary initiative focusing on human rights was based on the speech given by 
the secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, in 1999. The following 
Global Compact invites companies to promote and protect human rights within 
their sphere of influence by subscribing to ten principles taken from existing U.N. 
documents in the area of human rights. By January 2006, more than 2,300 
companies had joined the Global Compact (2006). Voluntary initiatives will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
2.4.2 Regulation beyond borders 
Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of lawsuits involving extraterritorial 
application of national laws have been brought against companies for human 
rights violations committed abroad. The largest number of these lawsuits has been 
brought forward in the United States in reference to the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA) which states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
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nations or a treaty of the United States" (28 US Code para. 1350). Accordingly, 
foreign citizens can sue private individuals or non-state actors before US courts 
for violations of international law. The ATCA has been used to bring cases 
against companies as well as some individuals including the former president of 
the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos. In terms of extractive companies, Shell, 
Chevron, Texaco, Freeport MeMo Ran, Unocal, and ExxonMobil among others 
have been sued in reference to the ATCA (Jagers, 2002: 184-194). 
Most of the ATCA cases involve international crimes including slavery, forced 
labour as a modem form of slavery, genocide, war crimes, torture, rape, and 
summary executions (Beyond Voluntarism, 2002: 104; Clapham, 2006: 253,255). 
There are also some cases (e.g., Wiwa v Shell) that are based on the participation 
of the company in the violation of international customary law by the host 
government (Clapham, 2006: 262). The cases typically involve situations where 
companies have allegedly aided and abetted a state in human rights violations 
rather than acted as perpetrators themselves (Clapham, 2006: 254). The cases 
therefore invoke the concept of accomplice liability or complicity. The emerging 
case law suggests that in order to be liable, companies have to take active steps in 
cooperating or participating in the alleged violations (United Nations, 2006). 
However, in the case brought against Unocal, the court of appeals ruled that 
"knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on 
the perpetration of the crime" was a sufficient test for complicity (US Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed in 18 September 2002, 14210, para 4). 
Companies can therefore be held liable for international crimes when they know 
35 
or should have known that their acts assist or encourage the perpetration of such 
crimes (Clapham, 2006: 258). 
Despite the resistance and lobbying of the business community, the principle that 
companies can be held accountable in US law for human rights violations 
committed in another country has not been rejected. By 2006, altogether 36 
ATCA cases involving companies had been brought forward. None of these had 
been decided in favour of the plaintiffs, twenty had been dismissed, three settled, 
and the rest were still ongoing (United Nations, 2006). The emerging case law 
still suggests that companies can be held liable for certain types of human rights 
violations. 
In addition to the United States, lawsuits against multinational companies for 
human rights violations perpetrated abroad have also been filed in the United 
Kingdom (e.g., Adams v. Cape Industries pIc., 1990; Connelly v. RTZ Corp. pIc., 
1996), Belgium, and France (Jagers, 2002: 203-209). In contrast to the traditional 
application of international human rights law, companies have in these cases been 
held directly liable for alleged human rights violations. Direct corporate liability 
may also be emerging under domestic criminal law. According to a recent study, 
countries that have integrated the provisions of the International Criminal Court 
into their domestic legislation may have opened a window for prosecuting 
companies registered in these countries for human rights violations perpetrated in 
another country (United Nations, 2006). 
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2.4.3 Specific forms of regulation 
One form of regulation that has occurred particularly in the United States 
concerns selective purchasing laws enacted by state and city governments. These 
laws prohibit or sanction business interactions between public sector organisations 
and companies operating in certain countries where human rights violations occur. 
Their status has however been challenged in a variety of arenas, including U.S 
courts and the World Trade Organisation. In 1999, the US Court of Appeals found 
that a Massachusetts law on selective purchasing with regard to Burma was 
unconstitutional because (1) it interfered with foreign policy, (2) it impinged on 
Congress' power to regulate foreign trade, and (3) it was pre-empted by federal 
sanctions on Burma (Amnesty International & the Prince of Wales International 
Business Leaders Forum, 2002: 81-82). The same law has also been disputed at 
the World Trade Organisation because it can be seen to form a constraint to free 
trade (ibid.). Despite the challenge on the legal status of the selective purchasing 
laws, they have made a number of companies to change their behaviour. PepsiCo, 
for example, pulled out from Burma because of purchasing laws enacted in the 
United States (Cooper, 1997). 
2.4.4 Future directions 
There are commentators who believe that international law is moving towards a 
plurality of approaches where individuals and other private actors are accountable 
for human rights (e.g., Clapham, 2006: 26). According to Clapham, "to insist on 
the exclusive applicability of human rights law to governments generates a sense 
of impunity for those who are undermining people's rights" (Clapham, 2006: 54). 
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Also, the state-centric approach fails to echo the reality where human rights are 
observed as limitations on the power of companies and other non-state actors 
(ibid.: 56). There is still resistance to the treatment of companies as legal persons 
under international law. One reason for this is that "it has been assumed that 
increasing the categories of international legal persons recognized under 
international law will lead to an expansion of the possible authors of international 
law" (Clapham, 2006: 58; see also International Chamber of Commerce and 
International Organisations of Employers, 2006). 
Since 1999, the United Nations Sub-Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights has been developing human rights norms that have 
the potential of developing into legally binding regulation on companies. The 
"Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" (the Norms) are written in a treaty-like 
language and bring together a variety of existing human rights standards into one 
document (Draft Norms, 2004). They include articles on international criminal 
and humanitarian law, civil and political rights as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights, consumer protection, environmental standards, and anti-corruption 
principles. They are expected to establish "a base line of conduct" which all 
companies irrespective of their location or size would meet ''within their 
respective spheres of activity and influence" (United Nations, 2002b: para 23). 
The implications of this formulation have been discussed by legal commentators 
who have sought to identify the variables that determine the limits of corporate 
responsibility and to ensure that the boundaries between state responsibility and 
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corporate responsibility are clear (e.g., Clapham, 2006: 230-3; Ratner, 2001). 
According to the secretary-general's special representative John Ruggie, the tenn 
"spheres of activity and influence" is a fragile basis for binding standards on 
human rights as the "legal meaning of the concept remains elusive" (United 
Nations, 2006: 67). 
The Working Group that drafted the Nonns views them as 'soft law', similar to 
United Nations declarations, principles, guidelines, standards, and resolutions 
which interpret existing international law and reflect established international 
practice without introducing binding obligations on companies (Weissbrodt & 
Kruger, 2005). The Norms can also be seen as part of the process of consensus-
building that will result in a treaty or customary international law (ibid.). They 
have however encountered strong resistance from the business community which 
opposes any moves from voluntary codes towards binding nonns (Clapham, 2006: 
233-4; United Nations, 2006). The debates about the proposed reparation 
payments to victims and monitoring of compliance have been particularly 
contentious (United Nations, 2006: para 59). A commentary by the International 
Chamber of Commerce and the International Organisation of Employers viewed 
the Nonns as privatisation of human rights: "The essential problem with the draft 
Nonns is that it privatises human rights by making private persons (natural and 
legal) the duty-bearers. Privatisation leaves the real duty-bearer - the State - out 
of the picture" (International Chamber of Commerce and the International 
Organisation of Employers, 2006: 4). Similarly, the secretary-general's special 
representative saw the Nonns as problematic because they do not differentiate the 
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responsibilities of states from those of companies and in some instances impose 
higher obligations on companies than on states (United Nations, 2006: para 66). 
He also questioned the authority of the Norms: 
What the Norms have done, in fact, is to take existing state-based human 
rights instruments and simply assert that many of their provisions now are 
binding on corporations as well. But that assertion itself has little 
authoritative basis in internationallaw - hard, soft, or otherwise (United 
Nations, 2006: para 60). 
The special representative concluded his commentary on the Norms by regretting 
the debate that the Norms have created: "[I]n the SRSG's view the divisive debate 
over the Norms obscures rather than illuminates promising areas of consensus and 
cooperation among business, civil society, governments, and international 
institutions with respect to human rights" (United Nations, 2005: para 69). Other 
commentators have argued that the effectiveness of the Norms will be determined 
by their take-up by companies (Clapham, 2006: 235). 
2.4.5 Universal Declaration calls on companies 
The focus in the Universal Declaration is on the possession of rights by 
individuals and "references can be found to society, the state, groups, and 
individuals" (Clapham, 2006: 40). Even though international human rights law 
has focused on state action, human rights are not defined with regard to a specific 
duty-holder in the Universal Declaration (Clapham, 2006: 34). The Universal 
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Declaration calls on "every individual and every organ of society [ ... ] to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms" (Universal Declaration, 1948). As organs of 
society, companies are therefore invited to observe and advocate the human rights 
standards identified in the Universal Declaration. 
2.5 Amounting pressure on companies 
Since the mid-1990s, business organisations have been increasingly pressured to 
consider their role in the promotion and protection of human rights. The attention 
on companies has been driven by non-governmental organisations against the 
background of globalisation that has decreased the power of governments to 
regulate the behaviour of companies. The main reasons for this decrease in power 
are, on the one hand, the free trade agreements that prioritise trade to social and 
environmental concerns and, on the other hand, the principle of extraterritoriality 
that limits the capacity of states to apply their domestic law in foreign countries 
(Cragg, 2000; Forsythe, 2001). Furthermore, the opening of China and post-Soviet 
countries to foreign investment has given multinational companies more freedom 
to choose the countries and legal regimes in which they operate. As a result, 
companies operate in a situation where the markets are global, but human rights 
standards are not (Beyond Good Deeds, 2002: 5). The absence of common 
standards in the area of human rights has been referred to as a regulatory vacuum 
(Cragg, 2000). Accordingly, companies are left to set their own standards in 
accordance with international norms or to follow local practice which may 
conflict with what is expected from the company at home. 
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Parallel to the development of the regulatory vacuum, the progress in 
communication technology, particularly the Internet, has increased the reach and 
scope of the human rights groups that previously functioned locally without the 
means to communicate their concerns to larger audiences (Ratner, 2001; Spar, 
1999). Today, the operations of companies are scrutinised by a network of activist 
groups that are in contact with each other and capable of mobilising media 
coverage for issues of their choice (Muchlinski, 2001). A British Petroleum 
manager stressed the extent of this scrutiny by saying that "there is nowhere to 
hide" (Rice, 2002). 
Non-governmental organisations emerged in the 1960s as actors that have 
examined and publicised the condition of human rights in different countries. At 
first, they directed their attention on particular human rights issues in a small 
number of countries and mounted pressure on governments to honour their 
commitment to the respect of human rights. Amnesty, for example, was 
established in 1961 to defend the freedom of opinion and religion in countries 
such as Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2006). Many human rights organisations 
still focus on particular issues while the largest organisations have come to report 
on the state of human rights in a large number of countries (e.g., Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch). 
Since the mid-1990s, non-governmental organisations have directed some of their 
attention on companies in which they found a vulnerable target that appeared to 
be more responsive to bad publicity than repressive regimes (Broadhurst, 2000; 
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Jungk, 1999; Muchlinski, 2001; Spar, 1999)5. Companies selling consumer 
products have been particularly sensitive to reputational damage caused by name-
and-shame campaigns because of their highly visible brand names and the threat 
of consumer protests (Muchlinski, 2001; Spar, 1999). The attention of non-
governmental organisations has centred on multinational companies that have 
been urged to bring their operations in foreign countries into conformity with 
internationally agreed standards and laws at home (Broadhurst, 2000; Ratner, 
2001). Furthermore, the scrutiny exercised by non-governmental organisations has 
focussed on multinational companies registered in Western countries rather than 
on companies based in developing countries (Broadhurst, 2000). 
The attention of non-governmental organisations and the media has focussed on a 
series of cases where multinational companies have allegedly aggravated the 
human rights situation in a particular country. The role of Shell in Nigeria is 
perhaps most often presented as an example of the negative influence of foreign 
investment on human rights. Shell has failed to satisfactorily address the calls for 
environmental responsibility and more equitable allocation of revenue derived 
from the extraction of oil in the Nigerian delta. As a result, local movements have 
sabotaged the company's assets in the country. The Nigerian government has 
reacted by setting up paramilitary forces responsible for securing the oil fields and 
company facilities against attacks. The forces have however exacerbated the 
situation by committing human rights violations including beatings, rapes, and 
S Amnesty International. for example. formalised its focus on companies in 1995 by adopting a 
resolution that set an objective for the organisation to reach business organisations "to motivate 
constructive action by them against the violations within AI's mandate" (Amnesty International 
Council Meeting. September 1995 cited in Chandler. 2000: 8). 
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killings. Moreover, in 1995, some leaders of the local movement calling for more 
responsible behaviour from Shell were executed as a result of a controversial trial. 
Shell was criticised for doing nothing to prevent the hanging of the activists 
among whom was Ken Saro-Wiwa, an internationally known author. Subsequent 
campaigns to boycott Shell have threatened the company's sales in the United 
States and Europe. Shell has consequently revised its approach to human rights 
and now seeks to proactively address human rights concerns in Nigeria and 
elsewhere (Manby, 1999; Wheeler et al., 2002). 
2.6 Human rights concerns vary by industry 
Although most industries have been associated with some human rights concerns 
(see, e.g., Amnesty International & the Prince of Wales International Business 
Leaders Forum, 2002), extractive and labour intensive industries have been at the 
centre of the debate on business and human rights. The human rights concerns 
encountered by the companies that operate in these two industries have however 
differed. This is important because the nature of the human rights concern may 
affect the way in which companies respond to it. It is therefore possible that the 
approaches that companies assume to address human rights issues vary from one 
industry to another. As seen in Chapter 1, this present research focuses on the 
extractive industries. 
In the labour intensive industries, particularly in the textiles and apparel sectors, 
companies have been linked to human rights violations in the work place 
including the minimum wage, freedom of association, and health and safety issues 
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(Human Rights Watch, 1999; Spar, 1999; United Nations, 2006). The violations 
reflect the important role that labour costs play when companies make decisions 
about the location of their investments and the following unwillingness of 
governments to respect their commitment to international labour standards. This 
phenomenon has been referred to as "the race to the bottom" (e.g., Spar, 1999). 
Accordingly, companies relocate from one country to another in the search oflow 
labour costs, which makes governments unwilling to enforce human rights 
standards that are seen as incompatible with the comparative advantage of 
countries. 
In the extractive industries, companies have often been accused of complicity in 
the human rights violations perpetrated by host governments (OEeD, 2002a; 
Handelsman, 2001: 6; United Nations, 2006). This criticism stems from what is 
seen as a strong relationship between extractive companies and host governments. 
The relationship is strong because companies seek to foster and maintain 
relationships with host government authorities who control the access to natural 
resources that are located in a restricted number of countries (Spar, 1999; 
Winston, 2003). The relationship is also strong because foreign investment by 
extractive companies is in many countries the main source of income for the host 
government (Reed, 2002). As a result, the interests of the companies and host 
governments have been seen to collude and the companies have been associated 
with human rights violations committed by host governments or other connected 
groups. The violations have included forced labour, forcible relocation of people, 
the general repressive nature of the regime, large-scale corruption, and any human 
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rights violations perpetrated by government forces providing security for foreign 
companies (DEeD, 2002a; Handelsman, 2001: 6; United Nations, 2006). 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the role of companies in the protection of 
human rights. It first introduced the concept of human rights and defined human 
rights as the rights listed in the Universal Declaration. It then discussed corporate 
accountability for human rights and described the pressure placed on companies 
to promote and respect human rights. It then examined how human rights 
concerns vary from one industry to another. 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature that is relevant for conceptualising corporate 
approaches to human rights. The chapter unfolds as follows. It is first established 
that little research exists on the ways in which companies have addressed human 
rights concerns. Prior research in the area of business and human rights has 
investigated the impact of foreign investment on human rights rather than the 
behaviours that companies have engaged in to influence human rights. Because of 
the scarcity of research in business and human rights, other bodies of literature are 
also examined. More specifically, research in corporate social responsibility, 
issues management, and stakeholder management are reviewed for exploring how 
issues similar to human rights have been previously framed. Each of these areas of 
research are examined in relation to the three research questions. 
3.2 Business and human rights 
Little research exists on the ways in which companies address human rights 
concerns. The connection between business and human rights has been previously 
investigated from three principal perspectives. First, a number of researchers have 
discussed the developments that have intensified the attention and pressure placed 
on companies with regard to human rights (e.g., Broadhurst, 2000; Cassel, 2001; 
Cragg, 2000; Forsythe, 2001; Spar, 1999). This literature was already reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Second, researchers have studied human rights as ethical principles 
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that should guide corporate behaviour (e.g., Arthaud-Day, 2005; Waddock, 2004). 
This research is not examined here as the focus of the present research is on 
corporate practice rather than the norms that guide or should guide this practice. 
Finally, researchers have investigated the impact of foreign investment on human 
rights and the circumstances in which companies have been associated with 
human rights violations in a particular country (e.g., Idahosa, 2002; Manby, 1999; 
Spar, 1999; Wheeler et al., 2002). It is this last area of research that comes closest 
to examining corporate approaches to human rights, but as will be seen next, even 
then the focus is on the ways in which foreign investment affects the condition of 
human rights rather than on the characteristics of the approaches and behaviours 
that companies can employ to influence human rights. 
Foreign investment has often been seen to have a negative influence on human 
rights in developing countries. Notably, Stephen Hymer argued in 1971 that 
multinational companies ally with repressive regimes to maintain their financial 
dominance and to keep the poorest groups in these countries in a position where 
they cannot challenge the prevailing system. Hymer's argument was supported by 
the behaviour of a number of multinational companies that colluded with 
repressive regimes in the 1970s and early 1980s: United Fruit assisted in 
overthrowing the government in Guatemala, ITT played a role in ousting the 
Allende government in Chile, and several oil and gas companies forged 
relationships with dictatorships in Africa (Spar, 1999). 
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The changes in the scope and nature of foreign investment since the 1970s have 
however made Hymer's argument outdated. Many companies now invest abroad 
in the search of new customers that have sufficient buying power to purchase their 
products. Such companies gain from the economic and social development of all 
segments of the society and Hymer's argument therefore becomes obsolete or 
reversed. (Spar, 1999) Moreover, a number of authors have argued that, in 
general, foreign investment has a positive impact on the condition of human 
rights. Debora Spar (1998, 1999), for example, contends that foreign investment 
in developing countries influences the local environment in a positive way 
because the working standards of Western companies are nearly always higher 
than those of the host country. Positive changes may also result from the public 
scrutiny exercised by human rights activists and the media. 
In contrast to Spar (1998, 1999), a number of case studies on the impact of 
business on human rights suggest that companies need to take special measures to 
ensure that their influence on human rights is positive and even then foreign 
investment may worsen the condition of human rights. Manby (1999), for 
example, concluded on the basis of his study of how Shell and Chevron became 
associated with human rights violations in Nigeria that multinational companies 
need to adopt substantive measures to ensure that their presence enhances the 
respect for human rights. Wheeler et al. (2002) showed that even when companies 
take measures to address human rights concerns, their impact on human rights 
may be negative. Wheeler et al. based this conclusion on their study of the ways 
in which Shell has dealt with its stakeholders in the Ogoni area in Nigeria. They 
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argued that a discrepancy exists between the company's approaches to 
stakeholders at the corporate and local level. Shell has become sensitised towards 
stakeholders and human rights at the corporate level and in some countries in 
response to the public attention placed on its operations and impact in Nigeria, but 
its subsidiary in the country has been unable to successfully engage with local 
stakeholders and carry out community programmes in the Ogoni area. Idahosa 
(2002) went further by arguing that companies cannot make a meaningful 
contribution to development or human rights in the absence of democracy and 
conflict. His argument was based on the analysis of the effect of Talisman Oil on 
human rights violations in Sudan. He concluded that foreign investment can 
provide a repressive government with a reason and financial means to violate 
human rights. 
To sum up, previous research has examined the impact that foreign investment 
has on human rights in developing countries. However, because of the complexity 
of human rights issues and the factors that affect them, "[ w]e do not know what 
really happens to human rights as multinationals invest abroad" (Spar, 1999: 56). 
Existing research suggests that companies need to take special measures to ensure 
that their influence on human rights is positive (Manby, 1999). Even then foreign 
investment may exacerbate the state of human rights (Idahosa, 2002; Wheeler et 
al., 2002). No previous research was found on the ways in which companies have 
sought to address human rights concerns. The present research will therefore 
contribute to the literature on business and human rights by investigating the 
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characteristics and determinants of the activities that companies have assumed to 
influence human rights. 
3.3 Corporate social responsibility: Framing 
business-society relations 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Research in the area of business and society investigates the role and behaviour of 
companies in the context of changing societal demands and expectations. 
Literature in this area is relevant for the present research because it offers 
concepts and frameworks for analysing how companies can deal with issues that 
arise from their external environment. 
This section provides an overview of the business and society field. The section 
starts with the establishment of corporate social responsibility as the central 
concept of the field. The emergence of corporate social responsibility as a 
business concern and an area of research is then briefly described before the 
concept is critically reviewed. In the end of the section, social responsiveness is 
identified as the main area of research to which this present research relates and 
therefore reviewed in more detail than the other areas. 
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3.3.2 Centrality of the corporate social responsibility concept 
The concept of corporate social responsibility has been the main way of 
conceptualising business-society relations (Matten et al., 2001). It was first 
introduced by Howard Bowen in 1953 and has since then served as the focus of 
discussion on the role of business in society. The definitional debate on corporate 
social responsibility peaked in the 1960s and 1970s (Carroll, 1999). Thereafter, 
other related concepts have appeared to capture the attention of the research 
community. In the 1980s, researchers focused on developing the notion of 
'corporate social performance' (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; 
Wood, 1991). In the late 1990s, the concept of 'corporate citizenship' (e.g. Matten 
et aI., 2003; Windsor, 2001; Wood & Logsdon, 2001) emerged to mark the 
renewed interest in the business and society field. However, despite the rise of the 
new concepts, the term corporate social responsibility is still widely used and 
serves as a reference point for the more recently introduced concepts. 
3.3.3 Emergence of corporate social responsibility 
Fist publications on the role of business in society have been traced to as early as 
the 1930s (Carroll, 1999), even though corporate social responsibility became an 
area of concern for companies only in the 1960s (Ackerman, 1975: 6-7; Preston, 
1986; Vogel, 1996; Wood, 1991b). The emergence of the new field reflected the 
increasing pressures placed on companies to assume a greater responsibility for 
correcting the harmful impacts of business operations, a role traditionally 
performed by the society as a whole (Sethi, 1979). Companies, particularly in the 
United States, experienced public scrutiny regarding a variety of issues including 
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the support of repressive regimes in Southern America, discrimination of women 
and other minorities, and product safety (Vogel, 1986). Corporate social 
responsibility was one way in which companies responded to the pressures. It was 
seen as a method of self-regulation different from government legislation and 
individual ethics (Wood & Logsdon, 2001). Two new areas of management 
research consequently developed: business, government, and society; and business 
ethics (Vogel, 1996). The concept of corporate social responsibility has been 
explored in both of these areas. The present study relates primarily to the fonner 
area of business, government, and society as the research questions concern the 
study of corporate policy and practice rather than moral or ethical reflection. 
By the 1980s, governments had introduced legislation on many of the issues that 
had led to the emergence of corporate social responsibility in the 1960s 
(Ackerman, 1975: 9; Marx, 1986; Vogel, 1986; Wood & Logsdon, 2001). At the 
same time, concern for corporate social responsibility seemed to be declining as 
the notion of shareholder value was rising in importance in the era of neo-liberal 
policies promoted by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. During this 
period, uncertainty in the external environment was caused by de-regulation and 
foreign competition rather than social and political demands placed on companies 
(Vogel, 1986). 
If attention on corporate social responsibility was comparatively modest in the 
1980s and early 1990s, many factors have contributed to a renewed interest in the 
topic since the mid-l 990s. This interest has been driven by the demands voiced by 
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civil society groups for the broader distribution of business benefits and corporate 
management of the effects of business operations in society (Warhurst, 2000). The 
demands have been increasingly placed on companies as governments have been 
under pressure to curb their expenses (Matten et al., 2003; Reich, 1998). 
Vulnerable to reputational damage, companies have provided a convenient target 
for pressure groups that have used modem communication technologies including 
the Internet to advocate their arguments (Spar, 1999). 
Henry Mintzberg and his colleagues (2002) view the latest interest in corporate 
social responsibility as a way to criticise the priority given to shareholders at the 
expense of other stakeholder groups. Accordingly, corporate social responsibility 
is about arguing that corporations are not only economic entities; responsible 
companies also seek to contribute to the societies in which they operate. In 
contrast to Mintzberg and his colleagues (2002), Robert Reich (1998) was of the 
view that some recent developments in the area of corporate social responsibility 
endorse the importance given to shareholders. He argued that the movement for 
corporate governance, for example, seeks to ensure that managers act in the 
interest of shareholders rather than an array of stakeholder groups. 
The most recent wave of interest in corporate social responsibility has been 
marked by some new developments. First, the debate is now more about how to 
make substantial commitments rather than whether to make them at all (Smith, 
2003). This shift is illustrated by the concrete and specific initiatives on corporate 
social responsibility including ethical sourcing, social audits, stakeholder 
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dialogue, and listing of companies against socially responsible investing criteria 
(e.g., The Dow Jones Sustainability Index and FTSE4Good). Second, there has 
been an increasing interest in the topic in Europe where not only businesses but 
also governments have engaged in the debate and launched initiatives on 
corporate social responsibility. This is in distinction to the 1960s when corporate 
social responsibility was mainly a North American phenomenon. 
3.3.4 Frustration regarding the lack of a common conceptual 
foundation 
The definitional debate on corporate social responsibility peaked in the 1960s and 
1970s (Carroll, 1999). No commonly accepted conceptual foundation was 
however established during this period. Instead, many researchers felt frustrated 
about the wide and non-specific use of the term. Sethi, for example, noted in 1975 
that "[t]he phrase corporate social responsibility has been used in so many 
different contexts that it has lost all meaning" (p. 58). Similarly, Preston and Post 
(1975) observed that corporate social responsibility seemed to refer to some 
"vague and highly generalised sense of social concern that appears to underlie a 
wide variety of ad hoc managerial policies and practices" (p. 9). Zenisek (1979) 
described the multitude of meanings given to the concept as follows: 
The term means something, but not always the same thing, to just about 
everyone. To some it conveys the idea of legal responsibility or liability; 
to others it means socially responsible behaviour in an ethical sense; to 
still others the meaning transmitted is that of 'responsible for' in a causal 
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mode; many simply equate it with 'charitable contributions'; many of 
those who embrace it see it as a mere synonym for 'legitimacy'; a few see 
it as a sort of fiduciary duty (p. 359). 
As there has been few definitional contributions to the concept of corporate social 
responsibility since the 1970s (Carroll, 1999), the field still suffers from a lack of 
a shared conceptual basis. Clarkson highlighted this weakness in 1995 by stating 
that corporate social responsibility and its related concepts, social responsiveness 
and social performance, "carry no clear meaning and remain elusive constructs" 
(p. 92). As seen before, the conceptual debate has shifted to other related 
concepts such as corporate citizenship. 
Despite the absence of a clear and widely accepted conceptual basis, two themes 
recur in definitions of corporate social responsibility. The two themes are: (1) 
accommodation of corporate behaviour to society's values and expectations and 
(2) the voluntary nature of corporate social responsibility. Even though a variety 
of views have been presented about both themes, they capture much of the 
definitional debate on corporate social responsibility and highlight the essence of 
the concept. 
3.3.5 Accommodation to society's values and expectations 
Already Howard Bowen, who has been acknowledged for providing the seminal 
definition of the modern concept of social responsibility (Carroll, 1999; Wartick 
& Cochran, 1985), defined corporate social responsibility as the accommodation 
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of corporate behaviour with society's values and expectations: "obligations of 
businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those 
lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our 
society" (Bowen, 1953: 6, cited in Carroll, 1999: 270). According to Bowen, 
corporate social responsibility is an obligation that arises from the fact that 
corporate decisions and actions have an impact on the lives of people. Bowen 
argued that because of this impact, companies should conduct their business in 
line with the objectives and values of the societies in which they operate (Bowen, 
1953, cited in Carroll, 1999). 
Similarly to Bowen, other researchers have conceptualised corporate social 
responsibility with reference to society's values, objectives, and expectations of 
business. Carroll (1979), for example, defined corporate social responsibility in 
relation to the different types of expectations placed on companies: "The social 
responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary expectations that society has of organisations at a given point in 
time" (p. 500). In the same way, Zenisek (1979) described corporate social 
responsibility as "the degree of 'fit' between society's expectations of the business 
community and the ethics of business" (p. 362). Wood (1991) similarly argued 
that "business and society are interwoven rather than distinct entities; therefore, 
society has certain expectations for appropriate business behaviour and outcomes" 
(p. 695). Other prominent researchers that have defined corporate social 
responsibility in relation to society's expectations include Murray and Montanari 
(1986), Schwartz and Carroll (2003), and Swanson (1995). 
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In line with these views, Wood provided further clarification on the levels of 
analysis with regard to society's expectations of business in her 1991 review of 
the literature in the area. She argued that expectations can be placed on companies 
at three levels: institutional, organisational, and individual. Accordingly, 
expectations can apply to all companies because of their role as economic 
institutions. Expectations can also be placed on particular companies in relation to 
their sphere of influence and activities. Finally, expectations can pertain to 
individual managers as moral actors. These three levels of analysis will be 
invoked later on in the methodology chapter (see 4.4.1). 
The view that companies should accommodate their behaviour to society's values 
and expectations has been challenged by a number of researchers. Henderson 
(2001), for example, argued that not all demands placed on companies are 
reasonable and well founded. Wartick and Cochran (1985) similarly posited that 
"[b]eing responsive does not necessarily mean the same thing as being 
responsible" (p. 703). Indeed, being responsive to the expectations of certain 
groups can be deemed irresponsible by others as the experience of the German 
companies that complied with the policies of the Nazi regime demonstrates. This 
is why Wood (1991 a) insisted that socially responsible corporate behaviour needs 
to rest on principles that "express something fundamental that people believe is 
true" (p. 695). Companies should hence be responsive to only those expectations 
and demands that are consistent with some commonly recognised moral 
principles. As seen in Chapter 2, human rights standards enshrined in the 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide the most widely accepted list of 
rights and duties in the world. The Declaration can therefore be seen to provide 
principles with which socially responsible companies should comply. 
3.3.6 Nature of corporate social responsibility 
As just seen, despite the perceived lack of common conceptual ground, corporate 
social responsibility is often defined as the accommodation of corporate behaviour 
with society's values and expectations. No consensus however exists on the other 
theme that repeatedly appears in definitions of corporate social responsibility, the 
nature of the behaviour that should be considered as corporate social 
responsibility. The debate pertains to whether corporate social responsibility 
pertains to all corporate activity or only activity that is driven by other than 
economic interests and legal requirements. 
Many prominent researchers are of the view that corporate social responsibility is 
more than seeking profits and complying with the requirements of the law and 
that it therefore concerns the acceptance of voluntary or additional responsibilities 
beyond those motivated by economic interests and the law. Sethi (1975), for 
example, noted that most conflicts between firms and other social institutions 
have arisen from the failure of companies to meet the changing social 
expectations placed on them. He further argued that in order to avoid crisis, firms 
should adapt their behaviour to prevailing norms, values and expectations in 
addition to fulfilling their economic and legal obligations. In the same way, Davis 
(1973) defined corporate social responsibility in what Wood (1991) has called a 
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classic definition as "the firm's consideration of, and response to, issues beyond 
the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm" (p. 312). 
Similarly, McGuire (1963), Sethi (1975), and Jones (1980) asserted that a 
company's social responsibility extends beyond its economic and legal 
obligations. More recently, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) described the scope of 
their research in the area of corporate social responsibility as follows: "[W]e 
define CSR as actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the 
interests ofthe firm and that which is required by law" (p. 117). 
Carroll's popular definition of corporate social responsibility from 1979 is 
inconsistent with the understanding of corporate social responsibility as the 
acceptance of voluntary or additional responsibilities. For Carroll, corporate social 
responsibility does not only concern the study of voluntary activity that he divided 
into ethical and discretionary responsibilities, but also activities motivated by 
economic interests and the law. This view stands in contrast to Davis (1973) and 
others who defined corporate social responsibility as something more than seeking 
profit and complying with existing laws. 
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GRAPH 3.1. Carroll's pyramid of corporate social responsibility 
/\ 
Be a good corporate citizen Discretionary Desired 
Expected Be ethical 
) 
Ethical 
------------------_. 
Legal Required Obey the law 
Be profitable Economic Required 
Sources: Carroll (1991) and Schwartz & Carroll (2003). 
The popularity of Carroll's (1979) four-part definition of corporate social 
responsibility becomes clear in the context of the debates that took place in the 
1960s and 1970s. At the time, a number of scholars made arguments against 
corporate social responsibility (for a summary of the arguments, see Davis, 1973). 
One of the most influential ones was presented by Milton Friedman (1970) who 
asserted that managers should "make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom". This view was interpreted as an argument against 
corporate social responsibility, even though Friedman stated that companies 
should comply with "ethical custom" whilst seeking to make profit. Friedman was 
seen to challenge the idea of corporate social responsibility because he contended 
that the main social responsibility that companies had was the maximization of 
profits (Wartick & Cochran, 1985). Carroll's definition of corporate social 
responsibility addressed this challenge by recognising that profitability is one of 
the social responsibilities of companies, even though there are also others. 
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The distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary corporate action has not 
become a defining feature of the corporate social responsibility concept, which 
may be explained by the success of Carroll's definition in addressing some of the 
arguments made against corporate social responsibility in the 1970s. Many 
researchers have however used it as a starting point in their research. The 
advantage of defining corporate social responsibility as voluntary action is in 
separating corporate social responsibility from other corporate activity. It also 
mirrors the fact that corporate social responsibility issues faced by companies are 
often those that are not codified in law or directly attached to economic 
motivations. 
3.4 Social responsiveness 
As just seen, accommodation of corporate behaviour to society's values and 
expectations has been seen as an important element of the corporate social 
responsibility construct. The development of corporate responses to society's 
values and expectations has been conceptualised as social responsiveness (e.g., 
Carroll, 1979; Sethi, 1975). In what follows, the concept of social responsiveness 
is first briefly discussed. The way in which responsiveness has been included in 
the models of corporate social performance is then examined. In doing so, issues 
management and stakeholder management are introduced as areas of research that 
shed light on how society's values and expectations can be identified and 
responded to. Issues management and stakeholder management are found 
particularly relevant for the present research because corporate approaches to 
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human rights can be seen as processes by which companies identify and respond 
to society's values and expectations in the domain of human rights. 
3.4.1 Concept of social responsiveness 
The concept of social responsiveness appeared in the 1970s to highlight the shift 
in focus from the normative and conceptual study of corporate social 
responsibility to the study of social response processes. Social responsiveness has 
been defined as a process through which corporate behaviour is adapted to 
society's norms, values, and expectations (Sethi, 1975). It has been seen to 
complement the normative concept of corporate social responsibility by adding an 
action dimension to it (Carroll, 1979; Wood, 1991). Wartick and Cochran (1985) 
expressed the difference between the two concepts by describing social 
responsiveness as a verb in distinction to social responsibility that resembles a 
noun. 
In distinction to the researchers who have viewed social responsibility and 
responsiveness as interconnected concepts, Carroll (1979) defined social 
responsiveness as separate from corporate social responsibility. He asserted that 
responsiveness carries "no moral or ethical connotations" that are inherent in 
definitions of corporate social responsibility (p. 502). This disintegration of the 
descriptive concept of social responsiveness from the normative concept of 
corporate social responsibility has been criticised by a number of researchers (e.g., 
Swanson, 1999; Wood, 1991). Swanson (1999), for example, argued that the 
disintegration of the two concepts has led to the segregation of research along 
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normative and descriptive lines. Attempts have been made to connect the two 
concepts to each other. Wood (1991), for example, defined corporate social 
performance as the extent to which a company makes use of processes of 
responsiveness to realise principles of corporate social responsibility. Social 
responsibility and responsiveness can therefore be seen as concepts that are 
inherently interconnected. 
3.4.2 Responsiveness in the models of corporate social 
performance 
Social responsiveness has been included in the models of corporate social 
performance as one of its main dimensions. Corporate social performance models 
organise earlier literature in the area around a variety of themes to provide a 
framework for assessing corporate behaviour against some criteria (e.g., Carroll, 
1979; Sethi, 1975; Swanson, 1999; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991). In 
this context, corporate social responsibility is viewed as a normative concept that 
provides a basis for the evaluation of corporate action and its outcomes and social 
performance can be described in relation to the degree or kind of the processes 
and activities that a company assumes to implement principles of corporate social 
responsibility (Wood, 1991). 
It was Carroll (1979) who first presented responsiveness as an aspect of a 
company's social performance. Carroll defined responsiveness as "the managerial 
processes of response" (p. 502) and identified a number of processes of 
responsiveness that contribute to the degree of a company's overall 
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responsiveness: planning and social forecasting, social decision-making and social 
policy, and organising for social response. The extent to which companies engage 
in these processes and hence social responsiveness can be described on a 
continuum from doing nothing to doing much. 
Similarly to Carroll, Wartick and Cochran (1985) defined social responsiveness as 
"the approach to realising social responsibility" (p. 767) and identified four such 
approaches: (1) reactive, (2) defensive, (3) accommodative, and (4) proactive. 
Wartick and Cochran hence viewed responsiveness as a company's general 
approach towards corporate social responsibility without specifying the actual 
processes and activities involved in responsiveness. Instead, they put forward 
social issues management as the method for operationalising social 
responsiveness. 
Wood (1991) made a further contribution to the concept of social responsiveness 
in her work on corporate social performance. She defined responsiveness through 
three organisational processes that a company can assume to implement corporate 
social responsibility: environmental assessment, social issues management, and 
stakeholder management. Each of the processes involves specific behaviours that 
companies can engage in. 
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TABLE 3.1. Responsiveness in the models of corporate social performance 
Author(s) Definition of responsiveness Categories of responsiveness 
Carroll 1979 Managerial processes of From "do nothing" to "do much" response 
Wartick and Cochran 1985 Approach to realising social Reactive, defensive, 
responsibility accommodative, proactive 
Processes for handling Environmental assessment, Wood 1991 information, people, and Issues issues management, stakeholder management 
Social responsiveness has hence been viewed as an essential component of 
corporate social performance models. There is however a lack of empirical 
research and knowledge about actual corporate behaviours of social 
responsiveness (Clarkson, 1995). Much of the empirical research relating to social 
responsiveness has been carried out in the areas of issues management 
(Ackerman, 1975; Arrington & Sawaya, 1984; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b; Dutton 
& Ottensmeyer, 1987; Greening & Gray, 1994; King, 1982; Mahon & Wartick, 
2003; Wartick & Rude, 1986) and stakeholder management (Clarkson, 1995; 
Hillman & Keirn, 2001; Mitchell et aI., 1997; Post et aI., 2000; Savage et aI., 
1991), which is why the rest of the chapter will focus on reviewing research in 
these two areas. 
3.5 Issues management 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Issues management concerns a company's attempt to detect and produce 
systematic responses to threats and opportunities arising from the external 
environment or from within the organisation. In the issues management literature, 
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important conditions and changes in the environment or inside the organisation 
are conceptualised as issues that a company can identify, assess, and respond to 
(e.g., Greening & Gray, 1994; Johnson, 1983; Mahon & Wartick, 2003; Wartick 
& Heugens, 2003; Wartick & Rude, 1986). Literature on issues management is 
relevant for the present research because human rights concerns can be understood 
as issues that companies anticipate and respond to. 
This section is organised around the three research questions. It proceeds as 
follows. The emergence of issues management as a corporate activity and a field 
of research is first described. The ways in which issues have been characterised 
are then examined for shedding light on how human rights concerns can be 
conceptualised (Research Question 1). Next, research on responses to issues is 
reviewed for exploring how activities that companies carry out for addressing 
human rights concerns can be categorised (Research Question 2). Finally, the 
factors that are proposed to affect the way in which companies respond to issues 
are examined for identifying variables that could determine the selection of the 
activities that companies carry out in response to human rights concerns 
(Research Question 3). 
3.5.2 Overview of issues management 
Issues management appeared in the 1970s as a corporate activity from the 
formalisation of the ad hoc approaches that a number of companies in the United 
States had used to respond to topical society-wide issues of the time. By the early 
1980s, larger companies in more mature industries were most likely to carry out 
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activities that could be regarded as issues management (Wartick & Rude, 1986). 
Some years later, following the recession and the less turbulent external 
environment of the 1980s, issues management was in many companies downsized 
and integrated into more established corporate functions (Wartick & Rude, 1986). 
As a result, the status of issues management is presently fragile both as a 
professional field and a topic of academic study (Wartick & Heugens, 2003). 
The term issues management is to some extent misconceiving because it implies 
that a company someway manages its external environment (Arrington & Sawaya, 
1984; Wartick & Rude, 1986). Issues management "is not intended to be a vehicle 
for creating social change or for controlling societal events" (Wartick & Rude, 
1986: 124), nor can issues be managed to some desired resolution with regularity 
(Arrington & Sawaya, 1984). Rather, issues management is concerned with the 
process of anticipating and contributing to the shaping and resolution of issues 
(Arrington & Sawaya, 1984). 
Research in issues management investigates how companies detect and deal with 
concerns arising from their external environment or from inside the organisation 
(Arrington & Sawaya, 1984; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 
1987; King, 1982; Mahon & Wartick, 2003; Wartick & Rude, 1986). The process 
of issues management has often been conceptualised as the identification, 
analysis, and response to issues (e.g., Greening & Gray, 1994; Johnson, 1983; 
Mahon & Wartick, 2003; Wartick & Heugens, 2003; Wartick & Rude, 1986). 
These three phases correspond to the execution of the practical activities of (1) the 
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scanning of the external environment for identifying issues that may affect the 
company, (2) the interpretation or assessment of issues, and (3) the development 
of a response to selected issues (Wartick & Heugens, 2003). 
The study of issues encompasses strategic issues that have an impact on a 
company's performance or strategy (Anson: 1975; King, 1982; Dutton, 1993; 
Dutton & Duncan, 1987b; Dutton & Jackson, 1987), public policy issues 
demanding collective public policy solutions (Arce1us & Schaefer: 1982; 
Buchholtz, 2003; Eyestone, 1978; Marx, 1986), and social issues representing 
projections of collective sentiments in society (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). The 
term corporate issue refers to all three types of issues. It has been used to 
highlight the focus on companies and managerial decision-making in the study of 
issues (Aram, 1989; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). 
3.5.3 Characterising issues 
Previous research in the area of issues management has focussed on 
distinguishing issues from other developments and conditions in society and 
within organisations. As Wartick and Rude (1986) wrote, "[t]he most fundamental 
question in 1M [issues management] is 'What is an issue?'" (p. 139). Based on a 
thorough review of relevant literature, Wartick and Mahon (1994) argued that the 
issue construct comprises three elements: (1) the impact of issues on the company, 
(2) the controversy surrounding issues, and (3) the expectational gaps between the 
behaviour of the company and the way in which this behaviour is perceived by 
one or more stakeholder groups. In what follows, these three elements and another 
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two issue characteristics stemming from the literature on issue evolution are 
discussed for shedding light on how human rights concerns can be conceptualised. 
It will be seen that extant research in the area of issues management has sought to 
define how issues differ from other phenomena in society; little attention has been 
paid on the issue characteristics that explain the way in which companies respond 
to issues. 
3.5.3.1 Impact on the company 
Issues have been distinguished from more general developments in society or 
within the company by their impact on the company's performance, objectives, or 
strategy (e.g., Ansoff, 1975; King, 1982; Dutton, 1993; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b; 
Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987; Zyglidopoulos, 2003). 
Issues have been defined in this way particularly in the strategic management 
literature (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). It was Igor Ansoff, a well-known author in 
the field of strategic management, who first conceptualised issues in relation to 
their impact on the company. He defined issues as "major environmental trends 
and possible events that may have a major and discontinuous impact on the firm" 
(Ansoff, 1975: 24-25). Accordingly, only some of the many concerns, events, and 
developments in the society demand managerial attention depending on whether 
they are "felt somewhere within the organisation" (Wartick & Mahon, 1994: 295). 
Other researchers have similarly to Ansoff asserted that developments, whether 
internal or external to the company, become issues requiring managerial attention 
when they have a potentially significant impact on the company. King (1982), for 
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example, stressed that strategic issues involve "possible outcomes that are 
important to, or of possible high impact on, the organisation's overall 
performance" (p. 45). More recently, Bigelow, Fahey, and Mahon (1993) stressed 
that issues are developments that affect "an organisation's performance and ability 
to meet its objectives" (p. 18). 
The nature and degree of the impact that issues have on the organisation has not 
been elaborated upon in the extant literature, except for Dutton and Duncan 
(1987b). These authors defined impact through how issues are perceived by 
managers. Accordingly, strategic issues are "internal or external developments, 
events, and trends viewed by decision-makers as consequential to the 
organisation" (p. 104). Dutton and Duncan therefore suggested that it is 
managerial judgement that determines whether societal developments and 
conditions become issues that companies pay attention to. Their definition is 
useful in predicting which issues are taken into account by managers, but it falls 
short in recognising that managers may fail to pay adequate attention to the 
developments that have important consequences for their company. 
3.5.3.2 Controversy arising from expectational gaps 
A number of researchers have viewed controversy as a key element of the issue 
construct. Issues have been associated with a degree of controversy particularly in 
the public policy literature (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). Cobb and Elder (1972 in 
Wartick & Mahon, 1994), for example, defined public policy issues as conflicts 
between two or more stakeholder groups over the allocation of resources. 
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Accordingly, issues arise from seemingly controversial and incompatible demands 
in the context of scarcity. Similarly, Eyestone (1978) explained the emergence of 
public issues as follows: "An issue arises when a public with a problem seeks or 
demands governmental action, and there is public disagreement over the best 
solution to the problem" (p. 3)6. 
In the area of issues management, controversy surrounding issues has been seen to 
stem from inconsistencies between stakeholder expectations and corporate 
behaviour. For example, Post (1978 cited in Wartick & Mahon, 1994) defined an 
issue as "a gap ... between what the organisation's relevant publics expect its 
performance to be and the organisation's actual performance" (p. 283). Similarly, 
Nigh and Cochran (1987) put more emphasis on the role of perceptions in the 
emergence of issues and defined an issue as "a gap between the expectations of a 
stakeholder regarding corporate behaviour and the same stakeholder's perceptions 
of actual corporate behaviour. An issue is thus the difference between 'what ought 
to be' and 'what is' from the perspective of a stakeholder" (p. 6). 
Wartick and Mahon (1994) suggested that the gap between stakeholder 
expectations and corporate performance results from three types of change: (1) 
change in corporate performance, (2) change in stakeholder expectations, or (3) 
change in both corporate performance and stakeholder expectations in such a way 
that a gap between the two widens. A change in stakeholder expectations is often 
6 Public policy issues have been defmed as controversial matters requiring public policy solutions 
(Wartick & Mahon, 1994). They involve multiple stakeholders and a form of collective action that 
may take place within the political system or another public arena (Mahon & Bigelow, 1992 in 
Bigelow et a1. 1993). 
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triggered by some development in society (Nigh & Cochran, 1987), even though 
stakeholder expectations do not necessarily reflect a change in the underlying set 
of societal norms and values (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). Issues, regardless of the 
type of change that underpins them, become more acute as stakeholders begin to 
make their concerns known either in a public forum or by confronting other actors 
and demand for change in order to close the gap between their expectations and 
corporate behaviour (Nigh & Cochran, 1987; Wartick & Wood, 1998: 176). It is 
hence stakeholders who through their actions create issues, a view put forward by 
Reichart (2003). 
There are situations where issues can arise from the expectations of a single 
individual, as noted by Wartick and Mahon (1994) in reference to an example 
presented by Ackerman (1973). Ackerman illustrated his article on social 
responsiveness with an example of a president of a large company who wished to 
close the gap between his public statements on hiring minorities and the actual 
performance of the company in this area. An issue existed because one person, the 
company president, saw a discrepancy between what he believed the company 
should have been doing and its actual behaviour. 
Expectational gaps have been categorised in a variety of ways (e.g., Reichart, 
2003; Wartick & Mahon, 1994; Zenisek, 1979). One categorisation was provided 
by Wartick and Mahon (1994) who organised expectational gaps into three groups 
based on Zenisek's (1979) earlier conceptualisation of gaps. Accordingly, factual 
gaps concern incompatible perceptions of what the company is doing by two or 
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more of the company's stakeholders. Conformance gaps pertain to inconsistencies 
between what a company is doing and what a particular stakeholder believes the 
company should be doing. Finally, ideals gaps entail disagreement between two or 
more stakeholders over how companies should behave. Reichart (2003) later 
noted that the different types of gaps are not mutually exclusive; an issue may be 
underpinned by more than one type of gap. 
TABLE 3.2. Types of expectational gaps 
Gap type Description Focus 
Factual gap What Is v. what Is Facts, as viewed by two or more groups 
Conformance gap What Is v. what should be Conformance, as viewed by one or more groups 
Ideals gap What should be v. what should Ideals, as viewed by two or be more groups 
Source: Wartick and Mahon (1994). 
3.5.3.3 Public attention 
Issues have also been depicted as to the nature and amount of public attention that 
they attract. The fluctuation of public attention has been a particularly important 
variable in the models that depict the evolution of public issues (e.g., Arcelus & 
Schaefer, 1982; Buchholtz, 2003; Marx, 1986). For example, Arcelus and 
Schaefer (1982) identified five stages in the development of public issues. The 
first stage concerns an emerging public awareness of an undesirable state of 
affairs in society. In the second stage pressure groups are formed. In the next stage 
the issue becomes a topic of political debate and receives attention in the policy-
making bodies and the media. In the fourth stage the issue goes through the 
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legislative process. In the fifth and final stage, relevant regulation is imposed on 
companies. Similarly to Arcelus and Schaefer, Buchholtz (1992: 510-511) 
suggested that public issues evolve at stages from issues of little importance to 
issues attracting significant public attention and enactment of legislation or other 
regulation. Buchholtz identified four stages in this process: (1) the changing 
expectations of the public, (2) the political stage where the issue is debated, (3) 
the legislative stage, and (4) the litigation stage. 
Some researchers have presented reservations about the role of public attention in 
issue evolution. These researchers have argued that a decline in public attention 
does not necessary mean that an issue has been resolved (Hilgartner & Bosk, 
1988; Lamertz et al., 2003). Instead, as argued by Hilgartner and Bosk (1988), 
specialised institutions may hold an interest in the issue even when the issue has 
lost its drama and novelty factor that has appeals for certain types of institutions 
(e.g. the media). 
3.5.3.4 Issue speCificity 
Another theme that occurs in the issue development models concerns the 
specificity of the demands placed on companies. Ackerman (1973), for example, 
described the emergence and development of issues in relation to the specificity of 
the links made between a social concern and a particular company. Accordingly, 
in the first phase, a social concern exists without attendant demands connecting it 
to a company. In the second phase, links between the social concern and a 
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company become clearer. In the third and final phase, expectations regarding 
company behaviour are made specific and the probability of sanctions increases. 
In line with Ackerman (1973), Arcelus and Schaefer (1982) described the 
development of issues in four stages in relation to the specificity of stakeholder 
demands. During the public awareness stage, an awareness of an undesirable state 
of affairs in society develops. Demands may be made for change, but they remain 
vague and unspecified. In the next stage, pressure groups are fonned. During this 
stage, the demands made on companies become more specific as groups advocate 
their views and positions. In the political debate stage, the demands become 
increasingly specific through a debate that takes place within political institutions. 
Finally, in the legislative process stage, the demands are addressed through 
concrete regulatory measures. 
Similarly, Ansoff (1973) depicted the development of strategic issues in relation 
to the degree of infonnation that is available for a company on a particular issue. 
This description of the issue life-cycle differs from the ones presented before 
because it focuses on the awareness and knowledge of managers rather than those 
of the actors external to the company. Accordingly, in the beginning of an issue's 
life cycle, managers may sense that some change is about to occur, but they have 
no specific infonnation about the source or type of change available. In due 
course, the source of change becomes clearer and the characteristics of the issue 
begin to crystallise. This stage is followed by the development of corporate 
responses to the issue of which the impact can finally be assessed and computed. 
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To summarise, the specificity of issues has been discussed by a number of 
researchers, but they have taken different positions as to its role in the 
development of issues. Ackerman (1973) described it as the clarity of the links 
made between a company and a particular social concern, whereas Arcelus and 
Schaefer (1982) saw it as the clarity of stakeholder demands. Somewhat 
differently, Ansoff (1973) focused on managers as decision-makers and defined 
specificity as the degree of information that is available for managers about a 
particular issue. 
3.5.4 Dimensions of responses to issues 
Researchers have previously identified a number of dimensions along which 
responses to issues vary. Based on a review of existing literature, these 
dimensions will be discussed under the following four main themes: (1) the 
organisational focus of responses (Ansoff, 1975; Buchholtz, 1992: 508, 510; 
Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Nigh & Cochran, 1987), (2) the response target (Mahon 
& Waddock, 1992), (3) the response magnitude (Ansoff, 1975; Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987) and (4) the approach to the organisational 
environment (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
3.5.4.1 Organisational focus 
Responses to issues can be divided into internal and external responses depending 
on whether they involve activities within or outside the organisation. Accordingly, 
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internal responses are directed at changing the structure of a company whereas 
external responses are aimed at affecting the environment in which the company 
operates (Buchholtz, 1992: 508,510; Dutton & Jackson, 1987b; Nigh & Cochran, 
1987). Responses to issues are typically aggregations of both internal and external 
activities: "A firm's response to an issue needs to be a co-ordinated set of actions, 
some of which may be internally directed while others may be externally directed" 
(Nigh & Cochran, 1987: 9). 
3.5.4.2 Response target 
Responses to issues have also been characterised on the basis of the response 
target. Notably, Mahon and Waddock (1992) divided responses to issues into 
substantial and symbolic action. Accordingly, substantial action involves 
"definitive moves that attempt to actually change or deal with the existing 
situation in specific, identifiable ways" (p. 27). Substantial action therefore 
concerns change in corporate behaviour or an attempt to influence the objective 
conditions that underlie an issue. In contrast, symbolic action pertains to the 
framing of an issue from the viewpoint of the organisation or its key constituents: 
"this is fundamentally a process of reinterpretation of the interpretation of events 
proposed by other actors" (p. 27). Symbolic action is hence concerned with 
affecting the perceptions that stakeholders have about corporate behaviour or 
some other tangible phenomena. 
Similarly to Mahon and Waddock's distinction between substantial and symbolic 
action, Buchholtz (1992: 510) categorised responses into those that aim to impact 
78 
the issue in question and those that attempt to influence stakeholder perceptions 
and expectations. Also Strand (1983) classified responses to social demands into 
four classes that involve either changing the environment or affecting the 
constituent demands placed on them. In the same way, Sethi (1979) classified 
strategies for narrowing the gap between corporate performance and societal 
expectations into four classes that resemble the distinction between substantial 
and symbolic action. Sethi's strategies are presented in the table below. The first 
three of them relate to attempts to influence the perceptions and expectations of 
business performance or what Mahon and Waddock called symbolic action. The 
final and fourth strategy concerns change in corporate behaviour and therefore 
substantial action. 
Table 3.3. Sethi's (1979) strategies 
Strategy Target of strategy 
Education and information Public perceptions of corporate performance 
Changing of symbols used to describe Public perceptions 
corporate behaviour 
-
Education and information Societal expectations 
Change corporate behaviour Corporate behaviour 
The distinction into substantial and symbolic action is also implicit in the way in 
which Dutton and Ottensmeyer (1987) described the main two functions of 
strategic issues management systems in organisations. They argued that, on the 
one hand, strategic issues management can be instrumental in aiding the 
organisation to adapt to its environment. This instrumental function resembles 
substantial action because it involves concrete behaviours aimed at 
accommodating corporate behaviour with the requirements of the external 
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environment. On the other hand, strategic issues management systems can 
perform a symbolic function aimed at forming and communicating meanings to 
different audiences or what Mahon and Waddock called symbolic action. 
The distinction into substantial and symbolic action can also be applied to the way 
in which Nigh and Cochran (1987) categorised responses to issues. They 
identified three distinct responses to issues that differ from each other in terms of 
the substantive or symbolic nature of the action and the arena in which the action 
is assumed. The first response involves altering corporate behaviour for the 
purpose of bringing it in line with stakeholder expectations. Because this response 
type concerns actual changes in corporate behaviour, it can be regarded as 
substantive action. The second response type concerns attempts to influence 
stakeholder expectations so that they are consistent with corporate behaviour; this 
represents symbolic action directed at affecting the views of other parties. The last 
response type pertains to contesting the issue in a public forum. This response 
type also represents symbolic action because it is aimed at influencing the views 
of others. It is distinct from stakeholder influence, the second response type, 
because the behaviour takes place in a specific arena. 
TABLE 3.4. Relationship between expectational gaps and issue responses 
Nature of the gap 
Response 
Source: Nigh and Cochran (1987). 
Expectations 
Debate the issue on 
the public arena 
Perceptions 
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The response types put forward by Arcelus and Schaefer (1982) can also be 
described in terms of substantial and symbolic action. Arcelus and Schaefer 
identified four different responses to issues, first of which pertains to a status quo 
where the company ignores a social demand made upon it. The second response 
type involves a pro-active adaptation to a social demand in the expectation of 
future regulation. This response involves actual changes in corporate behaviour 
and therefore represents substantial action. The third response type concerns a 
public stance on the social demand. With this response strategy, the company 
attempts to influence the evolution of the demand through the public opinion and 
the public policy process. A public stance response pertains to symbolic action as 
it is aimed at influencing the views of other parties about the issue. Finally, the 
company can combine the previous two response approaches to adopt a pro-active 
public stance and react to the social demand before legislation is enacted and, at 
the same time, engage in the public debate about the demand. As a combination of 
the previous two responses, this response type involves both substantial and 
symbolic action. 
Finally, some researchers have only focused on what Mahon and Waddock (1992) 
called symbolic action. Bigelow, Fahey and Mahon (1991), for example, put 
forward four different responses: containment, control, bridging, and influence. 
All of these involve attempts that are aimed at affecting the way in which different 
stakeholders frame a particular issue (see 3.5.5.1 below). Similarly, Husted's 
(2000) four response strategies concern the re-alignment of corporate values or 
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stakeholder expectations and therefore what Mahon and Waddock (1992) 
regarded as symbolic action. 
3.5.4.3 Response magnitude 
In addition to the organisational focus and target of responses, researchers have 
described issue responses as to their magnitude (e.g., Ansoff, 1975; Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987). Dutton and Jackson (1987), for 
example, identified response magnitude as one of the main dimensions along 
which responses to issues vary. They defined it as the extent of changes and 
activities that an organisation needs to take in order to respond to an issue. 
Similarly, Dutton and Ottensmeyer (1987) categorised strategic issues 
management systems on the basis of the scope of relevant activities. Accordingly, 
systems may involve little or considerable effort directed at altering external 
conditions or internal strategy and processes. 
Also Ansoff (1975) classified responses to issues according to what he called the 
response strength. He identified three strategies that can be presented on a 
continuum that depicts responses with regard to their magnitude. The first type of 
strategy that Ansoff labelled the direct response strategy is the strongest as it 
involves external action from the company. The second type of strategy, called the 
flexibility strategy, concerns the positioning of the company in such a way that the 
company's potential for the future is enhanced. This strategy is less strong than the 
direct response strategy because it involves less action. The third and final type of 
strategy is concerned with the collection of information about the organisational 
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environment for the purpose of improving the company's understanding of it. 
Ansoff saw this strategy as the weakest of the three strategies. 
TABLE 3.5. Ansoffs (1975) response strategies 
Direct response strategy 
Strong 
.. 
Flexibility strategy 
Response strength 
Awareness strategy 
Weak 
~ 
Finally, Dutton and Duncan (1987a) identified four response types that can be 
characterised as to their magnitude. The first type involves no responses in a 
situation where an issue is assessed as not urgent and infeasible to resolve. The 
second type concerns opportunistic responses. As the trigger for action stems from 
the feasibility of addressing the issue rather than the issue's urgency, responses 
pertain to opportunity rather than threat and do not entail major changes for the 
organisation. The third response type involves a variety of tactics that vary in their 
strength from coping with the situation to ousting the top management. These 
actions are typical in a crisis where the issue is considered as urgent, but 
infeasible to resolve. The fourth and last response type involves radical changes in 
the organisation's strategy and goals. This response type occurs when the issue is 
regarded as urgent and feasible to settle. The four response types put forward by 
Dutton and Duncan can be seen to vary as to the extent of changes and activities 
they imply. 
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3.5.4.4 Approach to the organisational environment 
Responses to issues have also been characterised as to the general approach that 
the organisation has towards its environment. Notably, Daft and Weick (1984) 
identified four interpretation modes that characterise the way in which 
organisations interpret their environment. The modes are based on two variables: 
(1) management's beliefs about the analysability of the external environment and 
(2) the extent to which the organisation intrudes into the environment to 
comprehend it. Daft and Weick associated the four interpretation modes to the 
strategy types proposed by Miles and Snow (1978): prospector, analyser, 
defender, and reactor. Accordingly, when the management assumes that the 
environment is unanalysable and the organisation has a passive approach to 
organisational intrusiveness, the organisation reacts to changes in the environment 
rather than takes initiative. Second, when the management regards the 
environment analysable and the organisation is passive about intruding its 
environment, the company is a defender that is concerned with maintaining its 
markets and focuses on efficiency within the organisation rather than on external 
relationships. Third, when the management perceives the environment as 
unanalysable and actively intrudes the environment, it becomes a prospector that 
sees the environment as opportunities and takes initiative with regard to the 
changes in the environment. Finally, when the management views the 
environment as analysable and actively intrudes its environment, it is an analyser 
that focuses on its core activities, occasionally taking initiative regarding the 
environment on the basis of careful assessment. 
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TABLE 3.6. Relationship between interpretation modes and strategy formulation 
Unanalysable Mode: Undirected viewing Mode: Enacting 
Assumptions Strategy: Reactor Strategy: Prospector 
about 
environment 
Analysable Mode: Conditioned viewing Mode: Discovering 
Strategy: Defender Strategy: Analyser 
Passive Active 
Organisational Intrusiveness 
Source: Adaptedfrom Daft & Weick (1984). 
3.5.5 Variables affecting responses to Issues 
Previous research suggests that diverse variables affect which activities 
companies carry out in response to issues. In what follows, these variables are 
reviewed in three groups: issue related variables, organisational factors, and 
institutional pressures. 
3.5.5.1 Issue related variables 
Nature of the expectational gap 
Some researchers (Husted, 2000; Nigh & Cochran, 1987) have suggested that 
responses to issues are affected by the nature of the gap that underlies issues 
because "[ d]ifferent types of gaps require different types of managerial responses" 
(Nigh & Cochran, 1987: 8). The responses put forward by Nigh and Cochran 
(1987) are based on a distinction between issues that arise from stakeholder 
expectations and those that emerge from stakeholder perceptions. A wider variety 
of responses are available for addressing issues that stem from stakeholder 
expectations than those arising from stakeholder perceptions. 
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In the same way, Husted (2000) argued that expectational gaps that underpin 
issues determine the strategy that companies assume in response to issues. More 
specifically, Husted suggested that there is a connection between expectational 
gaps as defined by Wartick and Mahon (1994) and issue strategy as 
conceptualised by Thompson and Tuden (1959). For example, companies assume 
a discovery strategy to respond to issues which arise from the expectational gaps 
that are based on incompatible perceptions over ''what is". The different types of 
expectational gaps and corresponding issue strategies are illustrated in the table 
below. 
TABLE 3.7. Connection between expectational gaps and strategy towards issues 
Expectational gap Issue strategy Specification of strategy 
Nonissue Computation Routine monitoring for the opening I-0fc:!oygaps 
What Is v. what Is Discovery Search for solutions to achieve .c:!gr~~.c:!.~_u p9.r:!_goaJ~ 
Re-alignment of corporate 
What is v. what should be Inspiration behaviour to expectations by 
.ql!~~tJQDll19...Q!(ty_aJlJes 
What should be v. what should be Bargaining Re-alignment of expectations throuoh neootlation 
Source: Husted (2000). 
Husted's assumption that responses can be connected to specific expectational 
gaps has been criticised. According to Reichart (2003). Husted ignored that issues 
may involve more than one gap: "[I]t might be difficult to see how some of these 
strategies and structures can symbiotically exist". 
Issue evolution stage 
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A number of researchers (Arcelus & Schaefer, 1982; Buchholtz, 1992; Bigelow, 
Fahey & Mahon, 1991; Marx, 1986) have described responses to issues in 
connection to the stage an issue occupies on the issue life cycle. They therefore 
imply that the issue evolution stage has an impact on the response a company 
assumes to address an issue. 
In general, researchers have suggested that a company's discretion to affect an 
issue decreases as the issue evolves and interpretations and positions are adopted 
by the interested parties (Ansoff, 1975; Bigelow, Fahey & Mahon, 1991). 
Companies therefore face a paradox when responding to issues: if they wait until 
adequate information is available, they have less discretion in planning and 
undertaking their responses than if they had acted upon vague information. 
Researchers have offered different solutions to this paradox. Ansoff (1973), for 
example, was of the of view that that at the early stage of issue evolution, 
responses should be relatively unfocused and aimed to increase the flexibility of 
the company to deal with the issue later on when more information becomes 
available. Arcelus and Schaefer (1982) proposed that earlier responses should be 
altered and more concrete responses formulated as issues move on along the life 
cycle from a high degree of uncertainty to a situation where government imposed 
regulation may be pending. 
Bigelow, Fahey and Mahon (1991) suggested a slightly different connection 
between issue evolution and responses to issues. They put forward four types of 
responses based on a conceptualisation of the phases of the issue life cycle. At the 
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emergence of an issue where the issue is still vaguely defined, the most 
appropriate response strategy is containment which is aimed at either preventing 
the further escalation of the issue or controlling the evolution of the issue towards 
a particular resolution. At the interpretation phase where different actors assign 
the issue with meanings, an issue is best dealt with by controlling the way in 
which different stakeholders frame it. At the positioning phase where 
stakeholders' stances on the issue become clear, a company should aim to bridge 
the interest gaps among the most important stakeholders. Finally, at the resolution 
stage, a company should use its influence to reach a solution that is desirable to it. 
In a later article, Bigelow et al. (1993) noted that companies may need to employ 
different response strategies simultaneously in order to deal with stakeholders that 
may be at different stages of the life cycle at a particular point in time. 
TABLE 3.8. Stages and responses to issues 
Issue evolution stage Response strategy 
Emergence Containment 
t------ _. __ ._---- -----------
Interpretation Control 
Positioning Bri~~~9_ 
Resolution Influence 
Source: Adaptedfrom Bigelow. Fahey and Mahon (1991). 
To summarise, the issue evolution stage has been argued to affect responses to 
issues. Typically, the issue life cycle is divided into separate stages and each stage 
is linked to a particular response strategy. Researchers generally assume that 
companies can exert most influence on issues at the early stages of issue 
evolution. Also, responses are expected to be more specific or focused at the later 
stages of issue evolution. 
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Interpretation of issues 
A number of researchers (Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton, 1993; Dutton & Duncan: 
1987a; Dutton & Jackson, 1987) have linked the interpretation of the 
developments in the external environment to the actions carried out by companies 
in response to these developments. Argued Daft and Weick (1984): "Almost all 
outcomes in terms of organisation structure and design, whether caused by the 
environment, technology, or size, depend on the interpretation of problems or 
opportunities by key decision makers. Once interpretation occurs, the organisation 
can formulate a response" (p. 293). Accordingly, the way in which issues are 
interpreted affects how companies respond to them because "different 
interpretations of issues engage different individual and collective processes for 
dealing with them, resulting in different organisational outcomes" (Dutton, 1993: 
340). What is more, the range of alternative interpretations over an issue and the 
scope of managerial discretion diminish as issues evolve (Mahon & Waddock, 
1992). 
The process of translating interpretations into action has been described by Dutton 
and Jackson (1987) as follows. Individuals first attach meanings to some selected 
developments in society or within the organisation by assigning linguistic labels 
to them. Linguistic labels denote categories that organise physical and social 
objects into groups. For example, Dutton and Jackson argued that the label 'threat' 
has been used by decision-makers in business organisations to imply "a negative 
situation in which loss is likely and over which one has relatively little control" (p. 
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80). The resulting action relates to the attributes of the category. For example, 
"[t]he low control implied by the threat label should lead decision makers to focus 
attention on changing internal organizational processes in order to adapt, because 
internal activities are easier to access and manipulate" (p. 83). Dutton and Jackson 
stressed that in order to study the process of translating interpretations into action, 
the actual categories used by decision-makers to assign meanings to issues need to 
be identified. They also argued that issue interpretations are affected by the 
structure and culture of the organisation to which individuals making the 
interpretations belong; this is why interpretations and subsequent actions differ 
among organisations. 
Daft and Weick (1984) provided further clarification on the way in which 
interpretation of environmental conditions and developments affects strategy 
formulation within organisations. They argued that two dimensions explain 
differences in how organisations make interpretations of their environment: (1) 
management's beliefs about the analysability of the external environment and (2) 
the extent to which the organisation intrudes into the environment to comprehend 
it. Based on these two dimensions, Daft and Weick put forward a model of four 
interpretation modes and strategy types as already discussed before (see 3.5.4.4). 
Dutton and Duncan (1987a) offered another set of propositions about 'how 
interpretation affects responses to issues. They argued that responses to issues 
vary on the basis of the assessments that managers make about the urgency and 
feasibility of taking action. Based on the assessments, they identified four types of 
organisational responses to strategic issues can be identified; these responses are 
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portrayed in the table below (see also 3.5.4.3). Dutton and Duncan also proposed 
that the assessments that managers make about urgency and feasibility are 
affected by organisational beliefs and resources. 
TABLE 3.9. Urgency and feasibility of organisational responses 
Assessment of 
urgency Low 
High 
Assessment of feasibility 
Low 
No responses 
Coping, ousting responses 
Source: Dutton and Duncan (1987a). 
High 
Opportunistic responses 
Reorienting responses 
In summary, researchers have suggested that the ways in which changes and 
conditions in society and within the organisation are interpreted translate into 
particular responses to issues. The way in which issues are interpreted is however 
affected by the organisational context in which the interpretations are made. From 
this follows that responses between organisations vary and that managers 
belonging to the same organisation tend to make similar decisions about how to 
respond to an issue 
3.5.5.2 Organisational factors 
In addition to issue characteristics, organisational factors have been argued to 
affect the way in which companies respond to issues. Responses to the same issue 
should therefore vary among organisations. Ideologies (Meyer, 1982), structures 
(Meyer, 1982), organisation of the issues management function (Wartick & Rude, 
1986), corporate strategy (Arcelus & Schaefer, 1982), top management 
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commitment (Greening & Gray, 1994), and size (Greening & Gray, 1994) have 
been proposed to affect issue responses. 
Research conducted by Meyer (1982) suggests that reactions to issues are affected 
by organisational ideologies and structures. Meyer studied organisational 
adaptation to environmental jolts defined as "transient perturbations whose 
occurrences are difficult to foresee and whose impacts on organisations are 
disruptive and potentially inimical" in 19 hospitals that encountered an 
unexpected doctor's strike (p. 515). His analysis suggested that organisational 
ideologies defined as sets of beliefs shared among people about cause-and-effect 
relations determine the way in which jolts are perceived. In particular, hospitals 
according importance to environments, fostering strategic reorientations, 
embracing organisational change, valuing member's capabilities, and encouraging 
participation had the smallest amount of decline in measures for performance after 
the doctor's strike. Moreover, Meyer found that organisational structure may 
constrain responses to environmental jolts. For example, a divisionalised structure 
localised the impact of the doctor's strike whereas in a functionally structured 
hospital the effects of the strike were felt throughout the organisation. 
In addition to organisational ideologies and structure, the organisation of the 
issues management function has been found to affect responses to issues. Wartick 
and Rude (1986) established in their study of eight companies in the United States 
that in companies where the issues management function was a separate unit, the 
focus of the issue management function was externally orientated and strategic. 
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By contrast, in companies where the issues management function was integrated 
into the public relations department, issues management concerned internal 
communication rather than external activities. Even though the number of 
companies studied was low, these findings suggest that the administration and 
organisation of the issues management function affect whether companies engage 
in internal or external activities in response to issues. 
Further, corporate strategy has been related to responses to issues. Arcelus and 
Schaefer (1982) argued that "[t]he selection of responses to social demands cannot 
be made in isolation from other strategic decisions facing the firm" (p. 352). 
Similarly, Dutton and Duncan (1987b) argued that responses to issues can only be 
understood in the context of strategic issues facing the organisation. 
Finally, in their study of 103 companies, Greening and Gray (1994) found a 
relationship between the development of the issues management function and two 
organisational factors: company size and the commitment of the top management. 
They discovered that larger companies are more likely to have formal issues 
management structures and to assign resources to issues management. Moreover, 
organisations where the top management was committed to issues management 
were likelier to formalise the issues management function. Greening and Gray 
based their hypothesis on the positive relation between organisation size and 
issues management structures on resource dependency theory which suggests that 
large organisations have more resources to alter their environments than smaller 
organisations. This argument also applies to a connection between company size 
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and external responses to issues, even though Greening and Gray focused on 
internal issues management structures. 
3.5.6.3 Institutional factors 
Besides issue-related and organisational factors, researchers have examined the 
impact that institutional factors have on how companies respond to issues. 
Greening and Gray (1994) examined the relationship between three institutional 
factors and the development of companies' issues management structures in their 
study of 103 companies: issue-related media exposure, interest group pressure, 
and the severity of the crises experienced. They found no support for the 
relationship between media exposure and the development of issues management 
structures. In contrast, they found some support for the relationship between 
developed issues management structures and the two other variables, interest 
group pressure and the severity of crises. Even though the research focused on 
issues management structures, the findings suggest that organisations that 
experience interest group pressure and issue-related crises are likely to take action 
in response to issues. 
3.6 Stakeholder management 
3.6.1 Introduction 
In this section, literature on stakeholder management is examined to shed further 
light on the three research questions. Research in stakeholder management is 
pertinent for the present research because it conceptualises the way in which 
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companies take action with regard to society's values and expectations, including 
those related to human rights. 
Like the previous section on issues management, the following section is 
organised around the three research questions. A brief overview of stakeholder 
theory and management is first provided. The stakeholder concept is then 
examined for understanding how it has been used to frame society's values and 
expectations of which human rights are an example (Research Question 1). Next, 
the nature and type of action that companies have been proposed to take in 
response to stakeholder pressures are reviewed for exploring the ways in which 
activities that companies assume to address human rights concerns can be 
categorised (Research Question 2). Finally, the factors that have been suggested to 
affect the ways in which companies respond to stakeholder pressures are 
discussed for understanding what explains the selection of activities that 
companies assume in response to human rights concerns (Research Question 3). 
3.6.2 Overview of stakeholder management 
The stakeholder concept was popularised by Freeman in his landmark book, 
Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach published in 1984. Freeman 
defined stakeholders as individuals or groups of individuals who can affect or are 
affected by the achievement of an organisation's objectives (p. 46). According to 
Freeman, "[s]takeholders include employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, 
banks, environmentalists, government and other groups who can help or hurt the 
corporation" (Freeman, 1984: vi). A number of researchers in the business and 
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society field had already earlier considered the role of constituent groups in the 
management of organisations. Johnson (1971: 50 cited in Carroll, 1999: 273), for 
example, defined responsible corporate behaviour as follows: "A socially 
responsible firm is one whose managerial staff balances a mUltiplicity of interests. 
Instead of striving only for larger profits for its stockholders, a responsible 
enterprise also takes into account employees, suppliers, dealers, local 
communities, and the nation". Jones (1980) similarly asserted that companies have 
an obligation to their constituent groups including customers, employees, 
suppliers, and communities. Freeman conceptualised these groups as stakeholders 
that have similar interests with regard to a company. 
Stakeholder theory is concerned with the processes and outcomes of stakeholder 
relationships for both the company and its stakeholders (Jones & Wicks, 1999). It 
posits the company as a hub of relationships between stakeholders. Freeman 
(1984: 25, 58) initially portrayed these relationships as two-way influence 
between the company and particular stakeholder groups although he recognised 
that stakeholders are interconnected and that coalitions of stakeholder groups may 
emerge to help or oppose a company on a particular issue (see Graph 3.1). More 
recently, researchers have viewed stakeholder relationships as more complex and 
interrelated, not just a collection of one-to-one relationships between the company 
and its various stakeholders (Key, 1999; Post et aI, 2002; Rowley, 1997). As seen 
in Graph 3.2, the company can therefore be regarded as part of a stakeholder 
network in which the company's position in the centre of the net is not taken for 
granted (Rowley, 1997). In this network, each stakeholder possesses its own 
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stakeholders and relationships may exist between the company's vanous 
stakeholders. In the field of management studies, the focus is on companies as 
entities through which diverse actors pursue multiple purposes that may not 
necessarily be congruent (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Research in the area has 
focussed on managerial decision-making (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Hill & Jones, 
1992; Jones & Wicks, 1999) although it has also included the study of the 
behaviour of stakeholders other than the company (e.g., Frooman, 1999) and the 
examination of the entire network of relationships between stakeholders without a 
particular emphasis on the role of the company or the manager (e.g., Rowley, 
1997). 
GRAPH 3.1. The company and its stakeholders according to Freeman (1984) 
Firm 
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GRAPH 3.2. Company in a network of stakeholder relationships according to 
Rowley (1997) 
Stakeholder theory has been viewed as a normative rather than explanatory or 
predictive theory of management. Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued in their 
influential article that because there is no guarantee that managers consider 
stakeholder interests other than those of critical stakeholder groups, stakeholder 
theory is mainly a normative theory that promotes the consideration of all 
stakeholder interests because of the intrinsic value that each stakeholder 
possesses. Key (1999) further argued that because stakeholder theory has not been 
able to identify the causal laws that explain relationships between stakeholders, it 
mainly has descriptive and prescriptive value. Also Clarkson (1995) and Jones 
and Wicks (1999) view stakeholder theory as mainly a normative theory. 
The stakeholder concept has been advanced in a number of research fields. First, it 
has been presented as a theory of the firm. Donaldson and Preston (1995), for 
example, saw stakeholder theory as an alternative to the neoclassical theory of the 
firm. According to them, companies have conventionally been viewed as 
organisations that managers control for the benefit of the owners or as black boxes 
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that transform inputs provided by investors, employees, and suppliers into outputs 
for the benefit of customers. In stakeholder theory, companies are in contrast 
presented as organisations "through which numerous and diverse participants 
accomplish multiple, and not always congruent, purposes" (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995: 70). Other researchers have sought to integrate stakeholder theory with 
other theories of the firm. Freeman and Evan (1990), for example, combined the 
contractual theory of the firm with stakeholder theory. They argued that modem 
business organisations are series of multilateral contracts among stakeholders: 
"the interests of a multiplicity of stakeholders interact to form the modem 
corporation". Similarly, Hill and Jones (1992) incorporated the stakeholder 
concept into agency theory to present the firm as a nexus of contracts between 
stakeholders and managers. 
Stakeholder theory has also been advanced as an alternative approach to strategic 
management (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Post et al., 2002). Researchers in this field 
have argued that in contrast to other theories of strategic management, stakeholder 
theory takes into account the social and political environment in which companies 
operate (Post et al., 2002). This is important because in addition to the company's 
base of resources and competitive position within a particular industry, strategic 
threats and opportunities arise from the claims and expectations placed on the 
company by various social and political actors. It is therefore the management of 
relationships with critical stakeholders, in conjunction with the accumulation of 
conventional assets, that determines the company's capacity to survive and create 
wealth in the long term (Post et aI., 2002). The stakeholder view provides 
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managers with a framework that allows them "to more effectively handle 
turbulent external environments" (Freeman, 1984: 8). 
Finally, within the business and society field, stakeholder theory has been 
advanced as an increasingly popular way of conceptualising corporate social 
responsibility (e.g., Carroll, 1991; Clarkson, 1995; Whetten et aI., 2002; Wood & 
Jones, 1995). Carroll (1991: 43), for example, saw "a natural fit between the idea 
of corporate social responsibility and an organisation's stakeholders". More 
recently, Clarkson (1995) made an argument for approaching corporate social 
responsibility as stakeholder management on the basis of a 10-year research 
programme. Clarkson used both Carroll's (1979) and Wartick and Cochran's 
(1985) models of corporate social performance to organise and analyse the data 
that he had collected through empirical research. He found that the models did not 
provide clear categories under which he could have classified the empirical 
material because the models "were not grounded in the realities of corporate 
practice" (p. 97). Clarkson found that corporate social responsibility could be 
better analysed through the relationships that companies had to different groups in 
society. He also found that managers understood the concepts of stakeholder 
management whereas they "do not think or act in terms of the concepts of 
corporate social responsibilities and responsiveness, nor of social issues and 
performance" (p. 98). 
This current research is primarily concerned with stakeholder theory as the 
process of stakeholder management by which managers reconcile the objectives 
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of a company with the claims and expectations of various stakeholder groups 
(Alkhafaji, 1989: 104; Carroll, 1991; Post et al., 2002). Stakeholder management 
encompasses the identification and analysis of stakeholders and the development 
of strategies on how to deal with different stakeholder groups (Carroll, 1991; 
Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Post et al., 2002). In practice, it 
involves ''the development and implementation of organisational policies and 
practices that take into account the goals and concerns of all relevant 
stakeholders" (Post et al., 2002: 9). Relatively little research however exists on the 
policies and practices relating to stakeholder management. Research in the area 
has rather centred on the development of the stakeholder concept and the 
identification and classification of stakeholders and their influence on companies 
(Andriof & Waddock, 2002). 
3.6.3 Characterising stakeholders 
Stakeholder theory is underpinned by the assumption that society's values and 
expectations of business can be framed through the stakeholder concept. It is 
assumed that the values and expectations are expressed by stakeholder groups that 
are composed of individuals with similar interest in a particular company 
(Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Key, 1999). In spite of the 
important role that stakeholder interests are seen to play in the definition and 
categorisation of stakeholders, they have rarely been analysed in further detail. 
Freeman (1984: 60-63) is one of the few authors who examined stakeholder 
interests or expectations in any detail. He grouped stakeholders by their interest 
into three categories that can be placed on a continuum from having an equity in a 
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company to being a stakeholder that is being affected by the organisation's 
operations. He positioned a middle category between these two extremes to 
capture market-based interests other than those based on equity. 
TABLE 3.10. Nature of stakeholder interests 
Equity 
E.g. owners 
Source: Freeman (1984). 
Market 
E.g. 
customers, 
suppliers 
Kibbitzer 
E.g. 
government 
Freeman (1984: 92-95) also defined interests as effects that can be grouped into 
technological, social, political and managerial effects. The effects can be 
understood as the effect that a particular stakeholder has on the company, but also 
as effects that the company has on the stakeholder. The purpose of the 
classification is to underscore that stakeholders may have other than their main 
interests in organisations. For example, a consumer advocate may have other than 
economic interests in the company even thought these other interests are less 
important than the primary interest. 
A variety of groups including shareholders, employees, customers and suppliers 
are typically identified as stakeholders. They are often divided into groups on the 
basis of their salience for a particular organisation. The distinction between 
primary and secondary stakeholders, for example, is based on how essential a 
stakeholder group is for the achievement of the organisation's objectives (e.g., 
102 
Clarkson, 1995; Savage et al., 1991). Primary stakeholders are stakeholders 
without whose participation an organisation would cease to exist. Such 
stakeholders include employees, shareholders, and customers. Secondary 
stakeholders are individuals or groups that are not essential for a firm's survival. 
They are not engaged in transactions with the firm, but may still be in a position 
to interfere with and damage a company's business. These groups include 
competitors and the media. (Clarkson, 1995) 
In an influential article, Mitchell et al. (1997) went beyond the basic 
categorisations of stakeholders and offered a range of criteria for narrowing down 
the universe of stakeholders and determining the salience of different stakeholder 
groups. Mitchell et al. proposed that three stakeholder attributes as perceived by 
managers characterise stakeholders and their salience for a company. The three 
attributes are: (1) the stakeholder's power to influence the organisation, (2) the 
legitimacy of the stakeholder's relationship with the organisation, and (3) the 
urgency of the stakeholder's claim on the organisation. The three attributes are 
socially constructed and vary over time and circumstances. The possession of one 
or more of the attributes determines the type of the stakeholder and its salience to 
a particular organisation. A highly salient stakeholder possesses all three attributes 
and a nonstakeholder holds none of them. Stakeholders may gain and loose in 
attributes and therefore become more or less salient for a firm. Based on statistical 
tests, Agle et al. (1999) later confirmed the positive relationship between 
stakeholder attributes and the degree to which managers prioritise stakeholders as 
described by Mitchell et al. (1997). 
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Stakeholders have also been categorised with regard to different theoretical 
approaches to strategic management. Post et al. (2002) divided stakeholders into 
three groups based on the "three dimensions of the strategic setting" (p. 9). The 
first group stems from the resource-based view and involves what Post et al. call 
the company's resource base. This group includes three stakeholder groups: 
investors, employees, and customers. These groups constitute the company's core 
stakeholders. The second group relates to the company's position in relation to its 
competitors within a particular industry and market. This group of stakeholders 
includes business partners, unions, and regulatory authorities. The third and final 
group springs from the stakeholder view and comprises stakeholders in the 
company's social and political environment including governments, communities, 
and private organisations. Any stakeholder in any of the three groups may be the 
most critical one at a particular time or on a particular issue. 
In addition to the categorisations of stakeholders on the basis of their salience, a 
distinction has been made between social and non-social stakeholders (e.g., 
Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997: 168). The non-social stakeholders include the 
physical environment, nonhuman species, and future generations and they differ 
from social stakeholders because they cannot be communicated with directly 
(ibid.). Non-social stakeholders can be considered through groups that advocate 
issues that relate to these stakeholders. Such issues include climate change and the 
protection of wildlife. 
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Previous research has hence focussed on categorising stakeholder groups and their 
importance to companies rather than the issues that may be of concern to 
stakeholders: "little has been done to identify which stakeholder interests should 
be attended to and what managers should do to address them" (Berman et aI., 
1999: 488). This focus reflects the assumption that society's values and 
expectations are expressed through stakeholders and that is therefore stakeholders 
and relations with them rather than issues that companies should manage (e.g., 
Clarkson, 1995). More research is needed on the type of issues that become 
critical in relations between stakeholders and companies and the ways in which 
companies can address these issues. 
3.6.4 Strategies and activities involved in stakeholder 
management 
Researchers have emphasised the relational nature of stakeholder management 
(e.g., Andriof & Waddock, 2002; Post et aI., 2002; Savage et al., 1991; Wheeler & 
Sillanpaa, 1997: 168). Accordingly, the development and maintenance of 
stakeholder relationships is essential for successful stakeholder management, and 
organisations should develop capacity for doing this (Savage et aI., 1991). Little 
research has however been carried out on the resources and competences required 
for interacting with stakeholders, although Freeman (1984: 73) broadly defined 
stakeholder management capability as the organisation's understanding of its map 
of stakeholders, the processes of dealing with these stakeholders, and the 
transactions which take place between the organisation and its various 
stakeholders. Researchers have instead identified various strategies that 
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companies can pursue with regard to groups of stakeholders (e.g., Friedman & 
Miles, 2002; Harrison & St. John, 1996; Rowley, 1997; Savage et aI., 1991). 
These strategies are generic in the sense that they do not specify the exact nature 
of the attached activities. For example, collaboration, a strategy suggested by 
Savage et al. (1991) may involve an array of arrangements from informal and 
occasional information sharing to profit-seeking ventures with considerable 
investment from the parties. 
As will be seen, the stakeholder management strategies put forward by different 
authors share few characteristics except that they can be described with regard to 
the degree of involvement with stakeholders. Some of the strategies assume a high 
degree of cooperation with stakeholders whereas others are characterised by the 
avoidance of interaction with stakeholders. 
Savage et at. (1991) proposed four different strategies for managing stakeholders. 
These strategies are essentially generic approaches that organisations can have 
towards a particular stakeholder on a particular issue. The four strategies are: (I) 
involvement, (2) monitoring, (3) defence, and (4) collaboration. Involvement 
concerns the inclusion of stakeholders into decision-making and other activities in 
organisations. Monitoring refers to the monitoring of particular stakeholder 
groups for ensuring that their interests do not conflict with those of the 
organisation. Defence involves the reduction of the dependence that constitutes 
the stakeholder's interest in the organisation and collaboration refers to 
partnerships and other collaborative ventures established between the organisation 
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and the stakeholder. Selection between strategies is detennined by the 
stakeholder's potential for threat and opportunity to the organisation (see 3.6.5.1). 
Harrison and st. John (1996) suggested that companies can choose from two basic 
postures to manage stakeholder relationships. One posture involves the buffering 
of the company from environmental uncertainty through traditional stakeholder 
management techniques that are aimed at stabilising and predicting environmental 
changes. These techniques include market forecasting and public relations efforts. 
The other posture pertains to bridging or boundary-spanning that companies can 
use to increase their control over the activities of the stakeholder with the 
overriding objective of reducing environmental uncertainty. Harrison and St. John 
called these activities proactive partnering techniques. The posture that the 
company should employ depends on the role that the stakeholder plays in 
influencing environmental uncertainty (see 3.6.5.1). 
Friedman and Miles (2002) suggested in reference to Archer (1995) that 
companies can engage into four types of behaviour with regard to a particular 
stakeholder. First, they may defend a relationship they have to a stakeholder. 
Second, they may behave opportunistically to fonn a relationship to a stakeholder. 
Third, they may seek a compromise to reconcile interests that diverge. Finally, 
they may seek to eliminate a stakeholder with which they compete in some way or 
with which their interests conflict. The behaviours depend on the nature of the 
relationship between the organisation and a stakeholder and the compatibility of 
their interests (see 3.6.5.2). 
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Finally, Rowley (1997) identified four roles that companies may have in a 
network of relationships between stakeholders: (1) compromiser, (2) commander, 
(3) subordinate, and (4) solitarian. Unlike the strategies and postures described 
before, the roles do not relate to any particular stakeholder relationship; instead, 
they characterise the general role that a company tends to have vis-a.-vis its 
stakeholders. A compromiser negotiates with stakeholders for an arrangement that 
satisfies all parties; a commander attempts to control stakeholder behaviours and 
expectations; a subordinate complies with established nonns and expectations of 
stakeholders with more power; and a solitarian avoids stakeholder pressures 
through buffering and concealing. The four roles are detennined by the density of 
the stakeholder network and centrality of the company in the network (see 
3.6.5.3). A company may therefore exist in several stakeholder networks and have 
a different role in each of them depending on the two variables. 
In addition to generic stakeholder management strategies, researchers have 
examined a number of more specific tools involved in stakeholder management. 
These include stakeholder audits depicting the organisation's stakeholders and its 
current strategies and practices for managing relationships to these stakeholders 
(Freeman & Gilbert, 1987; Wheeler & Sillanpiiii, 1997: 170), stakeholder surveys 
aimed at mapping out the opinions of particular stakeholder groups (Wheeler & 
Sillanpaa, 1997: 172), and stakeholder consultation or dialogue as a process by 
which the organisation engages with its stakeholders to exchange views with them 
(Wheeler & Sillanpaa, 1997: 171). 
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3.6.5 Variables affecting the selection of strategies and 
activities 
Researchers have identified a number of variables that affect the selection of 
stakeholder management strategies. These variables can be divided into three 
groups: (1) stakeholder attributes, (2) nature of the stakeholder relationship, and 
(3) characteristics of the network of stakeholder relationships. As will be seen 
below, most of the variables are stakeholder attributes. This mirrors the focus of 
extant research on the characteristics and classification of stakeholders. 
3.6.5.1 Stakeholder attributes 
A number of researchers have identified the relative power of the stakeholder as a 
variable that affects the way in which companies approach stakeholder 
relationships (Freeman & Gilbert, 1987; Frooman, 1999; Hill & Jones, 1992; 
Mitchell et aI., 1997; Rowley; 1997; Savage et aI., 1991). Stakeholder power has 
been defined in diverse ways. Freeman and Gilbert (1987) identified three sources 
from which stakeholders derive their power. Formal power stems from the power 
of certain stakeholders to affect corporate policies and behaviour. Investors have 
such power because they can, for example, cast their vote in the election for 
corporate directors. Also government has formal power to regulate corporate 
behaviour. Economic power concerns the ability of customers and suppliers to 
influence the company's performance. Political power derives from the civil 
society where groups express and forward their interests. Rowley (1997) defined 
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power in relation to the network structure and the company's position in the 
network whereas Mitchell et al. (1997) defined it as to the extent to which the 
company can impose its will in the company-stakeholder relationship. 
In addition to power, a number of other stakeholder attributes have been argued to 
affect the way in which companies manage relations to stakeholders. Savage et al. 
(1991) argued that strategies for managing stakeholders should be based on two 
assessments: (1) the stakeholder's potential to threaten the organisation and (2) 
the stakeholder's potential to cooperate with the organisation. These assessments 
depend on the stakeholder's control of resources needed by the organisation, 
power, likelihood of taking action, and likelihood of forming a coalition with 
other stakeholders. Savage et al. did not examine these stakeholder attributes 
further, but they identified four types of strategies that companies can employ for 
managing stakeholders (see 3.6.4). 
TABLE 3.11. Typology of stakeholder management strategies 
Stakeholder's potential for threat to the organisation 
Stakeholder's 
potential for High 
cooperation with the 
organisation 
Low 
Source: Savage et al. (1991). 
High Low 
Collaborate Involve 
Defend Monitor 
Harrison and St John (1996) regarded environmental uncertainty as a key 
determinant of stakeholder management strategies because they viewed 
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stakeholder management as a way through which uncertainty can be controlled, at 
least to a certain degree. Because stakeholders can increase and reduce 
environmental uncertainty, the selection of stakeholder management strategy is 
affected by on the one hand, the contribution of the stakeholder to environmental 
uncertainty and, on the other hand, the ability of the stakeholder to influence 
environmental uncertainty. Moreover, in addition to the stakeholder's relationship 
to uncertainty, the way in which companies approach particular stakeholders is 
affected by the importance of these stakeholders for the company's general 
strategy. 
Finally, Rowley (1997) argued that individual stakeholder relationships cannot be 
used as a basis for developing theory that predicts corporate responses to 
stakeholder pressures because companies respond to the multiple influences 
stemming from the entire net of stakeholder relationships. He argued that the way 
in which companies respond to stakeholder pressures depends on the variation of 
two factors: (1) the density of the stakeholder network surrounding the 
organisation (see 3.6.5.3 below) and (2) the centrality of the company in this 
network. Rowley defined centrality as the extent to which the company can 
control the flow of information between different stakeholders. He argued that the 
company's ability to resist stakeholder pressures increases as the company's 
centrality in the stakeholder network becomes higher. 
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3.6.5.2 Nature of the stakeholder relationship 
Friedman and Miles (2002) suggested in reference to Archer (1995) that strategic 
actions taken by organisations and their stakeholders depend on two variables that 
characterise relations between the two: (1) the compatibility of interests and (2) 
the nature of the connections between organisations and their stakeholders. 
Friedman and Miles gave two values for both of the variables. Interests can be 
compatible or incompatible. For example, the interests of shareholders and the 
organisation are typically compatible because the top management is expected to 
manage the organisation in the interest of the shareholders. Connections between 
organisations and their stakeholders can be necessary or contingent depending on 
whether the two parties recognise that a formal relationship exists between them. 
If both parties recognise that such a relationship exists, the connection is 
necessary. If it is not recognised or only exists momentarily in special 
circumstances, the connection is contingent. Based on the two variables, 
stakeholder relations can be grouped into four categories, as can be seen in the 
table below. Each category corresponds to a particular type of strategic action (see 
3.6.4). 
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TABLE 3.12. Nature of stakeholder relationships 
Connections between stakeholders 
Stakeholder 
interests 
Compatible 
Necessary 
~: 
Shareholders 
Top management 
Partners 
Compromise: 
Trade unions 
Contingent 
Form relations: 
The general public 
Companies connected 
through trade aSSOCiations 
Eliminate: 
Some NGOs 
Incompatible Customers Aggrieved/criminal members 
Suppliers of the public 
Some NGOs 
Source: Friedman and Miles (2002). 
3.6.5.3 Characteristics of the stakeholder network 
As seen before, Rowley (1997) argued that one of the variables that affects the 
way in which companies respond to stakeholder pressures depends on the 
variation of the density of the stakeholder network surrounding the organisation. 
Rowley defined density as the number of ties that link actors in a stakeholder 
network. The maximum number of ties can be calculated on the basis of the total 
number of ties that exists if each actor in the network is tied to every other actor. 
Rowley argued in reference to earlier research that as network density increases, 
the ability of stakeholders to constrain the company's actions increases as the ties 
between stakeholders result in shared behavioural norms and communication links 
that can be used to monitor the company's behaviour. 
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3.7 Relationship between issues management and 
stakeholder management 
Issues management and stakeholder management can be seen as somewhat 
alternative approaches to how society's values and expectations are framed. In the 
issues management literature, society's values and expectations are conceptualised 
as issues that companies can anticipate, assess, and respond to. The focus is on 
issues that may involve various stakeholders. In the literature on stakeholder 
management, more emphasis is put on relations to stakeholders and it is 
stakeholders who represent and express society's values and expectations of 
business. The quality of relationships to particular stakeholders and the overall 
network of stakeholder relations is taken into account in decisions about particular 
issues. 
Over time, the focus has shifted from issues management to stakeholder 
management that has become increasingly popular among business and society 
scholars following the publication of Freeman's book on the stakeholder approach 
to strategic management in 1984. Indeed, the role of stakeholders has been 
considered so central in the development of issues that some researchers believe 
that the main challenge for issues management is "to bring a more coordinated, 
proactive, and sustained approach to the management of an organisation's 
relationships with its stakeholders" (Nigh & Cochran, 1987: 4). 
Many researchers regard issues management and stakeholder theory as 
complementary rather than alternative ways of identifying and addressing 
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society's values and expectations. Researchers in both fields have sought to 
establish links between the issue and stakeholder concepts. Freeman (1984), for 
example, viewed the identification and prioritisation of issues for each stakeholder 
group as an essential element of stakeholder analysis (p. 113-114) and Carroll and 
Buchholtz (1999: 616-617) saw the mapping of the groups that are or may get 
involved with issues as an important aspect of issue analysis. There is still some 
disagreement about where the focus of analysis should lie. Savage et al. (1991), 
for example, argued that the relevance of stakeholders for the organisation is 
issue-specific and that the willingness and opportunity of stakeholders to act 
relates to particular issues. Conversely, Wood (1991) put the focus on the 
stakeholder concept by arguing that stakeholder management emphasises the role 
of actors, whereas issues management focuses on assessing the various interests of 
these actors. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter reviewed literature that is relevant for conceptualising corporate 
approaches to human rights. It was first found that little research exists on the 
ways in which companies have addressed human rights concerns. Prior research in 
the area of business and human rights has investigated the impact of foreign 
investment on human rights rather than the behaviours that companies have 
engaged in to influence human rights. Because of the scarcity of research in the 
area of business and human rights, literature on corporate social responsibility, 
issues management, and stakeholder management were also reviewed for 
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exploring how issues similar to human rights have been framed. It was found that 
literature in issues management and stakeholder management are particularly 
relevant for the present research because corporate approaches to human rights 
can be seen as processes through which companies identify and respond to social 
issues and stakeholder demands. Previous research in issues management and 
stakeholder management therefore provide useful insight for examining each of 
the three research questions as summarised in Table 3.13. 
TABLE 3.13. Summary ofliterature review 
Variable Author(s) 
RQl What characterises human rights issues? 
Issue attributes 
--r------------------- --------------- -Ansoff, 1975; King, 1982; Dutton, 
Impact on the company 
1993; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b; 
Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Dutton & 
Ottensmeyer, 1987; Zyglldopoulos, 
1---____________________ -+-=2-=.00=..,3=-:-_=---:-_ _____ _ ____ . __ 
Nigh & Cochran, 1987; Reichart, 
Controversy arising from an 2003; Wartick & Mahon, 1994; 
~e-xp-e-c-ta-t-io-n-a-l -ga-p--------_+~z~e~n~.i ,s~ekl 1979 ____ _ 
Public attention Arcelus & Schaefer, 1982; 
___ ._ .. __ . ______ ...... __ ._._. ___ ._. ___ . __ .. ____ .. ""_ ... ____ ..... __ .... __ .~.l,!f.b.bg.I.~z/ ..... ~QQ~.; ~ .. ~I.~., .... 1 ~ .. ~~L .. _.. .... . .... _ 
Issue specificity Ackerman, 1973; Arcelus and 
f..-________ +-_____________ + Schaefer 1982; Ansoff, 1971 
Interest Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & 
Stakeholder attributes f-- .....f.~stq!!.'-..!.2~~i.... . .K.ey L) 999 
Salience Mitchell et aI., 1997 '--___ . __ .. _____ , _______ .. ____ . ___ . _____ .. __ ... ______ L. ___ . __ ._ __ _ _ .. _. __ ......... __ ._ .. __ . 
f 
RQ2 What distinguishes the different strategies that companies have developed to manage 
human rights concerns? 
... . . --r---- --"--'--".-... - .. - .... -]BuChholtZ-: 1992: 508, 51C); Dutton 
Organisational focus & Jackson, 1987b; Nigh & Cochran, 
1--.... __ ._ .. _ ....... ______ ... _ .... __ ._ .. _ ... _ .. _ .. _ ........ _ .... _ .. _. ___ ... --._-...... - ... J,51~...?_ .. _ ... _ .. _ ....... _ .. -........... ..-..... .. .. - ..... -......... - .- ... . 
I Response magnitude Ansoff, 1975; Dutton & Jackson, 
I t 1987j Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987 
ssues managemen Arcelus & Schae fer, 1982; -
Response target 
Buchholtz, 1992; Dutton & 
Ottens meyer, 1987; Mahon & 
Waddock, 1992; Nigh & Cochran, 
_ ...... _ .. __ .. _ .. _ ...... ____ .... ____ .. _ .. __ .. __ .... ____ ............ __________ ........ _ ... _._._ .. _.!~!:l.ZL_?.~!h.i l . .1_9.L9. ; ... ~!.r.qrlq l _19~3 i .. _ .. . 
Degree of involvement with Friedman & Miles, 2002; Harrison & 
Stakeholder theory takeholders St. John, 1996; Rowley, 1997; 
.... _ .. ___ ._._. __ . _______ .. __ = ____ .... ____ .... _ ... _._._ .. ___ ."". ____ .. _ ... __ ._ .. _ ... _.__ .. _._L.?.!'l...Y.A9~_._E!...t aJ .,) 9.9..1 _ ... ..... _ 
RQ3 What explains the selection of strategies? 
--.. ------- -=~ec~~~~na~~a-;-- ------~-l~~\ed~ ~~~o ; N"lgii-& COCh!an~~-
l Arcelus & Schaefer, 1982; Issue characteristics Issue evolution stage Buchholtz, 1992; Bigelow, Fahey & Mahon 1991 ' Marx 1986 -;;t~rpr~~~-tio~-.. ------------I-Daft-& 'weick: 1984; Dutton, 1993;-' 
Dutton & Duncan : 1987a; Dutton & 
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............... _-_._---
Jackson, 1987 
--
Ideology Meyer, 1982 
Approach to organisational Daft &. Weick, 1984 I-~DY..i.~QD .. r:D.~.Q.~ .. ___ .. _____ . _____ .. __ .... _ .... ... _._-_._ ... __ . __ .. _._ ..... _ ...... _ .... __ .. ,-_ .. _ .. _ .. ..-__ . 
Structure Meyer, 1982 
Organisational factors Organisation of the issue Wartick &. Rude, 1986 r!Di:!!.lE.g~I')l~D..v.!:l.!lc:tJ9n 1--------- ............. - ........ ---.--
Corporate strategy Arcelus &. Schaefer, 1982; Dutton&' 
_P .. lJrlf~rl.I_.!.~.~z.1:> 
... -
Top management commitment Greening &. Gray, 1994 
--_._-----------
Size Greening &. Gray, 1994 
. _ .. __ ._--_. __ ._-_ ... _._--.... -_ ..... - ... -.. ....... -,"" .. _ ......... _" .......................... _._ ........... -.... __ ... _ ... _.-... _ .... --" ............... _ ....... 
Institutional factors 
Interest group pressure Greening &. Gray, 1994 
Severity of the crisis Greening &. Gray, 1994 
.... _._-_ ..... __ ...... __ ._ ... __ ._._ ............ __ ..... _---
Freeman &. Gilbert, 1987; Frooman, 
Power 1999; Hill &. Jones, 1992; Mitchell et 
Stakeholder attributes al., 1997; Rowley; 1997; Savage et 
......,...._.- -
~!.!l..1.2.9..t ___________ 
Influence on environmental Harrison &. St John, 1996 
. unc:~r!a.l!1ti 
-----
.. 
Density of stakeholder network Rowley; 1997 
Centrality of company in the Rowley; 1997 
Stakeholder network stakeholder network _: ................................................ _ ................................ _--_ ..... _ ..... _---_ ....... _ ... _ ............ _ ...... -.......... _-_.-... _ .. _ .. __ ........... _ .... __ .... _ .. _._ ....................... 
Connections between stakeholders Friedman &. Miles, 2002 
--_ .._._----
Compatibility of stakeholder interests Friedman &. Miles, 2002 
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4 Research design and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology that was used to investigate the research 
questions. The chapter is organised as follows. The reasons for adopting a case 
study research design are first explained. The components of the research design 
are then introduced before the unit and sub-units of analysis, case selection 
criteria, and the cases selected for the research are presented. The data collection 
and analysis methods are then described. The chapter concludes with the 
discussion of the generalizability, reliability, and validity of the research findings. 
4.2 Justification for case study design 
Case studies have been found particularly useful for developing theory in new 
areas of research (Eisenhardt, 1989). As seen in the literature review, the role that 
companies play in the promotion and protection of human rights has been 
examined at a general level and through a small number of case studies, but no 
systematic model has yet been developed to categorise and explain the policies 
and behaviours that companies engage in to address human rights concerns. The 
topic of the present research can therefore be seen as a new area of research, 
suitable for the case study method. 
The case study method is distinguished from other research strategies because it 
lets the researcher to focus on the context that may be pertinent to the 
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phenomenon under examination (Yin, 1994: 13). This openness to contextual 
factors seems particularly suitable for the business and society field in which 
topics are typically broad in nature and evade proxy measures and the 
development of narrow constructs (Post, 1990: 90). Similarly to other topics in the 
business and society field, corporate approaches to human rights are likely to be 
influenced by a variety of political, social, and economic conditions that can be 
investigated through a case study research design. 
4.3 Research design 
The adopted research design is a combination of the procedures suggested by Yin 
(1994) and Eisenhardt (1989) for building theory from case study research. The 
main difference between the processes put forward by these two authors relates to 
the role of theoretical propositions in the research design. Eisenhardt argued that 
in order to reduce bias stemming from theoretical expectations, the researcher 
should avoid reviewing previous literature prior to data collection and analysis. In 
contrast, Yin recommended the formulation of theoretical propositions before data 
collection so that the propositions can be used to focus and guide the gathering of 
data (1994: 21,28). 
The design of the present research followed Yin's (1994: 21, 28) suggestion of 
using theoretical propositions or similar theoretical devices in theory generation. 
A clean theoretical slate advocated by Eisenhardt was not even attempted as the 
research was underpinned by the assumption that any research is susceptible for 
bias stemming from human subjectivity (see Mintzberg, 1979). This bias was 
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reduced and made transparent through the validity and reliability measures 
discussed in section 4.8 below. 
Instead of research propositions, themes were identified for facilitating the 
collection and analysis of data. Themes are looser topics than theoretical 
propositions and they typically evolve as data is being interpreted. They may be 
based on previous literature or arise from the examination of the cases (Ryan & 
Bernard, 2000; Stake, 1995: 20). In this present research, major themes were first 
derived from the research questions and used to guide the review of previous 
literature and collection of data. Minor themes were then generated from the 
analysis of data and examined in relation to the concepts and frameworks 
identified in the literature review. The research design therefore followed the 
procedures suggested by Yin (1994). 
The research design consisted of the following five components: (I) formulation 
of the research questions and the definition of the 'case', (2) literature review, (3) 
data collection, (4) data analysis, and (5) interpretation of the research findings in 
relation to previous literature. These components are outlined as sequential steps 
involving specific activities in Table 4.1 below and discussed in greater detail in 
the remaining of the chapter. As will be seen, the research did not proceed one 
step at the time; instead, it involved moving back and forth between different 
steps. 
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TABLE 4.1. Outline of the research design 
Step Activity 
Formulation of research questions and • Formulation of research questions 
• Definition of the 'case' and units of analysis definition of the case 
• Establishment of case selection criteria 
-,----,-,--,-"'---,-,,-""---
• Exploration of how similar topics have been Literature review conceptualised before 
-
• Semi-structured interviews 
Data collection • Document review 
• Observation 
~' _____ '_" __ ''''''' __ ''_M __ . 
"' 
• Iterative coding and development of themes through Data analysis the comparison of cases and previous literature 
• Identification of contribution to different areas of 
Interpretation of the findings literature 
• Comparison with conflicting literature 
• Comparison with similar literature 
4.4 Case definition and selection 
The way in which the case is defined determines the focus and boundaries of case 
study research. It also has implications for the generalizability of the research 
findings as discussed later in section 4.7. In what follows, the case is defined 
through the identification of the main and sub-units of analysis. The number of 
cases examined and case selection criteria are then discussed in reference to 
relevant literature on qualitative research. 
4.4.1 Units of analysis 
This present research concerns the organisational level of analysis as defined by 
Wood (1991). She argued that corporate social responsibility and performance can 
be examined at three levels of analysis: institutional, organisational, and 
individual. The institutional level pertains to all firms by virtue of their role as 
economic institutions and the study of the role and impact of business in society 
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(e.g., Preston & Post, 1975; Sethi, 1975). The organisational level, and the level of 
this research, concerns particular firms and their activities. Research at this level 
examines firms as organisations that exist in a specific environment (e.g., 
Ackerman, 1975; Clarkson, 1995; Fischer et aI., 2003; Graafland et al., 2003; 
Kapelus, 2002; Sethi, 1979; Werre, 2003). The individual level focuses on 
managers as moral actors and decision-makers. This level of analysis is based on 
the assumption that the values of managers have an impact on the organisation 
and that managers can exercise discretion in their decision-making (e.g., Swanson, 
1999). 
The main unit of analysis was defined as the policies and activities carried out in 
response to human rights concerns in a country in which the government is 
unable to secure the respect for human rights or itself perpetrates human rights 
violations. The policies and activities are often referred to as the company's 
approach to human rights. The focus is on the policies and activities of a single 
company even though business operations in the extractive sector are typically 
joint ventures consisting of an operator that is responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the venture and a number of other companies holding an interest 
in the project. The analysis centres on the operator of the joint venture as the 
organisational entity that has a presence in a particular country and is therefore 
likely to carry out activities targeted at addressing human rights concerns. 
However, because some of the other joint venture partners may also take action to 
attend to human rights issues, their policies and behaviour are also examined. 
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Nonetheless, the policies and activities adopted by the operator of the joint 
venture remain the principal unit of analysis. 
The sub-units of analysis in this research pertain to categories of data rather than 
theoretical categories (for a distinction of categories, see Ragin, 1987: 7). The 
sub-units were derived from the three research questions to direct the collection 
and analysis of data. They are: (1) activities employed by companies to address 
human rights issues, (2) human rights issues addressed by these activities and (3) 
factors that affect the selection of the activities. Taken as a whole, the sub-units of 
analysis are assumed to constitute a company's overall approach to human rights. 
A research design that includes sub-units of analysis has been referred to as an 
embedded case study in distinction to a holistic case study in which the global 
nature of the case is examined (Yin, 1994: 41-42). The pitfall of embedded studies 
is the possible shift of focus from the main unit of analysis to the sub-units of 
analysis (Yin, 1994: 44). In this research, a conscious effort was made to move 
the analysis from the level of sub-units of analysis to the main level of analysis for 
considering the whole of a company's policies and activities in the area of human 
rights after particular instances were identified and explored. This analytical move 
is described as part of the process of data analysis in section 4.6 below. 
Most definitions of the unit of analysis concern boundaries of time (Yin, 1994: 
24). In this research, no time boundaries were set at the outset of the research. 
Instead, the period of study was determined through the investigation of the 
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activities that the case study companies had assumed to address human rights 
issues in a particular country until the end of year 2003. Even though the 
emergence of issues can be rarely related to a particular event or point in time, the 
development of each activity and issue was traced back in time as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. Consequently, the research became to cover a period of fourteen years 
from 1989 to 2003 for Total and Premier Oil in Myanmar and a period of seven 
years from 1997 to 2003 for Talisman and Lundin in Sudan. 
FIGURE 4.1. Period of study 
( Issue 1 J 4l1li----- Activity 1 
( Issue 2 J ... 1IIIf------- Activity 2 
( Issue n J .l1li----------- Activity n 
1989 2003 
4.4.2 Number of cases 
Researchers have held differing views on the ideal number of cases that should be 
studied for building theory. The main thrust of the discussion has been on whether 
a single case is preferable to mUltiple cases. A number of researchers, including 
Stake (1978) and Dyer and Wilkins (1991), have advocated the use of a single 
case. These researchers are of the view that the central aim in case study research 
is to describe the dynamics of the research topic in such a way that the reader 
understands the operation of a construct in a social context. Providing such an 
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understanding requires a rich description of the research topic through the telling 
of stories that are typically long and detailed. 
In contrast to the proponents of the single case study design, a number of key 
authors in case study research have preferred the use of multiple cases for 
developing theory. Yin (1994: 38-40, 45), for example, argued that the evidence 
from multiple cases is more persuasive than from a single case. According to Yin, 
a single case study design should only be adopted when the case is critical for 
testing a theory, in some way unique, or particularly revelatory providing an 
opportunity to study something that has been previously inaccessible to scientists 
(Yin, 1994: 45). Similarly to Yin, Eisenhardt (1989) preferred the use of more 
than a single case. She was of the view that with less than four cases, it may be 
difficult to build theory that is convincingly founded on empirical evidence. In an 
article written in response to Dyer and Wilkins (1991), she argued that a multiple 
case study design makes the elimination of chance associations easier and enables 
the researcher to generate more elaborate theory by triangulating propositions 
(Eisenhardt, 1991). Researchers have also argued that multiple cases are useful for 
developing theory on topics that are particularly complex (Amaratunga & Baldry, 
2001). 
In line with Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994: 36), a multiple rather than a single 
case study design was adopted for this present research for the purpose of 
developing more elaborate theory through the comparison of cases. However, due 
to the complexity and sensitivity of the topic, only two cases were examined in 
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depth. Two further cases were investigated to check the validity of the findings, as 
suggested in the literature on case study research (Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 
2000). Examples of all four cases are still given throughout the following three 
chapters that present the findings of the case study analysis. 
4.4.3 Case selection 
The companies selected for the research met the following three criteria: 
(1) they operated in the extractive industries, 
(2) they had sought to address human rights concerns in a particular 
country, and 
(3) data about their behaviour was available from diverse sources so that it 
could be corroborated. 
The first criterion reflects the focus of the research on the extractive industries. As 
seen in Chapter 2, companies operating in different industries have encountered 
different types of human rights issues, and since the nature of the issue may affect 
the way in which it is addressed, approaches to human rights may vary by 
industry. The second criterion on studying only companies that have sought to 
address human rights issues in a particular country was adopted for including 
cases that are critical for generating theory on corporate approaches to human 
rights. Such a purposive case selection criterion has been recommended by a 
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number of researchers (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Silverman, 2000: 102; Yin, 1993: 
33-34). The third and final criterion was employed to improve the quality and 
validity of the data by ensuring that corroboration of data acquired from different 
sources was possible, as suggested by a variety of researchers (e.g., Denzin, 1978: 
291; Jick, 1979; Yin, 1994: 92). 
Two cases were consequently selected: Total and Premier Oil approaches to 
human rights in Myanmar. Premier Oil was initially selected because access to the 
company became available at the early stages of the research. It is usual, though 
not ideal, to select cases on the basis of access (Silverman, 2000: 102). In this 
research, access to information was a major consideration in the selection of cases 
because of the sensitivity of the topic. Total was selected because it also operates 
in Myanmar and because a relatively large amount of information from different 
sources was available about the company's policies and activities in the country. 
The examination of the approaches of two different companies in the same 
country environment allowed the study of the impact of organisational factors on 
corporate approaches to human rights. For verifying the validity of the findings 
based on the analysis of corporate behaviour in one country, the approaches of 
two other companies operating in another country were investigated. These two 
further cases were however researched in less detail than the main cases (see 
Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster 2000). All four cases are listed in Table 4.2. 
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TABLE 4.2. Case study countries and companies 
Country Company 
Myanmar Total 
Premier Oil 
Sudan Talisman Energy 
Lundin Oil/Lundin Petroleum 
4.5 Sources of data 
One key characteristic of case study research is the use of multiple sources of 
evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hamel, 1993: 45, 1994: 13, 91; Yin, 1994: 79). Yin 
(1994: 79-80), for example, listed six sources of evidence for case study research: 
documentation, archival records, interviews, participant observation, direct 
observation, and physical artefacts. Three of these sources were used in this 
research: document material, semi-structured interviews, and observation. The 
evidence used for the main two cases is summarised in Table 4.3 below. 
A significantly larger amount of document material was available on Total than 
Premier Oil. As can be seen from the table below, in addition to the material also 
available on Premier Oil, information about Total's activities in Myanmar was 
accessible through (1) Myanmar-focused publications produced by the company, 
(2) court documents on the Doe v. Unocal case which concerns human rights 
violations allegedly carried out by the Myanmar army in furtherance of the 
Yadana project operated by Total, and (3) several reports by independent 
organisations about the impact of Total on human rights in Myanmar. This 
imbalance in the amount of document material was compensated by observation 
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and interviews at Premier Oil. Because data was viewed as a way to learn about 
human experience rather than the object of analysis, it was possible to analyse 
evidence obtained from different sources in the same way (see section 4.6 below). 
TABLE 4.3. Main sources of data for Total and Premier Oil 
Type of data Total Premier Oil 
Document material 
--General company 
J'_ubli~~nons Annual reports 1989-2003 Annual reports 1989-2003 
Corporate Social Responsibility Corporate Social Responsibl'iity 
Reports Reports 
?QQ?_IJr._~Q3 _. .._?QQ.! ... ~.?Q9~. _____ ._,._,_._._,_, ___ 
Myanmar-focused A report about the Yadana project 
..J1.!!l:llications In Myanmar 2002 
Total's website dedicated to its 
oper<!9.9nS in Myan.I!I .. <!r 
-._--", 
Internal company The company's CSR management 
~.ocuments ~Y~~~I!L?QQ;! 
.-Doe v. Unocal case material Court documents 1996-2003· 
Reports by independent 
Reporton-ihe situation in the 
pipeline area by Commission for 
organisations JU.~~~_~.E_I'!.~ .. E~.!'-~~J.QQ~ '.M _____ "_._M. ______ ._. __ . 
Report on the role of French 
companies abroad by a French 
!.'<!r!i.<! l!I~n~a':Y. _~QI!II!II~?iC?Q_.!~Q9..~_ ._--_ .. _._ ........... _---_ ... _ .......... _._ ... _ .... 
Reports on Total's operations in 
Myanmar byJ:OA 2002~Q03c 
Report on the role of Total in 
Myanmar by Bernard Kouchner 
?QQ3 
Jean du Rusquec Richard Jones 
Head of mission in CSR manager 
Myanmar 7 February 2003, & 
Interviews 22 January 2004, & 11 August 2003 
10 December 2003 Tom Sorrell Consultant to Premier Oil By Marion Cohend 
--
_ ... l3.$~pt~I!!P~r... .. ?QqJ. .. _______ 
CSR Committee meetings 
Observation nfa 30 November 2001 14 March 2002 
23 May 2002 
A case was filed against Total and Unocal In a Californian court for human rights violations In Myanmar. 
More than 70, 000 pages of documents were subsequently delivered to the court. 
b The report Includes Information on Total's operations In Myanmar based on transcripts of Interviews with 
Total staff. 
C Collaboration for Development Action (CDA) was commissioned by Total to examine the company's Impact 
In Myanmar. It has Interviewed more than 100 people In Myanmar Including Total staff, government 
officials, and villagers from the pipeline area. 
d Interviews were conducted by Marlon Cohen, a French journalist, for Terra Nova, a French non-profit 
organisation. They were checked by the Interviewee before being published. 
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4.5.1 Data and method triangulation 
As recommended by authors on qualitative and case study research (e.g., Denzin, 
1978: 291; Jick, 1979; Yin, 1994: 92), data and method triangulation were 
performed when possible with the purpose of obtaining a better understanding of 
the research topic. Data triangulation involved the search of additional evidence 
for the corroboration of research findings. For example, in order to verify the 
accounts of particular interviewees, further evidence was sought from other 
interviews, document material, or observation notes. Method triangulation 
concerned the corroboration of research findings by the use of data obtained 
through other data collection methods. Denzin (1978: 302) referred to this type of 
triangulation as between-method triangulation. It is employed to ensure that the 
research findings reflect the object of study rather than a particular method (Jick, 
1979). 
A number of inconsistencies were identified in the data through data and method 
triangulation. The analysis of the inconsistencies often led to clear progress in the 
development of concepts and theory. For example, the conflicting views that 
different actors have had about the human rights situation in the region in which 
Total and Premier Oil operate in southern Myanmar implied that human rights 
issues do not only involve concrete circumstances but also perceptions about these 
circumstances - a central distinction in the proposed model. 
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4.5.2 Document material 
A variety of documents were obtained for examining the cases. They can be 
grouped into five categories according to their source: (1) material by the case 
study companies, (2) reports by organisations commissioned by Total to 
investigate its impact in Myanmar, (3) court documents on the Doe v. Unocal 
case, (4) reports and other material by non-profit organisations on the role and 
impact of Total and Premier Oil in Myanmar, and (5) official documents by 
government and inter-governmental bodies on Myanmar. Each category is 
discussed in more detail below. The focus is on the material used to examine the 
main two cases: Premier and Total in Myanmar. 
Company documentation 
A variety of documents produced by the case study companies were examined. 
The annual reports of both companies were analysed from the year they entered 
Myanmar in 1989 until 2003. In general, the annual reports of Total provide little 
information on the operations in Myanmar whereas some of Premier Oil's reports 
- particularly the one from 2000 when the United Kingdom government asked the 
company to consider withdrawing from the country - contain information on the 
company's investment and reasons for staying in Myanmar. In addition to annual 
reports, the companies' corporate social responsibility reports were examined; 
both companies had published two such reports by 2003. These reports contain 
useful information on the companies' policies and activities in Myanmar. Total's 
report on the Yadana project and website on Myanmar operations were also 
reviewed (Total, 2002d; Total, 2003b). The latter was launched only in 2003; it 
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still provides detailed infonnation about incidents and activities in Myanmar from 
Total's viewpoint. Finally, internal documents on Premier Oil's corporate social 
responsibility management system were examined. These documents shed light on 
the company's overall policies and procedures in the area of corporate social 
responsibility, but provide little insight on the situation in Myanmar. 
Reports by external organisations 
A number of reports published by organisations that have visited the pipeline area 
as guests of Total were also examined. These include a report by Bangladesh-
based Commission for Justice and Peace that visited Myanmar in 1998 
(Commission for Justice and Peace, 1998). The report was based on the 
observations that the representatives of the organisation made during their visit to 
Myanmar. The representatives, Father Timm and Justice Subhan, spent five days 
in the country, including two days in the villages in the pipeline region. Their 
report provides infonnation on the human rights situation near the pipelines and a 
positive assessment of Total's contribution to the economic and social conditions 
in the area. The findings of the report have however been criticised because an 
employee of MOGE, the state-owned oil and gas company, accompanied and 
acted as an interpreter for Fathers Timm and Subhan during their visit to the 
pipeline area. EarthRights International has argued that "[g]iven the pervasive 
human rights abuses perpetrated by the Burmese military government, no villager 
can be expected to talk freely through a Burmese government interpreter; nor is it 
likely that they would be inclined to criticize the pipeline" (EarthRights 
International, 2000: 135). The infonnation contained in the report was therefore 
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not used to corroborate information about the human rights situation in the 
pipeline area, but analysed as a way in which Total has responded to the 
allegations made about the impact of its operations in the country (see Chapter 7). 
The examined reports also included publications by Collaborative for 
Development Action, a consultancy that Total asked to investigate the situation in 
Myanmar. Researchers from the consultancy subsequently visited Myanmar on 
several occasions. While doing so, they interviewed more than a hundred people 
including Total staff, government officials, foreign diplomats, non-governmental 
organisations, and villagers in the pipeline region. The findings of the visits are 
described in three reports that have been made publicly available (Anderson et aI., 
2002; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004). The reports provide 
detailed information about Total's activities, management structures, and views 
about operating in Myanmar. They also include information about the human 
rights situation in the pipeline area. This information was considered as relatively 
reliable because the researchers from the organisation took measures to ensure 
that their findings were substantiated by examples and consistent repetition (see 
Anderson et aI., 2002). Moreover, the fact that the reports contain evidence of 
human rights violations in the pipeline region suggests that Collaborative for 
Development Action has sought to present its findings in a fair manner. 
The report written by Mr. Bernard Kouchner on the role and impact of Total in 
Myanmar was also reviewed. Total invited Mr. Kouchner, founder of Medecins 
sans Frontieres, to visit the Yadana project in 2003. In his subsequent report (BK 
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Conseil, 2003), Mr. Kouchner assessed arguments about the impact of Total's 
investment in Myanmar and gave a positive evaluation about the company's 
social and economic activities in the pipeline region. He also expressed his 
support for Total's presence in Myanmar, but urged the company to take clear 
steps to promote democracy and human rights in the country. The launch of the 
report was well covered by the French media which criticised Mr. Kouchner for 
being paid to whitewash the company (e.g., Liberation, 10 December 2003). The 
report and the media's response to it offer useful information about Total's 
activities in Myanmar and differing views about the company's role and impact in 
the country. 
Court documents on the Doe v. Unocal case 
Material available through the Doe v. Unocal case was also examined. Doe v. 
Unocal is a class action that a group of Myanmar peasants filed in 1996 against 
Total and Unocal in a district court in the United States. It concerns alleged 
human rights violations committed by the Myanmar army in furtherance of the 
Yadana project operated by Total. The company was dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction in 1999, but the case went forward against Unocal until the 
company agreed to compensate the plaintiffs and thereby settle the case in 2005. 
Material submitted to the court includes testimonies by Unocal employees and 
other relevant people which can be considered as reliable because they were given 
under oath. The documents also include correspondence between Total and 
Unocal on the situation and operations in Myanmar. Overall, the documents 
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provide a rich source of data on Total's activities and policies in Myanmar from 
early to mid-1990s. 
Reports by non-profit organisations 
Reports and other material published by a number of non-governmental 
organisations that have investigated the human rights situation in the pipeline area 
without the facilitation of Total and Premier Oil were also examined (e.g., 
EartRights International, Karen Human Rights Group). These organisations call 
for the withdrawal of the companies, which is why both Total and Premier Oil 
have been critical about the information supplied by them (du Rusquec, 2003; 
Jones, 11 August 2003; Total, 2003b: 26). The material produced by the 
organisations was useful for identifying the controversial issues with regard to 
Total's and Premier Oil's investment in Myanmar. Similarly to the other sources 
of data, an attempt was made to either corroborate or critically discuss the 
information provided by the organisations (see section 4.5.1 on data and method 
triangulation). 
Official documents by government and inter-governmental bodies on 
l\lyanmar 
Documents relating to Myanmar were also obtained from the United Nations, the 
International Labour Organisation, and the European Union as well as the 
governments of United States, Britain, France, Australia, and Japan. These 
documents provide little information on the case study companies and their 
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activities, but they shed light on the broader context in which Total and Premier 
Oil have operated in Myanmar. 
4.5.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews were used to corroborate evidence collected from other sources of data 
and to access information that was not otherwise available. In total, ten interviews 
were carried out by the author. These included interviews with company 
managers, experts, and representatives of NGOs in the United Kingdom and 
France. In addition, two interviews conducted by a French journalist for a French 
non-profit organisation with Total's general manager in Myanmar were analysed 
(du Rusquec, 10 December 2003 & 22 January 2004). The interviews were 
checked by the interviewees before being published. The author's own attempts to 
arrange interviews at Total were unsuccessful. In addition to the interviews, the 
researcher had discussions with various organisations to fill in gaps in data. These 
discussions are referred to as personal communication as they did not constitute 
in-depth interviews. 
Semi-structured rather than structured interviews were carried out in order to 
maintain flexibility, an advantage of semi-structured interviews (Kvale, 1996: 84, 
97; Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 44). A list of themes and pre-prepared questions were 
developed for each interviewee based on their position and expected knowledge. 
Yet, the sequence of the themes and questions was left open to change so that the 
answers given by the interviewees could be pursued, as suggested in the literature 
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on qualitative interviewing (Kvale, 1996: 124; Mason, 2002: 69; Rubin & Rubin, 
1995: 44). 
Interviewees were at times asked to give their view on sensitive or critical 
information obtained from another source of evidence. This practice served three 
purposes: (1) it produced insight into the reliability of other sources of data, (2) it 
invited interviewees to analyse certain issues further, and (3) it was a useful way 
of introducing critical views on company behaviour. This third purpose was 
important because companies are wary of what they view as unfounded 
allegations of human rights violations (e.g., du Rusquec, 2003, Jones, 2003b). It 
was important to be able to raise issues for which the companies have been 
criticised without being seen to side with these views. 
All interviewees were told that the purpose of the research was to learn from their 
experiences rather than to criticise or assess how they had performed. This 
statement was made to ensure that the interviewees would feel comfortable to talk 
about human rights, a sensitive topic for the companies studied. Kvale (1996: 125) 
views the creation of such an atmosphere as essential for interviews. The 
interviewees were also told that they could remain anonymous though no one 
wished to do so. Anonymity was offered to improve the interview atmosphere 
through the establishment of trust, as suggested in the relevant literature (e.g., 
Fontana & Frey, 2000). 
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The interviews were carried out face-to-face in the office of the interviewee or 
over the phone. Only some of the interviews were taped and transcribed. In a 
number of occasions, the interviews were not taped because of the circumstances. 
For example, in one instance an opportunity to interview a busy expert over the 
phone arose suddenly without enough time to make arrangements for taping the 
interview. In these types of situations, notes were taken and archived. 
4.5.4 Observation of CSR committee meetings at Premier Oil 
Data also included the observation of three meetings of the corporate social 
responsibility committee at Premier Oil. This observation was originally designed 
to be part of participant observation that would have involved participation to 
company meetings, contribution to some projects, and a visit to Myanmar. The 
plan was however abandoned before the researcher had a possibility to visit 
Myanmar due to the sudden restructuring of the company. 
The meetings of the corporate social responsibility committee concerned 
discussion of Premier Oil's policies and activities in all the countries of operation 
including Myanmar. The meetings were attended by company staff from different 
departments including human resources and the management committee. Even 
though the observation contributed little to the development of the model on 
corporate approaches to human rights, it enhanced the researcher's overall 
understanding of Premier Oil's approach to human rights and activities in 
Myanmar in the wider context of the company's corporate social responsibility 
policies and management systems. 
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4.5.5. Implications of a sensitive research topic for access and 
reliability 
The role businesses play with regard to human rights is a sensitive topic for both 
companies and other actors. Sensitivity of research topics has been defined as a 
quality that is attached to the topic by people who are involved in or affected by 
the research process (Stanko & Lee, 2003). This quality seems to be attached to 
topics that pose a substantial threat to those affected by the research process (Lee, 
1993: 4). As will be seen below, the topic of the present research posed a different 
threat to the various actors that were affected by what is said about corporate 
operations in Myanmar and Sudan. 
Sensitivity of research topics can impact every stage of the research process from 
their framing to the dissemination of research findings (see Lee, 1993: 2). In the 
present research, the sensitivity of the topic gave rise to a number of challenges 
relating to access and reliability of the collected data. In what follows, these 
challenges are discussed in more detail. 
4.5.5.1 Access to primary data 
The sensitivity of research topics makes access to primary data problematic (Lee, 
1993: 2, 119; Stanko & Lee, 2003). In the context of the present research, 
problems of access related to primary material, partiCUlarly interviews, as people 
had different reasons for declining requests for interviews. First, corporate 
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managers were not willing to give interviews in a situation where any information 
could become evidence in the legal proceedings that all but one of the case study 
companies were engaged in with regard to their activities in Myanmar and Sudan 
(for reluctance stemming from exposure to lawsuits, see Adler & Adler, 2002). 
Corporate managers may also have been concerned about the effect that 
association to human rights violations potentially has on corporate reputation and 
financial performance. Other actors, particularly the NGO community, were also 
reluctant to speak to the researcher. Even when the researcher was introduced to 
the NGOs by a third party that they knew through work, several NOOs declined 
an interview request. At a more general level, as explained in section 7.8.4, the 
NGO community has been reluctant to engage with other actors with regard to 
corporate investments in Myanmar and Sudan as they have been concerned about 
providing legitimacy for such investments. In addition to corporate managers and 
the NGO community, it was problematic to gain access to people located in 
Myanmar and Sudan due to the political and security situation in these countries 
(see 5.2.4). Given that contact with foreigners often leads to a questioning by the 
security services, interviews could have had a detrimental effect on the personal 
safety of any interviewees from the two countries. 
Problems with access often shape the research agenda and deter researchers from 
investigating certain sensitive topics (Stanko & Lee, 2003). In the present 
research, despite the lack of access to primary data, meaningful research was 
possible because preferential access was gained for one of the case study 
companies (see 4.5.4) and relevant secondary material was available on all 
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companies and their operations in the case study countries (see 4.5.2). 
Furthermore, as explained next, the reliability of interviews with corporate 
managers and other actors was questionable in the context of a sensitive research 
topic. 
4.5.5.2 On the reliability of primary and secondary data 
In addition to complicating access to data, the sensitivity of the research topic 
gave rise to concerns about the reliability of data. These concerns became 
manifest at the early stages ofthe research process when information derived from 
different sources of data turned out to be contradictory. The contradictions were 
built in the theoretical framework (see 6.4), but particular attention was also paid 
to the reliability and triangulation of data. This is why the trustworthiness of 
different sources of information was discussed in section 4.5.2 above. In what 
follows, the relationship between primary and secondary sources of information is 
discussed further and the reasons for prioritising the latter are made explicit. 
Qualitative interviews are viewed as a way to get access to subjective experiences 
and attitudes (PerakyUi, 2005; Warren, 2002). Even so, the reliability of 
interviews as a way to collect data has been contested due to the subjective nature 
of the interaction that takes place in the interview event (Frontana & Frey, 2005; 
Kvale, 1996: 287). Many researchers have acknowledged this and, as a result, 
interviews are often viewed as "negotiated text", particularly by ethnographers 
(Frontana & Frey, 2005). Accordingly, the outcome and interpretation of 
interview material is affected by the interviewer, the interviewee, and the 
141 
relationship between them (Spradley, 1979). What is more, the context and 
situation in which interviews are carried out affect all the parties to the interview 
and therefore the content and interpretation of what is communicated in the 
interview situation (Frontana & Frey, 2005; Gubrium & Holstein, 2002). The 
reliability of interviews is therefore a complex matter and a challenge to this data 
collection technique (for a thorough discussion on the subjectivity and reliability 
of interviews, see Kvale 1996: 281-295). 
Interviewing people on sensitive topics gives rise to particular challenges. First, 
interviewees may seek to present or conceal information in order to prevent the 
findings of the study from casting the interviewee or hislher organisation in a bad 
light (Adler & Adler, 2002; Schwandt, 2001: 155; Stanko & Lee, 2003). Such 
behaviour can be assumed to have taken place when managers were interviewed 
for the current research. Second, because all the case study companies had been 
extensively criticised for their engagement in Myanmar and Sudan and were used 
to defend their activities, the interviewees were careful in their answers and 
seemed to have already ''packaged'' the information in a certain way. Spradley 
(1979) has previously identified such interviewees who are overly analytical as 
problematic because they see their situation from the viewpoint of an outsider and 
present a ready analysis of their experiences. Even when it is acknowledged that 
interviews are situations where the meaning is constructed by both the interviewee 
and the interviewer, this type of interviewee makes it difficult for the researcher to 
discover patterns of meaning in what the interviewee says. 
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One way to address concerns about the reliability of interviews is to give a 
reflective account of the process of interviewing and its interpretation (Frontana & 
Frey, 2005). A decision was made not to present the data in this 'confessional 
style' (van Maanen, 1988). Instead, a different approach was adopted because it 
was possible to access other data to complete and triangulate the information 
accessed through interviews. Secondary material available on the Doe v. Unocal 
court case was particularly useful because it included original communication 
between Total and Unocal as well as testimonies by corporate managers and other 
relevant people (see 4.5.2). As argued in the section 4.5.2 above, the 
trustworthiness of this material can be considered as higher than that of other 
sources of information including interviews because disincentives for submitting 
false information during a court case are more important than those for, say, lying 
in an interview with a doctoral researcher. 
4.6 Data analysis 
The interpretation of data was based on the sociological tradition that regards data 
as a way to learn about human experience of the world in distinction to the 
linguistic tradition that treats data as the object of analysis (Ryan & Bernard, 
2000; Tesch, 1990). It was therefore possible to analyse all the data as subjective 
accounts of reality, irrespective of whether the data was obtained through different 
methods or from different sources. As seen above, data and method triangulation 
were applied to explore how accounts varied between different individual or 
organisational sources. 
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All the data was first transformed into text. Interviews were either transcribed or 
included as notes. Observation data was converted into written notes. The 
resulting text was then coded in line with the procedures suggested by Coffey and 
Atkinson (1996: 29-53). The process of coding focused on the three research 
questions that were established as major themes: (1) human rights issues 
addressed by the companies, (2) activities assumed by the companies to attend to 
the human rights issues, and (3) factors affecting the selection of these activities. 
All the text derived from document material, interviews, and observation was 
allocated to at least one of these three categories. Codes were then assigned to the 
text within each category and considered as minor themes. The last step in the 
analysis concerned a move from the level of minor themes to the level of major 
themes and the establishment of links between themes. As a result, an order of 
interconnected themes emerged. 
Throughout the process of coding, themes arising from the analysis of data were 
examined in relation to the concepts and variables identified in the literature 
review. A number of ideas and models stemming from the previous literature 
were subsequently incorporated into the model being developed; others were 
excluded as irrelevant. 
A distinction between first-order and second-order concepts was applied 
throughout the process of coding, as suggested by van Maanen (1979). First-order 
concepts are the "facts" that arise from the data. They can include quantitative or 
personal accounts of the phenomenon studied. For example, information of the 
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activities carried out by the case study companies in Myanmar and Sudan was 
collected from the analysis of document material, interviews, and observation. 
Second-order concepts involve the organisation and explanation of first-order 
concepts by the researcher as well as the development of concepts, connections 
between concepts, and propositions from the data and organised into initial 
categories on the basis of the human rigths issue that they were targeted at 
addressing. For example, the information on the activities carried out by the case 
study companies in Myanmar and Sudan was organised into different categories 
that eventually formed the five human rights strategies discussed in Chapter 7. 
The distinction between first-order and second-order concepts therefore serves to 
separate the "facts" of the case from the process of interpretation and theorising. 
The distinction was found useful in generating theory from the data and staying 
reflective about the concepts and propositions being developed. 
The move from first-order concepts to second-order concepts involves induction 
based on generalisation from individual cases. Mintzberg (1979) referred to this 
type of induction as a creative leap that entails theorising based on the careful and 
systematic investigation of the collected data. The overall process of data analysis 
from the study of particular cases to more general statements is illustrated in 
Table 4.4 below. 
TABLE 4.4. Process of data analysis 
First-order concepts: 
Coding and organisation 
of the data into minor 
themes within the three 
major themes 
~ ~ Induction 
Second-order 
concepts: 
Development of concepts 
and propositions from 
the data 
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4.7 Generalisability of the findings 
The findings of case study research are not generalisable in the sense of universal 
laws that apply to all situations at any time (Schofield, 1990). There are 
researchers that do not even consider generalisation as an important goal for case 
study research (e.g., Stake, 1978). Instead of generalisability, these researchers 
aim at producing illuminating description and insight on some phenomenon 
(Schofield, 1990). It can however be argued that the findings of case study 
research are generalisable to a population that shares relevant characteristics with 
the cases being examined (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 
2000). This type of generalisability is possible because of empirical generalization 
which involves drawing inferences about characteristics of a larger population on 
the basis of a sample that represents some relevant attributes of the larger 
population (Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000). Statistical generalization is 
based on the same principle of empirical generalization. The difference between 
case study research and statistical research relates to the nature of the sample. In 
statistical research, the sample is randomly selected and should be large enough to 
carry statistical significance. In case study research, the sample is purposive in the 
sense that it is selected because it is expected to illustrate some relevant features 
of the larger population (Silverman, 2000: 104). The sample can, for example, 
include cases that are selected on the basis of some theoretical categories or 
propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Silverman, 2000: 105-7; Yin, 1994: 51). In this 
research, the larger population was first defined and criteria were then developed 
to select cases that would represent the relevant characteristics of the larger 
population (see 4.4.3). 
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The most important risk in empirical generalization involving purposive sampling 
pertains to the heterogeneity of the target population (Gomm, Hammersley, & 
Foster, 2000). This risk can be controlled by the systematic selection of the cases 
based on the examination of the relevant features that the sample cases share with 
the larger population (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000). 
The way in which such systematic selection was carried out for this present 
research was explained in section 4.4.3. It can therefore be argued that the 
research findings have relevance for the companies that fulfil the first two 
selection criteria: (1) they operate in the extractive industries and (2) they have 
sought to address human rights issues in countries in which the government is 
unable to secure the respect for human rights or itself perpetrates human rights 
violations. 
4.8 Reliability and validity 
In line with the positivist and post-positivist traditions (see Denzin, 1994), a 
variety of measures were taken to ensure the reliability of the data collection and 
analysis methods and the validity of the research constructs and findings. These 
measures are summarised in the table below. 
TABLE 4.5. Measures for reliability and validity 
Criteria Definition Tactic 
Establishment of correct • Comparison within and across cases 
Construct validity operational measures for the • Comprehensive data treatment 
constructs studied • Deviant-case analysis 
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Internal validity Establishment of causal relationships • Comparison within and across cases 
.1-.----.. -.-------.------.. --.. -
External validity Generalisability of the research • Definition of the case findings • Definition of case selection criteria 
Repeatability of research • Description of the process of data Reliability procedures analysis 
• Presentation of first-order data 
Many researchers have recommended the use of multiple sources of evidence and 
respondent validation as a way to improve construct validity (e.g., Denzin, 1978; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994: 33-4, 92). These researchers are of the view that the 
use of multiple sources of data improves construct validity by providing multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon. In contrast, Silverman (2000: 177) argued that 
the use of multiple sources and methods of evidence does not improve construct 
validity because it does not exclude the subjectivity of qualitative research. 
Accounts by different individuals and organisations are just a further source of 
data and insight on the study. Instead, Silverman recommended five methods that 
increase the validity of qualitative research: the refutability principle, the constant 
comparative method, comprehensive data treatment, deviant-case analysis, and the 
use of appropriate tabulations. Two of these methods were employed in this 
research to ensure construct validity: emerging concepts and hypothesis were 
tested within and across cases and analysis was carried out until the theory being 
developed covered all the data (see section 4.6). 
Internal validity concerned the establishment of causal relationships between 
particular human rights strategies and variables that affected the selection of these 
strategies. The validity of the suggested relationships was improved through 
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comparison within and across cases as suggested by Yin (1994: 35). Moreover, 
extant literature was examined for similar findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
External validity has been seen as a major challenge for case study research 
because the number of cases studied is usually too small to carry statistical 
significance (Yin, 1994: 36). The external validity can however be improved 
through the explicit specification of the population from which the research 
sample is taken (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000). In this 
research, external validity was sought through the clear definition of the case and 
case selection criteria (see section 4.4). (For a more elaborate discussion of the 
generalisability of the research findings, see section 4.7.) 
The reliability of the research process was ensured in two main ways. First, as 
suggested by Yin (1994: 36-7), the processes of data collection and analysis were 
described in this present chapter so that the same procedures can be followed by 
other researchers. Second, a fairly rich description of the data is provided in the 
following chapters so that the reader can assess the reliability of the conclusions 
made. Quotes from the data are used to allow the reader to access original 
material, as suggested in the literature on qualitative research (e.g., Ryan & 
Bernard, 2000; Schofield, 1990). 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter described the research design and methods used to investigate the 
research questions. The chapter began with the justification of a case study 
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research design. The steps making up the research design were then described 
before the unit and sub-units of analysis, case selection criteria, and the selected 
cases were presented. The data collection and analysis methods were then 
described. The chapter concluded with the discussion of the generalisability, 
reliability and validity of the research. 
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5 The context 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a background against which the human rights 
approaches of the case study companies can be analysed. The chapter proceeds as 
follows. The political, economic, and social situation in Myanmar and Sudan is 
first described. The arrival of foreign investment and its role in the economy of 
the two countries is then discussed after which the oil and gas projects under study 
are compared and contrasted in terms of their physical characteristics, ownership 
structure, and development over time. Finally, a brief profile of the companies is 
provided before the chapter ends with a summary. 
5.2 Country context 
5.2.1 Repressive role of the military 
Myanmar and Sudan are both countries where the military holds an important 
role. Myanmar has been ruled by a military government for most of the time since 
its independence from Britain in 1948. The latest government took power in 1988 
when General Ne Win, who had been leading the country for 26 years, stepped 
down in the context of pro-democracy demonstrations that had resulted from a 
growing inflation and a worsening economic situation. The new government 
clapped down the protests killing an estimated 3,000 people and imprisoning 
many others (Human Rights Watch, 1990; Smith, 1991: 16; United Nations, 
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1993). Nevertheless, the opening of the economy for foreign investment in 1989 
and the parliamentary elections of 1990 raised hopes of a more democratic era in 
the country. This is also when foreign companies including Total and Premier Oil 
entered the country. The hopes of democratic reforms were soon disappointed as 
the military prevented the new parliament from convening because against the 
expectations of the military, the majority of the seats had been won by the 
National League for Democracy, formed in the aftermath of the 1988 protests by 
Aung San Suu Kyi and two retired military officers. In the following years, many 
members of the new parliament were arrested and imprisoned (Amnesty 
International, 1990; Amnesty International, 1995; United Nations, 1993; United 
Nations, 2001: para 46-47). Some died in detention (Amnesty International, 1990; 
United Nations, 1993). Since then, the military junta has showed few signs of 
loosening its grip of the country. Regardless of power struggles among the top 
officers, many observers are of the view that the military has become stronger 
than ever because of the modernisation and expansion of the armed forces 
(Ashton, 1998; International Crisis Group, 2002b: 3-6; Selt, 1999: 4-7, 12). 
Similarly to Myanmar, the military has held an important role in Sudan since the 
country became independent from Egypt and Britain in 1956. The latest military 
coup took place in 1989 when Omar al-Bashir took power with the backing of the 
National Islamic Front (International Crisis Group, 2002a: 14-5). In 1993, the 
government was changed into a civilian one, but al-Bashir kept power as president 
of the country (ibid.). Since then, the government has taken a number of steps 
towards democratic reforms, but the impact of the steps has been limited because 
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of the continuing harassment of the political opposition and restrictions on 
political freedoms (United Nations, 2001; United Nations, 2003b). For example, 
the elections organised in 1996 were boycotted by the main opposition parties in 
an atmosphere of political repression and authoritarian rule (International Crisis 
Group, 2002a: 18). For most of the time that Talisman and Lundin operated in 
Sudan, the country was ruled by presidential decree under a state of emergency 
(International Crisis Group, 2002a: 20; United Nations, 2001; United Nations, 
2003b). 
5.2.2 Armed conflict 
At the time the case study companies invested in Myanmar and Sudan, both 
countries were experiencing internal armed conflict. In Myanmar, the central 
government has never held total control over the mountainous areas that surround 
the central plateau. These areas are populated by diverse ethnic groups, many of 
which have been in armed rebellion against the central government since 
independence from Britain. At the time of the 1988 demonstrations, there were 
over 30,000 insurgents divided into more than 25 armed groups (Smith, 1991: 10). 
In this context, one of the central aims of the new military government has been 
the unification of the country and its different ethnic and other insurgent groups 
and by the mid-1990s, the government had signed cease-fire agreements with 
most of the armed groups (Hawke, 1998; Silverstein, 1997: 134; Smith, 1994: 28, 
30, 31; Smith, 2001: 35). The armed fraction of the Karen, an ethnic group to 
which the majority of the population in the area where Total and Premier operate 
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in Myanmar belongs, is one the last groups that has not negotiated a peace 
agreement with the government (BBC News, 22 January 2004). 
In Sudan, the government's efforts to exert its control over the southern third of 
the country have given rise to a series of armed conflicts between the Arab north 
and the African south. These conflicts have been described as a civil war fuelled 
by various racial, religious, and economic factors between the centre and the 
periphery (International Crisis Group, 2002a: 5-6). The centre has traditionally 
favoured Arab Muslims of the north at the expense of African Christians of the 
south who have sought some degree of self-determination (International Crisis 
Group, 2002a: 5). The conflict resumed in 1983 when the government was 
seeking to have more control over the southern third of the country including the 
area where important oil deposits had been discovered (International Crisis 
Group,2002a: 13-14). At the time Talisman and Lundin entered the country in the 
late 1990s, the SPLA, which had been the main political and armed movement of 
the south, had split into separate fractions with the result of intra-southern fighting 
near the areas where the oil concessions are located (ibid.). As oil came on stream 
in 1999, the resulting revenue enabled the government to modernise the armed 
forces and launch successful attacks on the SPLA and other parties to the conflict 
(International Crisis Group, 2002a: 22). A peace agreement was finally negotiated 
in 2005, two years after Talisman and Lundin had left the country (United 
Nations, 2005). 
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5.2.3 Economic and social development 
Myanmar was isolated from the outside world until 1989 because of its policy of 
"the Burmese Way to Socialism" which involved the centralisation of economic 
control by the government. It only opened up for foreign investment in the 
aftermath of the pro-democracy protests that had resulted from the deteriorating 
social and economic situation in the country. The deteriorating conditions before 
the opening of the economy were highlighted by the fact that Myanmar was 
accorded the Least Developed Country status by the United Nations in 1987. 
Against this background, the military government has argued that any political 
transition needs to be underpinned by economic development (Smith, 2001: 37). 
Economic progress has, however, been held back by the mismanagement of the 
economy by government officials and their families (Silverstein, 2001: 132; 
Smith, 2001: 23). Also, a considerable number of companies have pulled out in 
response to pressures from human rights activists (The Burma Campaign UK, 
2005). Myanmar has relied on trade with its neighbours, particularly Singapore, 
Thailand, and Malaysia (Government of the Union of Myanmar, 1998). 
Unlike Myanmar, Sudan has never been closed to foreign investment, but parts of 
the economy were nationalised after the military coup of 1969. In the 1970s, 
economic development of the country looked promising and was supported by 
foreign capital from the United States, Europe, Arab countries, and the World 
Bank with the plan of making Sudan a food basket that could export agricultural 
products. This plan did not materialise as commodity prices declined and 
agriculture suffered from a lack of rainfall. Instead, Sudan gained one of the 
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largest foreign debts in the world. (Library of Congress, 2005) From 1983 
onwards, the economy also carried the cost of the civil war. Agriculture has 
remained the most important sector of the economy with 80% of the work force 
and approximately 30% of the GDP (CIA Factbook, 2006; Wolrd Bank, 2005). 
Sudan's main trade partner is China, but it also has important relations with other 
countries such as Japan and Saudi Arabia (CIA Factbook, 2006). Since 1999, the 
export of oil has led to a significant increase in the GDP per capita (see Table 
5.2). 
Economic progress in both Myanmar and Sudan has been hampered by economic 
sanctions. Sanctions were imposed on Myanmar after the 1988 crack down of pro-
democracy protests. The United States, for example, blocked any loans or 
assistance from international financial institutions to Myanmar (US Department of 
State, 2004). As a result, the World Bank has not given any new loans to the 
country since 1987 (World Bank, 2005). Sanctions have also been imposed on 
Sudan. In 1996, the UN security council called on its members to limit relations 
with the country because the government had failed to extradite suspects in 
relation to an assassination attempt of the Egyptian president (SIRES/I054; 
SIRES/1070). A year later, the US introduced a trade embargo against Sudan 
because of the role of the Sudanese government in international terrorism, 
instability in the region, and human rights violations (International Crisis Group, 
2002a: 6; US Treasury, 2006). The embargo prevented US companies from 
investing in the country. Some of the sanctions on Sudan were lifted before 
Talisman and Lundin withdrew from the country. For example, the UN Security 
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Council lifted its sanctions in 2001 when Sudan had complied with the provisions 
of its earlier resolutions (S/RES/ 1372). In contrast, in 2006, the United States still 
observed its sanctions on Sudan (US Treasury, 2006). 
As seen in Table 5.2, the UNDP Human Development Index ranks Myanmar and 
Sudan as countries of medium human development. In comparison to their 
neighbours, they perform better than the poorest countries in their region such as 
Kenya and Cambodia, but worse than the more developed countries such as Egypt 
and Thailand. This is illustrated by life expectancy at birth which in Myanmar and 
Sudan is similar or higher than in Cambodia and Kenya, but lower than in 
Thailand and Egypt. Table 5.2 also shows that both countries spend less on health 
than their neighbours. 
TABLE 5.1. Economic and social indicators 
I Coun~ I I GOP Public HOI Life Total rank 
I 
Total expectancy per expenditure armed population at birth in capita on forces (millions) years (PPP US$) health (thousands) (% of GOP) 
I I 2003 2000-2005 1995 2003 2002 2003 
Thailand I 73 63.1 69 .7 7,742 7,595 3 .1 307 
I 
--~--- -
Egypt 119 71.3 69.8 3,829 1,220 1.8 450 
I I 
-_. __ .-
-------
'._-_. __ .. -r··-----·--r-- -.----.-.----.-... --- 1---·_ ..... ·· ·_- .--.-._.-
I 129 49 .5 60.1 1,130 1,0271 0.4 378 Myanmar ! I 
---
I 
---_._-_ . . _--_._-- -_. __ .. _.-- ------_. ---_. __ .
- -
-
--
Cambodia 130 13 .5 56 1,110 2,078 2.1 124 
! 
._._- I --_._--- ---- --- --_.-
Sudan 141 I 34.9 56.3 1,110 1,910 1 105 I t-- --I I Kenya I 154 I 32 .7 47 1,438 1,037 2.2 24 
! I 
Source: Human Development Indicators (2006). 
I Figure is based on the World Development Indicators (2004). 
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5.2.4 Human rights situation 
Both the Myanmar and Sudanese government have been responsible for serious 
human rights violations. The United Nations has reacted to these violations by 
appointing special rapporteurs to investigate the situation of human rights in the 
two countries. Such nomination of special rapporteurs is relatively rare, which 
highlights the seriousness of the state of human rights in Myanmar and Sudan. In 
2000, only 16 other countries were investigated by special rapporteurs (Steiner & 
Alston, 2000: 621). 
Myanmar. Human rights violations are widespread in Myanmar. The military has 
been responsible for numerous human rights violations including extra-judicial 
killings and arrests, torture, rape, forced labour, and forcible relocation (ILO, 
1998; United Nations, 1993-2003). The security forces systematically monitor 
citizen's movements and communications (US Department of State, 2001). For 
example, the possession of an unregistered telephone or modem is punishable by 
imprisonment (United Nations, 1997). Freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association are restricted (United Nations, 1993-2003). In 2002, Reporters without 
Borders included Myanmar on its list of the five countries with the least press 
freedom in the world (Reporters without Borders, 2002). 
In 1999, the International Labour Organisation called on its members to review 
their relations with the Myanmar government and "take appropriate measures to 
ensure that the said Member cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate 
or extend the system of forced labour" (ILO, 2000). This call by the International 
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Labour Organisation was the first of its kind in the history of the organisation and 
reflected its concern over the widespread and systematic use of forced labour in 
the country. Although the government has now introduced decrees that ban the 
use of forced labour, the army still resorts to it in certain areas of the country (e.g., 
Human Rights Watch, 2003a; ILO, 2002; United Nations, 2003a). Forced labour 
has been seen to be caused by the military's policy of self-reliance according to 
which each army division is expected to generate food and income for its 
operations (Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 10). 
There have been some improvements in the condition of human rights during the 
last few years, particularly in relation to prison conditions (United Nations, 2003a: 
para 21). The government has also constituted a Human Rights Committee 
(United Nations, 2001: para 26). Nevertheless, the fact that the leader of the 
opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains under house arrest suggests that the 
situation regarding basic human rights remains fragile. This was confirmed by the 
United Nations Human Rights Rapporteur who said in November 2003 that the 
situation in the country was deteriorating (BBe News, 10 November 2003). 
Sudan. The north-south conflict in Sudan has given rise to serious human rights 
violations (United Nations, 1999; United Nations, 2001; United Nations, 2003b). 
All parties to the conflict have been guilty of abuses including killings, 
destruction and confiscation of private property, rape, and abductions (United 
Nations, 1999; United Nations, 2001). The conflict has also led to the 
displacement of at least 30,000 people in the southern third of the country (United 
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Nations, 2001). The living conditions in the south have been worsened by the fact 
that the government has used access to humanitarian aid as a tool in the pursuit of 
its military goals (United Nations, 1999; United Nations, 2001). The government 
forces have, for example, bombed civilians who have gathered for food 
distribution by humanitarian organisations (United Nations, 2001). As a result, aid 
organisations have suspended some of their relief operations in the country (ibid.). 
The internal conflict has also been associated with the practice of slavery. 
According to the UN Special Rapporteur, Gerhart Baum, the government has 
done little to prevent the practice from taking place. Slavery has been particularly 
related to the nomadic Arab tribes called the Murahaleen. The militias formed 
from the Murahaleen have been armed and deployed by the government to attack 
military and civilian targets. When doing so, the militias have been reported to 
destroy the food crops, kill the men, and abduct the women and the children for 
slavery. (United Nations, 2001) 
Freedom of speech, press, and assembly and association have also been restricted 
(United Nations, 1999; United Nations, 2001; United Nations, 2003b). A law 
allowing political parties was introduced in 1999, but the political opposition and 
human rights activists have been harassed by means of arbitrary arrests and 
detention without judicial review (United Nations, 2001). Freedom of the press 
has been limited through censorship and restrictions placed on the movement of 
journalists (ibid.). Overall, the situation regarding civil and political rights 
situation improved over the time Talisman and Lundin operated in Sudan though 
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in 2003, when the companies pulled out, the political opposition was still being 
harassed (United Nations, 2003b). 
5.2.5 Arrive foreign investment in the oil and gas sector 
Important oil and gas discoveries were made in both Myanmar and Sudan before 
the case study companies invested in the countries. Despite the isolation of 
Myanmar before 1989, a number of foreign companies explored offshore oil and 
gas resources in the country between 1973 and 1977 (Back in the Game, 1989; 
Maung, 1998: 146). No important finds were made at the time, but in the 
beginning of the 1980s, a joint venture between a Japanese and Myanmar 
company discovered an offshore gas field that later became Total's Yadana 
project (Maung, 1998: 148; Total, 2003b: 9). In Sudan, the first oil concession 
was granted in 1975 to Chevron. A year later, the company made its first strike. 
Work was only halted in 1984 when three of the company's expatriate employees 
were killed in an attack that echoed the resumption of the civil war a year earlier 
(Gagnon & Ryle, 2001: 26). 
Owing to a shortage of technology and skills, both Myanmar and Sudan required 
foreign investment to develop their oil and gas resources (Back in the Game, 
1989; Gagnon & Ryle, 2001: 26). Foreign oil and gas companies were able to 
enter Myanmar in the aftermath of the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations and 
the subsequent military reshuffle that took place in the context of a worsening 
economic situation. Foreign companies were interested in entering the country as 
it was believed to possess substantial oil and gas resources (Back in the Game, 
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1989; Myanmar Exploration Hitting Stride, 1992). Yet, investment in the newly 
opened Myanmar was viewed as "a gamble" by industry specialists because of 
poor infrastructure, distant location of oil and gas fields, and general political 
instability (Back in the Game, 1989). Nevertheless, foreign companies 
successfully bid for licences to explore the country's oil and gas resources (for a 
list of companies, see Myanmar Exploration Hitting Stride, 1992). 
In Sudan, two main developments allowed foreign companies that were 
enthusiastic about Sudan's potential to resume oil development in the area where 
Chevron had halted its operations in the early 1980s (OGJ, 1997). First, in 1992, 
Chevron relinquished its rights to the concession, which enabled other companies 
to acquire promising blocks in the area (Gagnon & Ryle, 2001: 26). Second, in 
1997, a peace agreement was negotiated between the government and rebel 
groups that had split from the SPLA. Even though the SPLA was excluded from 
the agreement, companies were able to enter the area with the protection of the 
army and local militia groups (International Crisis Group, 2002a: 135). 
The onshore resources in Myanmar turned out to be smaller and less exploitable 
than expected (Myanmar's Upstream Sector, 2000). In contrast, a number of 
offshore areas were successfully explored and developed into gas fields. A joint 
venture consisting of Texaco, Premier Oil, and Nippon Oil signed the first 
exploration contract for offshore gas fields with the state gas and oil company 
MOGE in 1990 (Myanmar Exploration Hitting Stride, 1992; Premier Oil, 2002a: 
14). Soon after, in 1992, Total successfully bid for the development rights of two 
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other offshore fields and consequently signed a production sharing contract with 
the state-owned MOGE (Myanmar Exploration Hitting Stride, 1992; Total, 2003: 
9). To this day, these two joint ventures, Yadana and Yetagun, remain the most 
important projects in the oil and gas sector which is the largest source of foreign 
direct investment for Myanmar (Government of the Union of Myanmar, 1998). 
In Sudan, parts of the concession relinquished by Chevron were purchased by 
Arakis Energy, a small Canadian company. In 1996, when the first oil was 
brought on stream, Arakis sold 75% of its interest to a number of other 
companies. These companies did not however have the technological and 
financial resources to develop the field further. The situation changed in 1998, 
when Talisman gained ownership of the interest that Arakis still had in the 
project. (Gagnon & Ryle, 2001: 26). Less than a year later, the first crude oil was 
exported (Talisman, 2000b: 1). The project remains the largest oil operation in the 
country and an important source of income to the government (Gagnon & Ryle, 
2001: 27). However, because the current resources are estimated to run out by 
2015, the future of Sudan's oil production is shaped by what will happen with the 
concession areas that have not yet been explored. The rights to the largest of these 
areas are held by Total (Total, 2003a). 
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5.3 Oil and gas projects in Myanmar and Sudan 
5.3.1 Physical description 
The Yadana and Yetagun projects in Myanmar involve the extraction of natural 
gas from offshore fields in the Andaman Sea and its transportation through 
pipelines across southern Myanmar to Thailand. The gas is extracted from 
separate offshore fields and carried via under-water pipelines that come together 
just off the Myanmar coast. Onshore, the pipelines run side by side before 
reaching the Thai border where a Thai company purchases the gas and transports 
it by way of another pipeline to the Ratchaburi area close to Bangkok. The 
pipelines are laid underground. The earth surface above them has been 
rehabilitated and is covered by grass and other vegetation. A service road follows 
the pipelines that stretch for 63 kilometres from the Myanmar coast in the West to 
the Thai boarder in the East. 
The projects in Sudan involve the exploration and extraction of oil from onshore 
deposits in southern Sudan. The oil is extracted from separate concession areas, 
each of which encompassed approximately 30,000km2 of land 
(http://spc.sditablel.php, accessed 2 September 2006). Both joint ventures use the 
same 1,540 kilometre pipeline to carry the oil to a terminal in Port Sudan on the 
Red Sea from where it can be shipped to different destinations. The pipeline is 
mostly buried with seven pump stations on the ground. 
The case study projects therefore shared a number of physical characteristics. 
Most importantly for their impact on human rights, they were located in the same 
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geographical areas and therefore in the same local communities, particularly in 
Myanmar. In Sudan, the facilities of Talisman and Lundin were relatively far 
apart because of the large size of the concession areas and the length of the 
pipeline. 
5.3.2 Ownership of the projects 
Each of the case study companies held an interest In a separate joint venture 
consisting of several companies. As seen in Table 5.3 , the interests varied from 
Talisman's 25% to Lundin's 40%. Typically for the oil and gas sector, the 
national petroleum companies of the two countries held an interest in each of the 
the projects. Also some other companies had an interest in more than one project. 
The state-owned Petronas of Malaysia, for example, held an interest in one of the 
projects in Myanmar and both projects in Sudan. 
TABLE 5.2. Interests in case study projects in 2002 
Country of Myanmar Sudan Company origin Yadana (Ofo) Yetagun (Ofo) GNPOC (Ofo) Block SA (Ofo) 
Total France 31.2375 
Premier Oil UK 26.6652 
Unocal US 28.2625 
Petronas Malaysia 30.0014 30 28.5 Caligari 
Nippon Oil Japan 14.1667 
PTIEP Thailand 25.5 14.1667 
MOGE Myanmar 15.0 15.0 
Talisman Canada 25 
Lundin Sweden 40.375 
CNPC China 40 
OMV Austria 26.125 
Sudapet Sudan 5 5 
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Total was the operator of the Yadana project, established in 1992. Other project 
partners included Unocal of the United States, the Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand (PPTEP), and the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise 
(MaGE). Unlike the other companies studied, Total did not sell its share in the 
joint venture over the period of research. 
Premier Oil had an interest in the Yetagun project. Even though the exploration 
contract for the concessions that became the basis of the project was originally 
signed between Premier Oil and MaGE in 1990, the project was first operated by 
Texaco. Premier Oil became the operator only in 1997 when Texaco withdrew 
from Myanmar. It stayed the operator until 2003 when it sold its interest in the 
project to Petronas. The other partners in the Yetagun project included Nippon Oil 
of Japan, PPTEP, and MaGE. 
Talisman had an interest in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
(GNPOC). It acquired its interest in 1997 by taking over another Canadian 
company, Arakis Energy. In 2003, Talisman sold its interest to ONGC Videsh, a 
subsidiary of an Indian state-owned company. Other partners in the project 
included the China National Petroleum Company, Petronas, and state-owned 
Sudapet. The operatorship of the GNPOC was not held by any of the project 
partners. Instead, each member company assigned employees to the GNPOC 
where important decisions required the support of at least two members holding at 
least 60% interest (Talisman, 2000b: 1). 
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Lundin Oil was the operator of the project that explored and sought to produce oil 
from Block 5A in Sudan. It held its interest through another company, 
International Petroleum Company (IPC), which was wholly owned by Lundin Oil. 
It was IPC that signed the exploration and production sharing agreement with the 
Sudanese government in 1997. Other companies in the joint venture were 
Petronas, OMV of Austria, and Sudapet. In 2003, Lundin sold its interest to 
Petronas. Lundin Oil was controlled by the Lundin family that also held 31 % in 
Sands Petroleum, the biggest single shareholder in Arakis Energy from 1994 to 
1998 when Arakis was taken over by Talisman. Lundin Oil therefore had links to 
both oil projects in Sudan. In 2001, Lundin Oil was taken over by Talisman with 
some of the assets, including those in Sudan, spun off as Lundin Petroleum. 
5.3.3 Timelines 
The present research covers the time that each of the companies had operated in 
Myanmar or Sudan by 2003. It therefore covers a different period of time for each 
of the companies studied. As seen in Figure 5.1, the time period was considerably 
shorter for Talisman and Lundin than for Total and Premier Oil. Moreover, Total 
was the only company that continued its operations beyond 2003; all the other 
companies withdrew from Myanmar or Sudan during the period of study after 
about five years of operations on the ground.7 
7 Lundin still holds a working interest in another concession in Sudan (Lundin, 2003a: 2). 
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The project timelines differed in some respects that are relevant for human rights. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the Yadana pipeline operated by Total was 
constructed before the Yetagun pipeline. Because of this, it was Total that was 
linked to the first allegations of forced labour in the pipeline region in Myanmar 
(see Chapter 6). Moreover, the period of research is considerably longer for Total 
and Premier Oil than for Talisman and Lundin; this may have affected the number 
and variety of human rights strategies employed by the companies. 
FIGURE 5.1. Project timelines 
YEAR Yadana Yetagun GNPOC Block SA 
1990 Contract signed 
1991 
1992 Contract signedB 
1993 
1994 
1995 Construction of the 
pipeline 
1996 
1995-1998 
1997 Construction of the Contract signed 
pipeline 
1998 Production starts Talisman enters 
1997-2000 
1999 Production starts 
2000 Production starts 
2001 
2002 Premier divests 
2003 Talisman divests Lundin divests 
Sources: Human Rights Watch, 2003; Premier Oil, 2002a; Total, 2002d. 
8 The Yadana field had been discovered by the state-owned MOGE in the 19808 (Total, 2003b: 9). 
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5.3.4 Project size 
The Yadana project operated by Total was the larger of the two projects in 
Myanmar. In 2002, it produced 525 million cubic feet of gas per day (mmscfd) 
against Yetagun's 199 mmscfd (Premier Oil, 2002a: 9; Total, 2002d: 26). As seen 
in Table 5.6, it also had considerably larger reserves of gas than the Yetagun 
fields (World Oil, 1998). The Greater Nile Production Operating Company to 
which Talisman belonged was the larger of the projects located in Sudan. In 2002, 
it was estimated to have reserves of 846 million barrels of oil (mmboe) against 
Block 5A's 149 mmboe (Lundin, 2002a; Talisman, 2002a: 5,64-65). In the same 
year, it produced 250,000 barrels per day; production in Block SA did not start 
during the period of research (Lundin, 2002a; Talisman, 2002a: 5). 
TABLE 5.3. Project production and reserves 
Myanmar Sudan 
Project Yadana Yetagun GNPOC Block SA 
Case study Total Premier Oil Talisman Lundin 
~!!!Eany 
- ---
Production/d 525 mmscfd 199 mmscfd 250,000 boe Oboe 
-, r----------" M __ ", __ M._. ___ .N. 
Reserves (proven 7,3 Tcfd 1,8 Tcfd 846,0 mmboe 149,1 mmboe 
and probable) 
Sources: Lundin. 2002a; Premier Oil. 2002a: 9; Talisman. 2002a: 5. 64-65; Total. 2002d: 26. 
World Oil. 1998. 
NB. Thefigures are from year 2002 exceptfor the proven and probable reserves for Myanmar 
projects which are from 1998. 
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5.4 Company profiles 
5.4.1 Total SA· profile 
Total's businesses comprise the whole range of activities from exploration to 
retail including exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas, power 
generation, trading, shipping, and refining and marketing of petroleum products 
such as automotive and aviation fuels. It also manufactures chemicals (Total, 
2003a). 
Total has experienced two important mergers since it entered Myanmar in 1989. 
The first merger in 1999 between Total and Belgium's PetroFina created Totalfina 
which merged again a year later with Elf Aquitaine. As a result of the mergers, 
Total became one of the five largest energy companies in the world (Fortune, 
2005). In 2002, it operated in more than 130 countries and employed more than 
120, 000 people (Total, 2002a). 
Pre-merger Total and Elf had close links to the French state as they were both set 
up to secure France's access to oil. Total was founded after the First World War in 
1924 at the request of the French premier to advance French oil interests abroad, 
particularly in the Middle East (Aubert, 1999: 57; Yergin, 1991: 190). Elf was 
established later in 1965 in a merger between a group of state controlled 
companies founded to explore oil outside the Middle East (Aubert, 1999: 57; 
Yergin, 1991: 526). With the purpose of ensuring that the companies contributed 
to France's objective to achieve a degree of energy independence, the French state 
held significant interests and special powers in both Total and Elf (Aubert, 1999: 
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61-62}. According to a French parliamentary commission investigating the role of 
French oil and gas companies in international politics, connections between the 
French state and Elf were particularly close (Aubert, 1999: 57-60, 73). The French 
government allegedly influenced politics in a number of countries through Elf. In 
one instance, Elf assisted a former president to carry out a coup d'Etat in Congo-
Brazzaville (Aubert, 1999: 1 13-125). 
The French state sold its shares and gave up its formal powers in Total and Elf in 
the late 1990s to meet the demands of the EU and WTO legislation (Aubert, 1999: 
61; ECON, 2002: 12). In 2003, Total had approximately 540,000 shareholders of 
which the majority (77%) were European pension funds, other institutional 
investors, and individual shareholders (Total, 2003a: 43). Important connections 
still exist between the French government and Total. A number of people have 
traditionally moved from Total to government posts and vice versa. Notably, a 
former Elf employee was appointed the French Ambassador to Myanmar in the 
late 1990s (Aubert, 1999: 60). The French government has also protected Total's 
interests abroad. In the mid-1990s, the Foreign Ministry took steps with regard to 
the lawsuits filed against Total in a Californian court for the company's actions in 
Myanmar (Aubert report, 1999: 92). The court was consequently found 
incompetent to apply United States law to a French company for activities in a 
third country (ibid.). 
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5.4.2 Premier Oil pic - profile 
In comparison to Total, Premier Oil is a relatively small company in the oil and 
gas sector. In 2002, it had activities in less than fifteen countries and it employed 
an estimated 500 people worldwide (Premier Oil, 2002a). It defines its business as 
production and exploration of oil and gas resources and commercial deal-making 
(Premier Oil, 2003:3). 
Premier Oil was established in 1934 in the United Kingdom to explore and 
produce oil and gas in Trinidad. It acquired its first interests in the North Sea and 
further expanded its activities in the United Kingdom through a merger and 
acquisitions in the 1970s (Premier Oil, 2001c). The operations in the United 
Kingdom are still a major source of Premier Oil's revenues and a financial basis 
for its exploration activities in other regions (Premier Oil, 2003a). 
Premier Oil discovered the Yetagun gas field in 1992 and subsequently became 
one of the partners in the joint venture that was formed to develop the field. In 
1997, it became the operator after Texaco, the former operator, pulled out from 
the project. As Premier Oil's first major development operatorship, the Yetagun 
project was central to the company's planned transition from an exploration 
company to a production and development operator (Premier Oil, 1998: 11,21). 
In furtherance of the transition, the company formed a strategic alliance with 
Amerada Hess and Petronas Caligari, each of which acquired a 25% interest in 
Premier Oil. The purpose of the alliance was to create a company that could 
become a leading independent oil and gas company in South East Asia. The 
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purpose was unrealised as the large shareholding of Amerada Hess and Petronas 
Caligari, in conjunction with the low price of oil, had a depressive effect on the 
company's share price that plummeted from 52p in 1997 to just lOp in 1999 
(Premier Oil, 2000: 3; Premier Oil, 2002: 2). By 2002, Premier Oil had modified 
its strategy and decided to focus on exploration and commercial deal-making 
rather than the development of oil and gas fields (Premier Oil, 2001: 3; Premier 
Oil, 2002: 2). A restructuring was announced in the fall of 2002. It consisted of 
the sale of the company's interests in the Yetagun project and a part of the 
operations in Indonesia in exchange for £234 million and the shares held in 
Premier Oil by Amerada Hess and Petronas Caligari (Premier Oil, 2002: 2). The 
Yetagun project has therefore been central to Premier Oil's strategy, particularly 
during the period from 1997 to 2003. 
5.4.3 Talisman Energy 
Talisman is one the largest independents in the oil and gas sector. In 2002, it had 
interests or operations in 12 countries and a permanent staff of more than 1,500 
people (Talisman, 2002a; Talisman, 2002b: 13). Its business focuses on upstream 
activities including the exploration, development, production, transportation and 
marketing of crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids (Talisman, 2006b). It 
does not seek to have any refining operations (ibid.). 
Talisman Energy was founded in the early 1950s as BP Canada. In 1992, BP sold 
its majority interest in the company which changed its name to Talisman Energy. 
Since then, Talisman has expanded its activities through acquisitions and 
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exploration activities. The majority of Talisman's oil and gas production is in 
Canada and the North Sea (Talisman, 2000a; Talisman, 2003a). It started its 
international operations only in 1994. The acquisition of the indirect working 
interest in Block 5A in Sudan through the take-over of Arakis Energy in 1998 led 
to one of its first activities outside Canada. By 2000, it had operations also in 
Algeria, Indonesia, Colombia, and Trinidad (Talisman, 2000a). 
In 2000, two years after Talisman had acquired Arakis Energy, oil production in 
Sudan represented 11% of Talisman's worldwide production (Talisman, 2000b: 
1). The investment in Sudan was therefore relatively important for the company. 
Many observers and the CEO of Talisman however believed that the company's 
share price was undervalued because of the investment in Sudan (Talisman, 
2002a: 2). 
5.4.4 Lundin Oil/Petroleum 
Lundin Petroleum is an independent company involved with the exploration and 
production of oil and gas. In 2002, it had interests or production in nine countries 
and 182 employees (Lundin, 2002a: 52). According to the Chairman, Ian Lundin, 
the company focuses on the exploration of oil, but also seeks to increase 
production in the short term through acquisitions (Lundin, 2002a: 7). Even when 
the controversy surrounding its operations in Sudan was heightened, it was "ready 
to face political challenges" (Lundin, 2000: 5). 
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Lundin Petroleum is registered in Sweden, but it belongs to a group of companies 
with legal entities in the Netherlands and Bermuda (Lundin, 2002a: 27). The main 
office is in Switzerland. The Lundin family controls the company through its 36% 
share and representation in the board (Lundin, 2002a: 25). Other shareholders 
include banks and institutional investors (ibid.). Carl Bildt, a prime minister of 
Sweden 1991-1994 and UN Special Envoy for the Balkans 1999-2001, is a 
member of the board (Lundin, 2000: 16). 
Lundin Petroleum was spun off from Lundin Oil in 2001 when Talisman acquired 
most of Lundin Oil's assets (Lundin, 2000: 2). Adolf Lundin, the Chairman of the 
Lundin Group and father of Ian Lundin who is the Chairman of Lundin 
Petroleum, has described the events as follows: 
We sold the company in 2001 for $400 million to Talisman, the Canadian 
company, and gave the shareholders one share in the new company, called 
Lundin Petroleum. That started with one asset, the Sudan concession, 
which Talisman didn't want. (Lundin, undated) 
The new company, Lundin Petroleum, continued with the same board and 
management team than Lundin Oil with its main assets in Sudan and Iran (Lundin, 
2000: 4; Lundin, 2002a: 9, 29). With the acquisition of Coparex in 2002, it 
expanded its activities to other countries (Lundin, 2002a: 6). Lundin Petroleum is 
closely connected to the other companies of the Lundin family which has 
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companies operating in a number of countries that are politically unstable 
including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Lundin, undated). 
TABLE 5.4. Company characteristics in 20029 
Characteristic I Total Premier Oil Talisman Energy Lundin 011 
Number of 121,469 478 1,565 182 ~I!l.P!9'i~~S 
-. 
Operating income 10, 126 million ( £263 million 2,439 million C$ 295,844 TSEK 
Assets 85, 329 million ( £538 million 11,594 million C$ 2,742,431 TSEK 
Earnings per 8.93 ( £1.58 3.73 C$ -0.1 SEK 
share 
r-'"--
Home country France United Kingdom Canada Sweden 
Sources: Lundin, 2002a; Premier Oil, 2002a; Talisman, 2002a; Total, 2002a. 
5.5 Summary 
Both Myanmar and Sudan were governed by a form of a military government 
during the period of research. The governments were responsible for serious 
human rights violations of which some were related to internal armed conflict. 
The political opposition was repressed in both countries, but it had more freedom 
in Sudan than in Myanmar. The situation in Sudan improved over time, but 
serious human rights violations were perpetrated throughout the period of study. 
The improvements in Sudan were followed by the lifting of sanctions by the 
United Nations and the European Union. In contrast, sanctions imposed on 
Myanmar increased over the period of study. The key country characteristics are 
summarised in Table 5.5 below. 
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TABLE 5.5. Key country characteristics 
Characteristic Myanmar Sudan 
1989 2003 1998 2003 
Population 50 million 35 million 
Military through 
Government Military junta No change presidential Little change 
decrees 
Peace-
agreements with Civil war, most of the Civil war, More than 25 
armed groups Khartoum peace Internal conflict armed insurgent agreement new peace with the agreement being groups excludes main exception of KNU 
rebel group negotiated 
and some 
smaller groups 
HOI rank nfa 129 157 141 
Overall human Serious violations Serious violations 
rights situation 
Sanctions Increasing Decreasing 
The case study projects shared a number of characteristics. Most importantly for 
their impact on human rights in Myanmar and Sudan, their operations involved 
the same geographical areas and therefore the same local communities, though the 
activities in Sudan were relatively far apart in a country that is the size of Western 
Europe. All the case study companies were domiciled in Europe or North 
America. Total was the only major; the others were independents of various size. 
Total also differed from the other companies because it had special links to its 
home government. Each company had an interest in a joint venture that was 
extracting and transporting oil or gas. The interests varied from Talisman's 25% 
to Lundin's 40% and were relatively important for all the companies except for 
Total. Finally, all the companies with the exception of Total sold their interests in 
Myanmar or Sudan after about five years of operations on the ground. 
9 Infonnation on the companies is reported from 2002 rather than 2003 because of Premier Oil's 
restructuring that distorted its financial outcome in 2003 . 
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6 Human rights issues 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes and explores the characteristics of the human rights issues 
addressed by the case study companies in connection with their operations in 
Myanmar and Sudan. It therefore responds to the first research question specified 
in Chapter 1 : What characterises human rights concerns encountered by 
companies? The focus is on the concerns that the companies have sought to 
influence through diverse measures. The term issue is therefore used to refer to 
those human rights concerns that the companies have decided to act upon rather 
than all the concerns that may be associated with their operations in a particular 
country (see 1.7). 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the ontological nature of human rights 
issues. As will be seen, human rights issues can be categorised into substantial 
and symbolic issues. This distinction underpins the remaining of the chapter 
which consists of two main parts. The first identifies and describes the substantial 
issues addressed by the case study companies in connection to their operations in 
Myanmar and Sudan. The second explores the concept of symbolic issues by 
examining the characteristics of the symbolic issues addressed by the case study 
companies in Myanmar and Sudan. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
main findings. 
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The distinction into substantial and symbolic issues reflects the way in which 
corporate human rights strategies are defined in Chapter 7. It is also one of the 
factors that will be argued to affect strategy selection in Chapter 8. The 
ontological nature of human rights issues is therefore an essential element of the 
framework of corporate human rights strategies. 
6.2 Substantial and symbolic issues 
The analysis of the cases suggests that human rights concerns can be categorised 
into substantial and symbolic issues on the basis of their ontological nature. 
Substantial issues involve policies, behaviours, or conditions that affect the 
enjoyment of the entitlements enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. For example, the behaviour of government provided security forces in 
both Myanmar and Sudan gave rise to concerns about a number of rights enlisted 
in the Universal Declaration including the right to life, liberty, and security (Art. 
3) and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention (Art. 9). The example of the 
behaviour of government provided security forces also shows that substantial 
issues do not only concern the policies and behaviour of companies, but also those 
of other actors that can be connected to company operations. As will be seen, 
most of the substantial issues addressed by the case study companies in Myanmar 
and Sudan arose from the actions of the host government or the army. 
In contrast to substantial issues, symbolic issues arise from the conflicting views 
and perceptions that different actors have about some policies or circumstances 
that can be associated to companies and the entitlements enlisted in the Universal 
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Declaration. Symbolic issues are therefore a result of the different ways in which 
companies and their stakeholders interpret events and situations. As seen in the 
literature review, the role of interpretation in the emergence of issues has been 
previously highlighted by researchers who have studied the development of social 
problems (Daft & Weick, 1984; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) and corporate issues 
(Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Lamertz, Martens, & Heugens, 2003). These 
researchers have argued that the same phenomenon may be perceived in a 
different way by different actors because individuals make specific interpretations 
of conditions and events from a multiplicity of possibilities. As will be seen, the 
analysis of the cases suggests that symbolic issues are underpinned by conflicting 
perceptions or interpretations of (1) some state of affairs and/or (2) the boundaries 
of responsibility between companies and other actors (see 6.4). 
The essential difference between substantial and symbolic issues therefore 
pertains to the degree of agreement that exists on the issue. For example, both 
Total and a number of non-governmental organisations agreed that the Myanmar 
army had resorted to the use of forced labour in the pipeline area in the mid-1990s 
(see 6.3.1.1 below). The behaviour of the army at that time therefore gave rise to a 
substantial issue addressed by Total. Later on, however, Total argued that the 
army had stopped using forced labour, whereas the non-governmental 
organisations alleged that the practice was still continuing (see 6.4.1.2). This 
disagreement on what was really happening gave rise to a symbolic issue 
underpinned by inconsistent perceptions of what was happening in the pipeline 
area. 
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The human rights issues addressed by the case study companies in Myanmar or 
Sudan can be divided into five principal categories as shown in Table 6.1 below: 
(1) behaviour of government provided security forces near the areas of operations, 
(2) quality of life in local communities, (3) high-profile human rights incidents, 
(4) social and economic situation outside the areas of operations, and (5) 
legitimacy of foreign investment. A number of more specific issues can be 
identified under each of the main categories. For example, the behaviour of 
security forces has given rise to concerns about extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, 
forced labour, and confiscation of private property. Table 6.1 also shows that the 
same main issue can involve both substantial and symbolic issues. 
TABLE 6.1. Human rights issues addressed by the case study companies 
Major issue 
Substantial issues 
Behaviour of 
security forces 
I Examples of specific issues Universal Declaration article 
I I Forced labour Art 4: Freedom from slavery 
L-.--------.-.--.------.. -.--- .----.-... -----... --.-......... ---.-.----... --..... --.. 
Forced relocations Art 13: Freedom of movement and residence 
I 
Extrajudicial killings Art. 3: Right to life, liberty, and 
security 
-------------------_.-._-- - -------
Extrajudicial arrests Art 9: Freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention 
r--.------------------ ----- - - -_.- ._-
Confiscation of private property Art 17 : Right to property 
---.-
Access to health care Art 25: Right to medical care 
t 
.. - .. ·-· .. · ..· .. --........ ·-·-· .... ·-·- .. -·---·-.. ·-·-· .. --·--.. · .... ---.-----.. --.-... -- - .-.-- .... -.. - ... --.. -
Quality of life in 1 Access to education Art 26 : Ri9ht __ to_ e_d .. ucation _ 
local communities ~ 
i Art 23: Right to work I Work opportunities Art 25: Right to an adequate 
1---__________ -+--_____ . __ . -- ______ .. ~tang9rQ...gUi\' lng -
I 
Arrest of Aung San Suu K i Art 19: Freedom of opinion and 
y expression High-level human ... _. ________ .. _. ___ .. _. __ .. __ ._._ .... __________ ._ .. ______ . ___ ... _ .... _ 
rights incidents Art 19 F d f d I National reconciliation : ree or;' ° opinion an 
I expression 
I 
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----.. ----.-~.-.-.-.. ----.--.----.------.--.-.-.-.-... -·-·----··-·---····--,--··---·-·-····-"-----c-
Art 22: Economic and social rights 
~i;~~ :~:s::.c:~~:~ cO~~~~~~_~~~~~i:I~~d g~~~_~_~,_ __"_,_,_,_,_~l~~~~~_~~_~~~~~~ _~~:_~~ _____ ,, 
of operations, ,_ Problems In the area of health Art 25: Right to medical care 
~ _________ ~ ________________ J _______________________ ____ 
Symbolic issues 
Behaviour of 
security forces 
Legitimacy of 
investment 
I Pre-investment violations Art 3,4, 9, 13, 17: As above 
1----,-----,---,--_·_,--- .. -,--,---,,--'''--, .. , ..,,-,--,---.. ,-.... -.. , ..-,----,--''''--,-,-,---
Forced relocations Art 13: Freedom of movement and 
residence 
Recent human rights situation Art 3-5,9, 13, 17: As above 
General human rights situation All 
As seen in Table 6.1 , substantial and symbolic human rights issues addressed by 
the case study companies in Myanmar and Sudan involve different families of 
rights. The behaviour of security forces pertains mainly to security rights that 
protect individuals against abuses of their physical integrity such as murder, 
torture, and rape, but also to the due process rights that provide for the protection 
of the law. The quality of life in local communities, the condition of unprivileged 
groups, and specific problems in the area of health concern economic and social 
rights regarded as indispensable for human dignity and the development of 
personality. The high-level human rights incidents addressed by the companies 
involve civil and political rights that seek to guarantee the freedom of opinion and 
right to influence how a particular country is governed. Finally, the legitimacy of 
investment in Myanmar and Sudan does not concern any particular family of 
rights but the overall situation of human rights. The case study companies have 
therefore addressed all main types of rights enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration. They have, however, been more reluctant to address issues related to 
civil and political rights than other types of rights (see 7.2). 
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6.3 Substantial human rights issues 
As just seen, substantial issues concern policies, behaviours, or circumstances that 
give rise to human rights concerns. The analysis of the cases shows that the 
substantial issues addressed by the case study companies in Myanmar and Sudan 
pertained to three principal areas of concern: (1) policies and behaviour of the host 
government and other external actors, (2) conditions in local communities, and (3) 
specific problems relating to health or unprivileged groups outside the areas of 
operations. The companies addressed several separate issues under these principal 
types of substantial issues. 
6.3.1 Policies and behaviour of external actors 
All the case study companies took measures to address human rights issues that 
arose from the policies and behaviour of the host government or other actors 
connected to their operations in Myanmar and Sudan. These measures addressed 
two main issues (1) the behaviour of security forces and (2) a number of high-
profile human rights incidents outside the areas of operations. The behaviour of 
security forces is here discussed as a substantial issue on which some degree of 
agreement exists. In section 6.4 below, the behaviour of security forces is 
examined as a symbolic issue underpinned by disagreements about the actual state 
of affairs and/or boundaries of responsibility between companies and the host 
government. 
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6.3.1.1 Behaviour of security forces 
The behaviour of government provided security forces gave rise to concerns about 
human rights violations in both Myanmar and Sudan. In Myanmar, the substantial 
issues centred on the practice of forced labour while in Sudan, the focus was on 
the bombardment and raiding of civilian settlements. In all the cases studied, the 
government forces were responsible for providing a secure working environment 
for the companies in collaboration with the private security companies that were 
directly employed by the companies (Anderson et aI., 2002: 6-7; Batruch, 2004; 
Jones, 2003b; Talisman, 2000b: 14; Total, 2003c: 13). The need for security 
arrangements in Myanmar and Sudan was heightened because the oil and gas 
installations and personnel were seen as legitimate targets by the armed groups 
that were opposed to the central government (Gagnon & Ryle, 2001; International 
Crisis Group, 2002a: 119; Talisman, 200lb: 14; Total, 2003: 14). Serious 
incidents took place in both countries. In Myanmar, a truck that carried personnel 
from a French company conducting survey work for the Yadana project was 
attacked in March 1995. As a result, five Myanmar nationals were killed and 
several others injured (Total, 2003c: 14). Attacks were also mounted against the 
oil fields in Sudan. For example, in 2001, several people working for Talisman's 
sub-contractor died in an incident that the SPLA claimed responsibility for 
(Talisman, 200lb: 14). 
Myanmar: forced labour and other violations by the army. According to 
Total, it first learned about human rights violations committed by the Myanmar 
army in the pipeline region in late 1995 after it had started the building of the 
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Yadana pipeline (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15). At this time, Premier Oil 
had not yet begun its operations in the area. The Myanmar army reportedly 
committed a range of human rights violations including forced and child labour, 
extrajudicial arrests and killings, torture, rape, and confiscation of private property 
without compensation (EarthRights International, 2001; Karen Human Rights 
Group, 1995; Laroche & Habbard, 1996). According to the non-governmental 
organisations that conducted interviews in the area, the military forced villagers to 
build army barracks and helipads, clear roads along the pipeline, and serve as 
porters for the military (Doe v. Unocal, 2001: 14198-9; EarthRights International 
& Southeast Asian Information Network, 1996; Karen Human Rights Group, 
1995; Laroche & Habbard, 1996). The provision of forced labour was organised 
by village heads who allocated the quota demanded by the army among village 
households (Karen Human Rights Group, 1996). Villagers were able to avoid 
forced labour by paying other villagers to work on their behalf or by sending their 
children to fill in the quota, a practice that resulted in accusations of child labour 
(EarthRights International, 2000: 10 1-1 03; Laroche & Habbard, 1996). A court 
document from the case brought against Total and Unocal in the United States for 
alleged human rights violations in Myanmar described the charges on forced 
labour as follows: 
Plaintiffs are villagers from Myanmar's Tenasserim region, the rural area 
through which the Project built the pipeline. Plaintiffs allege that the 
Myanmar Military forced them, under threat of'violence, to work on and 
serve as porters for the Project. For instance, John Doe IX testified that he 
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was forced to build a helipad near the pipeline site in 1994 that was then 
used by Unocal and Total officials who visited the pipeline during its 
planning stages. (Doe v. Unocal, 2001: 14198) 
The non-governmental organisations also reported that systematic human rights 
violations took place while villagers were forced to work for the army. These 
violations included extra-judicial arrests and killings, torture, rape, and 
confiscation of private property (see, e.g., EarthRights International, 2000: 53-60). 
Moreover, the non-governmental organisations alleged that the army requisitioned 
food, farmland and other private property from the villagers without appropriate 
compensation (EarthRights International, 2000: 107; Karen Human Rights Group, 
1996). The army troops also imposed a range of fees on local communities, 
including pagoda fees, sports fees, and sentry fees (EarthRights International, 
2000: 100-111; Karen Human Rights Group, 1995; Laroche & Habbard, 1996). 
As a result, many villagers fled the area as they were not able make a living while 
forced to work for the army and to pay so many fees (EarthRights International, 
2000: 100; Karen Human Rights Group, 1995; Laroche & Habbard, 1996). A 
villager interviewed by a researcher from EarthRights International described the 
situation in the end of 1990s as follows: 
My money and all my belongings like chickens, pigs, and cows were 
almost gone. A month before I left my village, I had to pay 7,000 kyat. It 
was for portering, forced labour, and for the Boad [Heinze] Island labou.r. 
Moreover, when the soldiers came into the village, all the food that they 
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ate, we had to give to them. [ ... ] [W]e escaped to Thailand. (EarthRights 
International, 2000: 100) 
The human rights violations committed by the Myanmar army in the pipeline 
region were similar to the violations that took place elsewhere in the country. 
Most of the violations seemed to stem from the military's policy of self-reliance 
which drove the army troops to confiscate private property, ask for additional 
payments on top of regular taxes, and force villagers to provide labour for the 
army. A failure to comply with the demands of the army was followed by extra-
judicial arrests, torture, killings, and other human rights violations. For example, 
villagers were physically abused or otherwise ill-treated while forced to work for 
the military. The army was also linked to numerous accounts of rape, particularly 
in the ethnic minority areas. (ILO, 1998; United Nations, 1993-2003) 
Total and Premier Oil maintained that human rights violations in the pipeline area 
stopped or became increasingly rare over time (Jones, 2003b; Total, 2003c: 15). 
This was contrasted by reports about continuing violations by non-governmental 
organisations, particularly EarthRights International (EarthRights International, 
2002; EarthRights International, 2003). The disagreement over the behaviour of 
the army gave rise to symbolic human rights issues involving conflicting 
perceptions about the human rights situation in the pipeline area (see 6.4.2). 
Sudan: security forces involved in civil war and attacks on civilians. The 
oilfields in Sudan were located in an area where an internal conflict had been 
187 
going on since Sudan became independent from Britain in 1954. The combination 
of fighting, raids of civilian settlements, drought, and government ban on access 
for relief organisations had damaging consequences for the situation of human 
rights and caused humanitarian emergencies in the area (International Crisis 
Group, 2002a: 122; United Nations, 1999). In 1999, when both Talisman and 
Lundin were operating in the area, the conflict was described in the following way 
by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan: 
"[I]nnocent civilians are the principal target and the famine is a direct by-product, 
as food is manipulated as a weapon of war" (United Nations, 1999: para 46). 
Although all the parties to the conflict in Sudan were guilty of human rights 
abuses, the majority of the abuses were conducted by the government forces and 
associated militia groups (International Crisis Group, 2002a: 116; United Nations, 
1999). According to human rights organisations, the same government forces that 
provided security for the oil fields over the period of research also took part in 
attacks against military targets and civilian settlements (Christian Aid, 2001; 
Gagnon & Ryle, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Local inhabitants in the area 
were attacked because they were considered possible rebel supporters and as such 
a security risk (Gagnon & Ryle, 2001; International Crisis Group, 2002a: 116). 
Attacks on civilians typically involved aerial bombardment followed by raids in 
which government sponsored tribal militia confiscated property, killed men, 
abducted young boys to use as soldiers, and enslaved women and children 
(International Crisis Group, 2002a: 121; United Nations, 1999). 
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The government forces or militias supported by them used company infrastructure 
such as airports and roads to attack military and civilian targets (Christian Aid, 
2001; Gagnon & Ryle, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2003; Talisman, 2000b: 16). 
The use of the Heglig airport that Talisman turned into an all-weather airport was 
particularly controversial. Gunships using this airport gave cover to oil workers, 
but also attacked civilian and military targets (e.g., Christian Aid, 2001; Human 
Rights Watch, 2003). Talisman admitted that the airstrip had been used for non-
defensive purposes: 
Despite the Company's stated position regarding the use of the Heglig 
airstrip and advocacy efforts in this regard, we believe that there were at 
least four instances of non-defensive usage of the Heglig airstrip in 2000. 
On these occasions helicopters or planes landed the airstrip for reasons 
that we could not determine were related to oilfield security and their 
presence was considered non-defensive by Talisman. (Talisman, 2000b: 
16) 
According to Talisman, oilfield infrastructure was owned by the government and 
therefore not under the company's direct control (Talisman, 2000b: 15). 
Nevertheless, the company took measures to ensure that the government did not 
use the infrastructure for offensive purposes (see next chapter), but the 
government still continued to use it for attacks against the SPLA and other targets 
as Talisman's corporate social responsibility report from 2001 explains: 
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Due to the increase in security incidents, as described earlier, there has 
been an increase in the use of the airstrips at Heglig and Unity by the 
Sudan military. [ ... ] the Unity airstrip located in the southeast of the 
concession has been operating as a military airstrip. (Talisman, 2001 b: 17) 
The Sudanese government also used access to humanitarian aid to achieve its aims 
(Gagnon & Ryle, 2001; International Crisis Group, 2002a: 136, 148). In 2001, 
USAID reported that the government had increased its clearance denials of UN 
aid flights, particularly to the oilfield areas (International Crisis Group, 2002a: 
148). Also, both the government and SPLA forces attacked aid workers in the area 
(United Nations, 1999). For example, in 1999, the SPLA abducted and killed 
people working for the International Committee of the Red Cross (United Nations, 
1999; United Nations, 2001). 
6.3.1.2 High-profile human rights incidents 
In addition to the behaviour of the army in the pipeline region, Total and Premier 
Oil expressed their concern over a number of high-profile human rights incidents 
that took place outside the pipeline region in Myanmar. The companies did not 
therefore only address substantial issues that could be connected to their 
operations in the country, but also some more general developments in Myanmar. 
This was, however, a recent phenomenon, particularly in the case of Total (see 
section 7.2.1). No evidence was found about similar activities by Talisman or 
Lundin Oil in Sudan. 
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National reconciliation and treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi. Both Total and 
Premier Oil expressed their concern over the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi and 
supported the process of reconciliation in Myanmar (see section 7.5.3). The 
treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi has brought regular attention on the situation in 
Myanmar. Since the demonstrations of 1988 that led to the opening of the 
economy and the elections of 1990, Aung San Suu Kyi has symbolised the 
campaign for democracy and human rights in Myanmar because of her popularity 
inside and outside the country and personal courage in facing the military regime. 
In 1991, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of her role in the 
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. The international 
community has put constant pressure on the military government to include Aung 
San Suu Kyi in the discussions about Myanmar's future (e.g., United Nations, 
2003a). The military has responded by holding talks with Aung San Suu Kyi and 
other members of the National League for Democracy, but the process of national 
reconciliation has suffered from the government's systematic policy of 
intimidation and repression of political opponents (see, for example, United 
Nations, 2000). 
In May 2003, during a period when Aung San Suu Kyi was not held under house 
arrest, her convoy was attacked in northern Myanmar. She was subsequently 
detained and operated in a hospital before put again under house arrest. 
Eyewitnesses and other parties believed that the attack was orchestrated by the 
Myanmar military (US Department of State, 2003). The United States, the 
European Union, Australia, and Japan consequently introduced new political and 
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economic sanctions on Myanmar. These sanctions are unlikely to be lifted before 
the military follows the appeals to hold discussions with Aung San Suu Kyi and to 
take other steps to further the national reconciliation process (United Nations, 
2003a). 
British prisoner of conscience. In addition to supporting the national 
reconciliation process and raising concerns about the treatment of Aung San Suu 
Kyi, Premier Oil addressed a number of other high-profile human rights incidents 
in Myanmar. In 2000, it contributed to the enjoyment of the freedom of opinion 
and expression by allegedly playing a role in the early release of a British 
national, James Mawdsley, who was imprisoned by the Myanmar authorities for 
expressing his views on the situation in the country (Premier Oils Wheels of 
Change, 2001; Premier Oil Looks Well Placed, 2002). Mawdsley travelled to 
Myanmar on three separate occasions to express his opposition to the policies of 
the military government by, for example, handing out pamphlets and playing 
democracy songs on a tape recorder (United Nations, 2000). He was twice 
deported, but re-entered for a third time without a visa through Thailand; he was 
subsequently arrested and sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment for illegal entry 
and distribution of leaflets (ibid.) The incident attracted some attention in the 
international media and was also raised within the United Nations. In addition to 
the case of Mawdsley, Premier Oil wrote to the government officials in Myanmar 
about a number of other issues related to the civil and political rights enumerated 
in the Universal Declaration, but unconnected to the company's operations in the 
country (Jones, 2003b). 
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6.3.2 Conditions in local communities 
All the case study companies launched community development programmes to 
improve the quality of life in the communities where they operated in Myanmar 
and Sudan (Premier Oil, 2001 b: 32; Lundin Oil, 2002b; Talisman Energy, 2000b: 
23-25; Total, 2002d: 16). These projects contributed to the enjoyment of a variety 
of social and economic rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration. The right 
to education, for example, was enhanced through a number of projects including 
the construction of schools, provision of physical and educational material, and 
financial support of teachers (Lundin Oil, 2002b; Premier Oil, 2001 b: 32; 
Talisman Energy, 2000b: 24; Total, 2002d: 16). The right to medical and health 
care was furthered by way of a range of measures including the construction of 
health centres and a series of campaigns on vaccination, hygiene, sanitary 
education, malaria, and access to water (Lundin Oil, 2002b; Premier Oil, 1998: 
15; Premier Oil, 2001b: 32; Talisman, 2000b: 25; Total, 2003c: 19-20). The 
enjoyment of the right to work was supported through, for example, micro-credit 
programmes and skills training (Lundin Oil, 2002b; Premier Oil, 1998: 15; 
Premier Oil, 2001 b: 32; Total, 2002d: 17). In addition to the regular community 
development programmes, Talisman and Lundin provided humanitarian assistance 
near their oil fields in Sudan (Lundin, 2000: 15; Talisman, 2000b: 23, 40). 
The community development projects reflect established corporate practice across 
companies and countries. Contribution to host societies at the local level became a 
particularly topical issue in the mid-1990s when local communities in several 
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countries voiced their concern over the negative effects that extractive projects 
had on their livelihood and the lack of benefits at the local level (see McPhail & 
Davy, 1998). According to a study carried out by the OECD in 2002, extractive 
industry companies now view the provision of community development, 
education, and health services as part of their involvement in host societies and it 
is common for companies in the extractive industries to launch social and 
economic programmes alongside their business operations (OECD, 2002a: 8). In 
line with the industry practice, all the case study companies carried out 
community development projects in connection with their operations around the 
world (Lundin Oil, 2001a: 12; Premier Oil, 2001b; Talisman Energy, 2003b; 
Total, 2003a: 36). The objective of such projects was, according to Total, to 
"rectify the human and economic imbalances" that industrial projects "can create 
in local communities that are often very unprivileged and deprived of institutional 
support" (Total, 2003a: 36). 
6.3.3 Specific problems in the area of health or unprivileged 
groups 
In addition to the activities that facilitated the enjoyment of social and economic 
rights in local communities, the companies carried out similar projects outside 
their areas of operation. These projects were significantly smaller in scale than the 
community programmes and mainly furthered the realisation of social and 
economic rights by a specific, unprivileged group or by people with a particular 
medical condition such as blindness (see 7.4.4). They are an example of the 
philanthropic ventures that many companies carry out in their host societies. 
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6.4 Symbolic human rights issues 
As already seen, symbolic issues arise from the different ways in which situations 
are perceived and interpreted. They are essentially disagreements between 
companies and their stakeholders about some circumstances or more abstract 
ideas. As will be seen below, the analysis of the cases suggests that the symbolic 
issues addressed by the case study companies related to two main issues (1) the 
behaviour of government provided security forces and (2) the legitimacy of 
investment in Myanmar and Sudan. The analysis of the cases further reveals that 
symbolic issues were underpinned by conflicting views about (i) perceptions of 
reality and (ii) the boundaries of responsibility between companies and other 
actors, particularly the host government. In what follows, the symbolic issues 
addressed by the companies are described in relation to these two factors. 
6.4.1 Conflicting perceptions of reality 
The analysis of the cases suggests that symbolic issues are often underpinned by 
conflicting views about some objective conditions. Such conflicting views 
correspond to what Wartick and Mahon (1994) referred to as factual gaps between 
perceptions of "what is". According to Wartick and Mahon, factual gaps arise 
from inconsistent perceptions of corporate behaviour. Evidence from the cases 
shows that in addition to corporate behaviour, factual gaps can also involve 
incompatible perceptions of some state of affairs. For example, Total and Premier 
maintained that human rights violations had become increasingly rare as a result 
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of their presence in the pipeline area (e.g., Jones, 2003b; Total, 2003c: 15), 
whereas a number of non-governmental organisations alleged that the anny 
continued to perpetrate systematic human rights violations in the area (e.g., 
EarthRights International, 2002; EarthRights International, 2003; Zandvliet & 
Fraser,2004: 19). 
Symbolic issues based on conflicting perceptions of reality are exacerbated by 
mistrust between companies and some other actors. Total's head of mission in 
Myanmar, for example, believed that there were organisations whose raison 
d'etre was to oppose foreign investment in the country and that the information 
provided by these organisations was affected by this objective (du Rusquec, 
2003). Similarly, Lundin's manager for corporate social responsibility regarded 
the approach of some organisations as "difficult": "[I]n many cases, views about 
the situation in Sudan were so very different that discussions rarely went beyond 
each side trying to convince the other of the correctness of its views" (Batruch, 
2004). At the same time, the organisations investigating the consequences of the 
companies' investment in Myanmar and Sudan found that the companies had a 
generally defensive attitude towards human rights and that the companies often 
misrepresented or suppressed information in order to continue their operations 
(see, for example, Christian Aid, 2001: 6; EarthRights International, 1996). 
6.4.1.1 Impact of investment 
The conflicting perceptions between companies and some of their stakeholders 
over the impact of investment on human rights in Myanmar and Sudan gave rise 
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to a symbolic issue that all the companies sought to address in some way. The 
conflicting views about the impact of investment echo the difficulty of examining 
the impact of foreign investment on human rights as already discussed in the 
literature review (see 3.2). The situation of human rights in a particular country is 
affected by so many different factors that it is difficult to make conclusive 
arguments about the impact of company operations on human rights. 
A variety of actors asked the companies to withdraw or suspend their operations 
in Myanmar and Sudan because they believed that foreign investment provided 
financial and moral support for the Myanmar and Sudanese governments that 
were responsible for gross and systematic violations of human rights (Aung San 
Suu Kyi, 1997: 169; European Parliament, 1998b; House of Commons 
Parliamentary Debates, 2000; NCGUB, 1995). For example, argued the Karen 
Human Rights Group that had reported about the human rights situation in the 
pipeline area in Myanmar: 
[J]n the case of Burma, foreign investment directly leads to suffering. [ ... ] 
The profits from these joint ventures stay with the military and are used to 
expand the Swiss bank accounts of junta members and to expand and arm 
the grossly oversized Army, which exists in the absence of any foreign 
threat, only to crush its own people. (Karen Human Rights Group, 1995) 
Similar calls were made on Talisman and Lundin in connection with their 
operations in Sudan. For example, Christian Aid asked the companies to suspend 
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their operations in the country and in this way to promote the respect for human 
rights: 
Christian Aid is not calling for the operational oil companies to sell their 
concessions, nor to relinquish their investment in Sudanese oil industry. 
But they must send a clear message to the government of the Sudan that it 
is unacceptable to violate human rights and humanitarian law in order to 
assist the production of oil. (Christian Aid, 2001: 33). 
The companies responded to the allegations by arguing that they had through their 
policies and activities set an example on international standards for the Myanmar 
and Sudanese authorities (e.g., Premier Oil, 1998: 14; Total, 2002c: 87). For 
example, stated Premier Oil in one of its annual reports: 
In any global business, judgements have to be made about doing business 
in countries that have political systems that are criticised by the 
international community. [ ... ] However, we believe that the development 
of an emerging country's energy resources is one of the prime requisites 
for long-term economic growth. We believe that the high standards of 
employment and welfare we set are seen as an example of what can be 
achieved and what is globally acceptable. (Premier Oil, 1998: 14) 
The companies also presented other arguments about their positive impact on 
human rights in Myanmar and Sudan. Total, for example, argued that the presence 
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of international companies is the best way of enforcing the process of 
normalisation and respect for human rights in Myanmar (Total, 2002c: 5). The 
companies also asserted that economic development was a step towards the 
respect of human rights (Talisman 2000b: 7; Total, 2003b: 25). Talisman 
expressed this argument in the following way in its first Corporate Social 
Responsibility report: 
The Canadian Government has expressed the view that "trade leads to 
development, and development leads to respect of human rights and leads 
to respect of democracy". We believe that this will be the case in Sudan. 
(Talisman 2000b: 7) 
6.4.1.2 Human rights situation in Myanmar 
Another issue over which the companies and a number of non-governmental 
organisations had conflicting views was the human rights situation in the pipeline 
area in Myanmar. These conflicting views were underpinned by the inconsistency 
of the evidence collected by the companies and the non-governmental 
organisations. Interviews carried out by the latter, particularly EarthRights 
International, suggested that the army still perpetrated systematic human rights 
violations in the vicinity of the pipelines (e.g. EarthRights International, 2002; 
EarthRights International, 2003; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 19). The alleged 
violations included forced portering for the military, providing soldiers with food 
and money, and forced work for infrastructure projects (EarthRights International, 
2002; EarthRights International, 2003). 
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In contrast to the reports by EarthRights International, Total and Premier Oil 
argued that the army had changed its behaviour in the pipeline area and that 
occurrences of human rights violations had become increasingly rare (Jones, 
2003b; Total, 2003c: 15). The companies based their position on the human rights 
monitoring that they carried out in the area. Both Total and Premier Oil observed 
the human rights situation through their personnel that was in regular contact with 
local villagers (see 7.4.3). The companies also asked other organisations and 
individuals to investigate the situation in the pipeline region. One of these 
organisations, Collaborative for Development Action, visited Myanmar at the 
request of Total in 2002 and 2003 to examine the impact of Total's operations on 
local communities. It found no evidence of systematic use of forced labour or 
other human rights violations in the villages that were included in Total's socio-
economic programme (Anderson et al., 2002; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003; Zandvliet 
& Fraser, 2004). Quite the opposite, villagers told the researchers from the agency 
that the presence of foreign companies had improved the situation regarding 
forced labour and ad-hoc taxation: 
Villagers repeatedly attributed the absence of forced labour and taxation 
by the army in the pipeline area directly to the presence of the gas 
companies (TFE and Premier Oil). Many people explicitly commented on 
the fact that the presence of the oil companies has improved their 
circumstances, specifically with regard to labour and taxation. [ ... ] Almost 
everyone immediately indicated that, even more important than these 
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economic and social benefits, was the advantage of having recourse when 
the army requested labour. (Anderson et aI., 2002: 10) 
EarthRights International countered these findings by alleging that local military 
commanders had advised villagers not to talk about the use of forced labour which 
still however continued (EarthRights International, 2002). For example, a farmer 
interviewed by a member of the EarthRights International team witnessed how 
villagers were advised not to tell about forced labour to the foreigners visiting the 
area: 
One time a commander from town came to our village and told us not to 
talk about forced labour if and when a delegation came and asked about it. 
That happened in April 2001, after the Water Festival. He called a meeting 
in our village, and he talked about it. Three days after he left, a delegation 
including one foreign woman came to our village and asked if there was 
any forced labour. No one dared to say yes because the soldiers had 
already told us not to say there still was forced labour. I saw a signpost 
outside the village that there would be no forced labour and that the 
soldiers could not ask for forced labour. But nothing has changed. 
(EarthRights International, 2002, Interview #071) 
EarthRights International recorded several similar accounts. On one occasion, 
military authorities from the capital visited a village in the pipeline area to ensure 
that forced labour was not used. Villagers were reluctant to report about incidents 
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of forced labour as local commanders had warned that anyone testifying about the 
practice would be punished. (EarthRights International, 2001) In 2002, a fanner 
from the Tenasserim division where the pipelines go across Myanmar described 
the situation regarding forced labour as follows: 
The situation in our village right now is sometimes good and sometimes 
bad. It is good when we have time to work for our family and our 
business, but it is bad when we have to work for the soldiers. Sometimes 
we have to work on the road in our village. People still have to porter for 
the soldiers. It happens once a month, and each time the soldiers order 
about two porters. [ ... ] The last time we had to work for soldiers, I did not 
have to go. But my wife's sister, only fifteen years old, had to go. It was 
for harvesting rice paddies from the LIB #401's field. [ ... ] I did not see 
people get paid for the work. Moreover they cannot refuse to go. If we 
don't go, we have to hire people for us. (EarthRights International, 2002, 
Interview #031) 
According to EarthRights International, Light Infantry Battalion 401 mentioned 
by the villager was known to have provided security for the pipeline projects 
(EarthRights International, 2001: 29, 95). 
Collaborative for Development Action, commissioned by Total, attempted to 
corroborate the accounts published by EarthRights International by asking 
villagers whether the anny had paid pre-emptive visits prior to their own earlier 
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visits. The villagers denied this. Collaborative for Development Action noted in 
its following report that because the villagers told about their previous 
experiences of forced labour and expressed their dissatisfaction about many 
government policies, it seemed unlikely that the army had threatened the villagers 
in the manner suggested by EarthRights International. (Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 
4) Moreover, during the organisation's first visit to the pipeline area, the villagers 
told the researchers that they felt safe reporting incidents of forced labour to Total 
staff (Anderson et al., 2002: 10). Also, the fact that the villagers had told the 
researchers about some incidents of human rights violations suggested that they 
were not afraid to disclose information about such issues. For example, 
Collaborative for Development Action was informed about the following incident 
in the pipeline area: 
One villager said that in December 2002, after the arrival of a new 
commander, his son was requested by the army to level ground and cut 
trees for a helicopter pad. The Head of Village (Ho V) confirmed that he 
had been asked by the army to "provide" 20 villagers for several hours. 
Although some villagers did not perceive this exercise as forced labour, 
others complained to the army, and they were exempted. In retaliation for 
the complaint, the battalion told the village that they could not sell their 
vegetables to the barracks, a situation that lasted for 6 weeks. (Zandvliet & 
Fraser, 2003: 14) 
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Subsequent to the complaints, the local battalion was reprimanded (Zandvliet & 
Fraser, 2003: 15). The army also retrospectively paid the villagers for the work 
they had conducted (ibid.). 
Collaboration for Development Action also visited exiled communities near the 
Myanmar-Thailand border to explore the possibility that the villagers who had 
been subjected to human rights violations could have left the pipeline area for the 
refugee camps in Thailand (Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 2; Zandvliet & Fraser, 
2004: 3). The consultancy subsequently found that several organisations based in 
the border area had recent information about the use of forced labour in the 
pipeline region (Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 19). The disagreement about the 
human rights situation in the pipeline region therefore persisted. 
6.4.1.3 Forced displacement in Sudan 
Similarly to the conflicting views over the human rights situation in the pipeline 
area in Myanmar, the inconsistent views about the forced population 
displacements in Sudan were underpinned by the contradictory findings of the 
investigations carried out by the companies and other actors. According to John 
Harker, who was asked by the Canadian government to investigate the issue of 
population movements, the first displacements took place in 1992 when the 
government started planning for oil exploration in the southern Sudan (Harker, 
2000: 10). Alleged depopulation of the area where the oil fields were located 
therefore started already before Talisman and Lundin invested in Sudan and 
continued after the companies began operating in the area in the late 1990s 
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(Christian Aid, 2001: 6; Harker, 2000: 11). According to Christian Aid, 
displacements resulted from a systematic series of attacks through which 
"government forces have destroyed harvests, looted livestock and burned houses 
to ensure that no-one, once displaced, will return home" with the effect that some 
areas were turned into "government-controlled no-go areas" (Christian Aid, 2001: 
6). In 1999, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Sudan reported that the government was following "a policy of forcible 
population displacement in order to clear oil-producing areas and transportation 
routes of southern civilians, who were suspected of supporting sabotage actions 
by the SPLA" (United Nations, 1999). 
The companies carried out their own investigations about population movements 
in Sudan and used evidence from these investigations to renounce the allegations 
about forced displacements. Talisman's investigations, for example, involved a 
satellite photo study which covered the time period from 1965 to 2000. According 
to the company, the photos showed "no evidence of appreciable human migration 
- in other words displacement - within the concession areas studied" (Talisman, 
2001b: 16). Instead, the study showed that some areas had experienced an 
increase in human population which was confirmed by the interviews the 
company conducted in Sudan (ibid.). Similarly, Lundin carried out its 
investigation on displacements when specific allegations were made in relation to 
a road built by the company, but found no evidence of forced displacements: 
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Having carried out our own investigation, we can now state categorically 
that there has been no forced population displacement along the 80 km all-
weather road which runs from our base camp at Rubkona to the present 
drill site at Jarayan, no burning of villages to make way for the road. There 
are witnesses on the ground who are prepared to testify about this. 
(Lundin,200Ic) 
Human rights groups criticised the investigations conducted by the companies. 
Human Rights Watch, for example, argued that the satellite images published by 
Talisman could have been interpreted differently from the way in which the 
company interpreted them. For example, the increase in human population 
showed by the images could have been seen to prove that agro-pastoralists tribes 
were being forced to move from rural areas into towns because of the internal 
conflict or other reasons such as drought (Human Rights Watch, 2003). 
6.4.2 Boundaries of responsibility 
In addition to conflicting perceptions of reality or objective conditions, the 
analysis of the cases shows that symbolic issues can be underpinned by differing 
views on the boundaries of responsibility between companies and other actors. 
Such views resemble what Wartick and Mahon (1994) called ideals gaps around 
incongruent arguments about ''what should be". As will be seen below, a further 
analysis of the cases suggests that differing views on the boundaries of 
responsibility can relate to (i) geography, (ii) time, and/or (iii) legitimate role of 
different actors. 
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6.4.2.1 Physical boundaries of responsibility 
Evidence from the cases shows that symbolic issues may be based on conflicting 
views over the physical or geographical limits of corporate responsibility. In 
Myanmar, the different ways in which the case study companies and non-
governmental organisations, particularly EarthRights International, defined the 
pipeline area contributed to the conflicting reports about the human rights 
situation in the area. Total and Premier Oil spoke about the geographical area 
around the pipelines as the pipeline 'corridor'. This area was 10-15 kilometres 
wide and covered the length of the onshore pipelines from the Myanmar coast to 
the Thai border. The villages that were included in the socio-economic 
programmes were located inside the corridor and the Myanmar government and 
the army troops in the area were aware of the boundaries of the corridor. 
(Anderson, Fraser & Zandvliet, 2002: 3; Premier Oil, 2001b) Total and Premier 
Oil referred to the villages inside the corridor when they asserted that they had put 
a stop to human rights violations in the pipeline area. In contrast, the allegations 
that EarthRights International made about human rights violations in the area 
were based on interviews with villagers that came from communities situated 
within twelve miles of the pipelines, an area somewhat larger than the corridor 
(EarthRights International, 2002; EarthRights International, 2003). It may 
therefore be that human rights violations took place in the vicinity of the 
pipelines, but outside what the companies regarded as the pipeline corridor. This 
explanation for the conflicting reports of the human rights situation in the pipeline 
area was supported by the observations made by Collaborative for Development 
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Action in 2002 during one of its visits to Myanmar. The organisation noted that 
the anny deployed forced labour and asked for contributions of money and food 
in the villages that were located just outside the 'corridor' (Anderson et al., 2002: 
10-11; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 15). 
Similarly, the different ways in which Talisman and Lundin and other actors 
defined the physical boundaries of their responsibility in Sudan contributed to the 
disagreement about whether displacements had occurred in the area where the 
companies' oil fields were located in Sudan. Talisman and Lundin focused their 
investigations of alleged displacements on the areas around their oilfield 
infrastructure (Lundin, 2001c; Talisman, 2001b: 16). In this way, the companies 
suggested that they only bore responsibility for what took place in the immediate 
vicinity of their operations. Other actors were however of the view that the 
responsibility of companies extended beyond the physical limits of the concession 
areas. Human Rights Watch, for example, showed this by criticising the selection 
of the sites that Talisman studied through satellite images for seeing whether 
population movements had taken place: 
Aside from the oil/government centers where gross population counts have 
increased, the analysis did not look at adjoining areas of the Block 1 
concession that are shown on earlier maps to have a high density of 
settlement. Instead, the other sites selected by Talisman for examination 
are small rectangles immediately surrounding active oil fields, areas that 
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have not shown up on prevIous maps as population centers or even 
clusters. (Human Rights Watch, 2003) 
Also Harker implied in his report commissioned by the Canadian government that 
Talisman was responsible for displacements that had been carried out in the areas 
surrounding its operations in Sudan by pointing out that a permanent human 
settlement in Heglig, located close to the concession area but outside the site of 
the company's base camp and pipeline terminus, had disappeared (Harker, 2000: 
47). 
6.4.2.2 Temporal boundaries of responsibility 
The analysis of the cases shows that, in addition to disagreements about the 
physical boundaries of corporate responsibility, symbolic issues can arise from 
conflicting views over the temporal boundaries of corporate responsibility. Such 
issues are illustrated by the disagreement between the case study companies and a 
number of non-governmental organisations over whether Total and Premier Oil 
were responsible for the human rights violations committed by the Myanmar army 
before Total and Premier Oil began their operations in southern Myanmar (e.g., 
EarthRights International & Southeast Asian Information Network, 1996: 23; 
Laroche & Habbard, 1996). 
The first public allegations about human rights violations committed by the 
Myanmar army in connection with the pipeline projects were made by a Reuters 
journalist in October 1992 (Brunsstrom, 1992). At the time. the army was 
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reportedly using forced labour to build a railway from Ye to Tavoy in southern 
Myanmar. The Reuters journalist associated this forced labour with the 
development of the Yadana pipeline. Total responded to the allegations by 
denying any connection between its pipeline operation and the Ye-Tavoy railway. 
It argued that the allegations were unfounded as the story was published before 
the pipeline route had been agreed on: 
At the time the article was written, Yadana was only a proposal. The 
pipeline route had yet to be determined and work would not begin for 
another three years. This not credible assertion was actually made in 
connection with an unrelated railroad project on which the government 
was working at the time. (Total, 2003c: 26) 
Yet, a number of non-governmental organisations including Karen Human Rights 
Group (1995; 1996), EarthRights International (EarthRights International & 
Southeast Asian Information Network, 1996: 15), and International Federation of 
Human Rights (Laroche & Habbard, 1996) have maintained that the army was 
building the railroad to improve the infrastructure in the area for the benefit of the 
pipeline projects: 
Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to do labour 
constructing the Ye-Tavoy railway line since late 1993. The details of this 
labour are already covered in several reports by KHRG [Karen Human 
Rights Group] and other groups. Comments by SLORC officers along the 
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railway route, SLORC itself and others have made it very clear that a 
major reason for the sudden hurried construction of this railway line was 
to support the gas pipeline infrastructure and the thousands of troops being 
used to secure the area. However, the foreign oil companies have faced so 
much international pressure about this railway that they have now 
categorically insisted that they will not under any circumstances use the 
railway. (Karen Human Rights Group, 1995) 
The non-governmental organisations have further alleged that in order to make the 
anticipated pipeline route secure, the army increased the number of its troops in a 
region where there had been no significant military presence before the early 
1990s (The Burma Campaign UK, 1998; EarthRights International, 2000: 23; 
EarthRights International & Southeast Asian Information Network, 1996: 2; 
Karen Human Rights Group, 1995; Laroche & Hubbard, 1996). The non-
governmental organisations have also claimed that the increased number of troops 
resulted in systematic violations of human rights in the area that the pipelines now 
traverse (EarthRights International & Southeast Asian Information Network, 
1996: 2; Laroche & Habbard, 1996). The alleged violations included relocations 
that the army carried out to enhance the military's control of the area by forcing 
villagers to live close to military camps or in other areas to which the army had an 
easy access (EarthRights International, 2000: 39-49; Karen Human Rights Group, 
1996). 
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In sum, the arguments presented by the non-governmental organisations about 
corporate responsibility for alleged human rights violations in what later became 
the pipeline area have given rise to symbolic issues underpinned by different 
views about the temporal boundaries of corporate responsibility. While the non-
governmental organisations have held Total and Premier Oil responsible because 
they believe that the Myanmar army was acting in furtherance of the pipeline 
projects, the companies have denied any responsibility for the violations that took 
place before they began their operations in the area. 
6.4.2.3 Legitimate role of actors 
The analysis of the cases suggested that symbolic issues also arise from the 
conflicting views held over the legitimate role of companies and other actors, 
particularly the host government. The debate on whether the case study companies 
should have continued their operations in Myanmar and Sudan illustrates how 
incongruent views over the legitimate role of companies can give rise to symbolic 
issues. The debate emerged from the calls made upon the companies to withdraw 
or suspend their operations in Myanmar and Sudan. Notably, in 2000, the British 
government asked Premier Oil to consider pulling out from Myanmar. Said Robin 
Cook, at that time the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs: 
It is important that the company [Premier Oil] should consider 
withdrawing, because if it continued with its development it would 
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produce a revenue stream that would be available to buttress a regime that 
is in great difficulty (House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 2000). 
The calls for withdrawal reflected the increasing expectations placed on 
companies since the mid-1990s with regard to human rights. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the scrutiny placed by non-governmental organisations on companies 
and developments of international human rights law showed that companies were 
expected to go beyond government regulation to promote the respect of human 
rights and to ensure that they were not complicit in human rights violations. 
Talisman described the changing boundaries of responsibility between companies, 
governments, and other actors in the following way: 
Corporations, however, are increasingly being asked to step into roles that 
were once the domain of governments or international bodies such as the 
United Nations. Defining what is properly expected of a company needs to 
be more clearly articulated and more rigorously debated. (Talisman 2001b: 
5) 
Still, when responding to the calls for withdrawal, the case study companies noted 
that their investment in Myanmar and Sudan was in line with the policies of the 
United Nations, the European Union, and their home government which had not 
introduced sanctions that would have affected extractive companies (e.g., Premier 
Oil, 2000: 3; Total, 2002c: 4). Total, for example, stated that it followed the 
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positions of the United Nations, the European Union, and the French government 
when deciding where to invest: 
Notre premier critere est de respecter la position de l'ONU, de l'Union 
europeenne, et du gouvennent francais. Nous acceptons de travailler dans 
un pays a la condition sine qua non que ces institutions legitimises y 
autorisent les investissements. (Total, 2002c: 4) 
The position of the companies suggested that they saw governments and inter-
governmental organisations as the actors that set policies on foreign investment 
and that they were unlikely to pull out or freeze their investment in a country in 
the absence of regulation to such effect by their home government or international 
organisations. Total explicitly stated that it was not the role of companies to 
decide whether a particular government was legitimate (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 
2002c: 4; Total, 2003c: 25). It also argued that there were organisations that were 
in a more suitable position than companies to influence governments, particularly 
on how the income generated from oil and gas projects should be distributed: 
[I]t would constitute interference if an oil company were to presume to 
dictate how a country should spend its oil income but international 
organisations such as the World Bank are well placed to exert their 
influence and offer advice, which would be particularly welcome in the 
case of Myanmar (Total, 2003c: 25). 
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter explored the nature of the human rights issues addressed by the case 
study companies in Myanmar and Sudan. It was first argued that human rights 
issues can be categorised into substantial and symbolic issues on the basis of their 
ontological nature. Accordingly, substantial issues involve policies, behaviours, 
and circumstances that affect the enjoyment of human rights or constitute a direct 
violation of the entitlements enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, whereas symbolic issues involve incongruent interpretations that 
stakeholders make about policies, behaviours, and conditions related to the 
entitlements enlisted in the Universal Declaration. The distinction into substantial 
and symbolic issues reflects the way in which Mahon and Waddock (1992) 
divided responses to issues into substantial and symbolic responses even though 
this distinction has not been previously extended to issues. 
A further analysis of the symbolic issues addressed by the case study companies 
showed that they were underpinned by inconsistent views between companies and 
other actors about (i) some objective conditions or (ii) the boundaries of corporate 
responsibility. The first type of inconsistency corresponds to what Wartick and 
Mahon (1994) referred to as factual gaps between perceptions of "what is". The 
second type of inconsistency resembles what Wartick and Mahon (1994) called 
ideals gaps around incongruent arguments about "what should be". A further 
analysis of the cases suggested that conflicting views over the boundaries of 
responsibility can relate to (i) geography, (ii) time, or (iii) legitimate role of 
different actors. 
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7 Human rights strategies 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies and explores the strategies that the case study companies 
pursued to address human rights issues in Myanmar and Sudan. The chapter 
begins with a review of how the companies' approach to human rights developed 
over the period of study. In line with the portrayal of human rights issues in 
Chapter 6, a distinction is then made between substantial and symbolic action and 
more specific strategies identified under each type of action. Overall, a total of 
five strategies are isolated from the activities carried out by the companies: (1) 
direct strategy, (2) indirect strategy, (3) information strategy, (4) leveraging 
strategy, and (5) stakeholder engagement strategy. The first two of these are forms 
of substantial action, while the last three represent symbolic action. The greater 
part of the chapter consists of the more detailed discussion of each of the five 
strategies. The interconnectedness and organisational mode of strategies are also 
examined. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings. 
7.2 From silence to constructive engagement 
7.2.1 Human rights in government relations 
Chapter 6 showed that most human rights issues addressed by the case study 
companies in Myanmar and Sudan arose from the policies and behaviour of the 
host government. This is why the companies often referred to their policies on 
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government relations when they were called upon to use their influence to 
improve the situation of human rights in the two countries. A closer analysis of 
the companies' policies in this area shows that they changed over the period of 
research. In what follows, this change is described as a move from silence on 
human rights issues to constructive engagement with the host government. 
The companies were initially reluctant to raise human rights issues with 
government authorities. Premier Oil, for example, stated in 1998 that it did not 
support any particular political party and that its discussions with host 
governments were confined to its business operations (Premier Oil, 1998: 14). 
Similarly, Lundin preferred to focus on its commercial mission and refrain from 
"getting involved in political affairs of a country" (Batruch, 2004). In line with the 
other companies, Total applied a global policy of political non-interference and 
neutrality, even though it was renowned for its diplomatic skills acquired through 
the recruitment of former diplomats (Aubert, 1999: 73; Total, 2002c: 85). Total's 
general policy of political non-interference and neutrality bore particular 
relevance to the situation in Myanmar where it was enforced by the view of the 
Total staff that the Myanmar government was a monolithic entity over which the 
company had little influence (Anderson et al., 2002: 20). 
Over time, however, the companies became more willing to bring up human rights 
issues in their relations with government officials. Premier Oil, for example, had 
by 2000 started to seek ways in which it could raise the issue of human rights with 
the Myanmar authorities (Premier Oil, 2000: 3; Premier Oil, 2001: 10). The 
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change in the company's policy coincided with the time the UK government 
requested it to consider withdrawing its investment from Myanmar (House of 
Commons Parliamentary Debates, 2000). The company described its new position 
as follows: 
These rights are to be protected and promoted throughout Premier Oil's 
business operations and in our relations with both business and local 
community partners. We will also use our legitimate influence to promote 
the protection of human rights outside of our areas of operation. (Premier 
Oil, 2001 b: 5) 
Premier Oil referred to this policy as constructive engagement. It involved the 
promotion of human rights through a dialogue with the host government and 
activities that addressed what the company did not "directly control" (Premier Oil, 
2000: 22; Premier Oil, 2001a: 10). In Myanmar, these activities included the co-
ordination of human rights seminars for government officials, members of the 
police, and military officers (Premier Oil, 2001a: 10; Premier Oil, 2000: 22). 
Similarly to Premier Oil, Talisman adopted a policy of constructive engagement. 
In its first corporate social responsibility report published in 2000, the policy was 
explained as follows by Jim Buckee, CEO of Talisman: 
In all countries where we operate, we believe we have a duty to advocate 
respect for human rights where there are abuses and we will strive to 
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ensure that in this regard our actions are scrupulously fair and that we lead 
by example. [ ... ] In Sudan, where conflict and reported human rights 
violations are widespread, I believe our responsibility is great. (Talisman, 
2000b: 7) 
Also Total showed signs of becoming more active in expressing its stance on the 
political situation in Myanmar despite the lack of change in its general policy of 
non-interference and neutrality. For example, in 2003, Total expressed its concern 
over the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and the slow progress of the process of 
national reconciliation (du Rusquec, 2004; Total, 2003b: 4). Such action was 
encouraged by organisations that Total had asked to investigate the impact of its 
investment in Myanmar. Collaborative for Development Action, for example, 
warned that silence on the country's political situation and human rights 
violations could be perceived as support for the military government and its 
policies (Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 18). Similarly, Bernard Kouchner 
recommended after visiting Total's operations in the country that the company 
should openly express its support for democracy and human rights (BK Conseil, 
2003). In 2002, Total explained the modification of its position in the following 
way: 
TotalFinaElf participates in the economic development of host countries, 
respecting their cultures and without interfering in politics. We have no 
legitimate authority to recognize or condemn a specific regime or 
government. This political neutrality does not mean that we do not express 
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our point of view to national or local authorities on all issues, particularly 
human rights, of concern to us [ ... ]. (Total, 2002c: 85) 
Similarly to Total, Lundin maintained its general policy of non-interference 
throughout the period of study, but made an exception to this policy by asking 
Carl Bildt, a fonner UN special envoy for the Balkans and a member of Lundin's 
board, to have discussions with the host government and other parties to the 
conflict in Sudan. Bildt's task was to show Talisman's support for the peaceful 
resolution of the situation in the country: ''the company needed to make clear to 
the protagonists in the conflict that it saw peace as the best means to ensure 
sustainable oil operations" (Batruch, 2004). 
In sum, all the companies were initially reluctant to raise human rights issues with 
the Myanmar and Sudanese governments. Over time, however, all the companies 
altered their position in some way. By 2000, Premier Oil and Talisman were 
explicit about their policy of constructive engagement and support for human 
rights. Also Total and Lundin altered their position by taking measures to promote 
the respect for human rights in their relations with government authorities despite 
their unwillingness to modify their general policy of political neutrality and non-
interference. 
7.2.2 Role of CSR policies and systems 
The human rights controversy surrounding the operations in Myanmar and Sudan 
contributed to the launch of corporate social responsibility policies and 
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management systems in all the companies studied. Premier Oil, for example, 
acknowledged that its motivation to develop and implement policies on corporate 
social responsibility grew when it became the operator of the Yetagun project: 
"Premier's focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) intensified in 1997 
when it became a significant operator of production and developments projects in 
South East Asia" (Premier Oil, 2002: 11). Consequently, it formulated specific 
policies on human rights, political neutrality, and constructive engagement in 
conjunction with more general principles on responsible business conduct. It also 
set up a corporate social responsibility programme and conducted a social audit of 
its operations and activities (Premier Oil, 1998; Premier Oil, 2001b: 2,9; Premier 
Oil, 2002b). 
Similarly to Premier Oil, Talisman adopted new operating principles and 
management structures in response to the human rights concerns that arose in 
connection with its investment in Sudan (Talisman, 2000b: 5). Wrote the 
Chairman of the Board in 2000: "Choosing to operate in a country with internal 
conflict amplifies the need for rigorous commitment to and disclosure of 
performance against corporate social responsibility principles" (Talisman, 2000b: 
5). The need became stronger when a shareholder resolution asked the company's 
management to ensure that Talisman complied with the International Code of 
Ethics of Canadian Business (Talisman, 2000b: 6). As a result, Talisman endorsed 
the Code and translated it into more specific operating principles relevant for the 
situation in Sudan (Talisman, 2000b: 8). A related management system with 
identifiable objectives and target dates was also put in place (Talisman, 2000b: 9). 
221 
Also Lundin responded to the negative publicity attracted by its investment in 
Sudan by adopting a code of conduct, organising an awareness session on human 
rights within the company, and disseminating a management primer on human 
rights (Batruch, 2004). In difference to Premier Oil and Talisman, it did not, 
however, start reporting about its activities in the area of corporate social 
responsibility with the same level of detail and regularity than the other 
companies. 
In comparison to the other case study companies, the controversy in Myanmar 
played a less important role in the introduction of corporate social responsibility 
policies within Total because the company operated in a much higher number of 
countries than the other companies. Corporate social responsibility was 
announced a high priority for Total after it merged with Elf Aquitaine in 2000 
(Total, 2001: 12). Rather than a way to respond to the human rights concerns in 
Myanmar, the importance given to corporate social responsibility could therefore 
be seen as a way to counter the negative reputation of Elf that had been involved 
in one of the worst corruption scandals of the French history, l'affaire Elf. The 
new company also revised its code of conduct, created an ethics committee, and 
initiated a process to develop business-wide commitments, guidelines, and 
management systems to be able to measure and report about its ethical 
performance (Total, 2001: 12; Total 2002c: 7). It was in this context that the 
company justified its presence in Myanmar. Previously, it released little 
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infonnation about its policies in the country, even though it had applied a code of 
conduct that was adapted to local circumstances in Myanmar (Total, 2003b: 7). 
7.2.3 Commitment to human rights 
All the case study companies made an explicit commitment to human rights over 
the period of research. For example, Total expressed its commitment to human 
rights through a code of conduct adopted in October 2000. The code stated that 
wherever the company operates, it adheres to the principles expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the treaties of the International Labour 
Organisation, and the OEeD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Total, 
2002b). Total affinned this commitment to human rights and international 
standards in its first corporate social responsibility report published in 2002 by 
pledging to comply with the principles and regulations of the United Nations, the 
European Union, and the French government when considering investment in a 
particular country (Total, 2002c: 86). In the same report, it stressed that its 
investment in Myanmar did not violate any regulation introduced by these 
institutions (Total, 2002c: 88). 
As already seen, Premier Oil fonnulated general business principles that defined 
the company's view on its role in society soon after it became the operator of the 
Yetagun project in 1997 (Premier Oil, 1998: 14). Similarly to Total, it made 
reference to government regulation while explaining its view on responsible 
business: 
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We believe that the high standards of employment and welfare we set are 
seen as an example of what can be achieved and what is globally 
acceptable. And we pursue business opportunities by fonnulating an active 
non-political strategy that takes into account both the UK's and EU's 
human rights policies. (Premier Oil, 1998: 14) 
Moreover, in its human rights policy, Premier Oil referred to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and international labour standards: 
The Premier Oil Human Rights Policy is based on the fundamental rights 
pronounced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is guided 
by those rights enshrined in the core labour conventions of the 
International Labour Organisations (Premier Oil, 200 I b: 5). 
Similarly to Total and Premier Oil, Talisman and Lundin also made a 
commitment to operate in line with international standards on human rights, but in 
difference to the companies operating in Myanmar, they did not seek to justify 
their investment in Sudan in relation to the position of their home government 
(Batruch, 2004; Talisman, 2000b: 4). Instead, Talisman made an explicit 
commitment to support principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Talisman, 2000b: 4). It also introduced the Sudan Operating Principles that were 
based on international standards on human rights and corporate social 
responsibility (Talisman, 2000b: 8). Similarly, the Code of Conduct adopted by 
Lundin was based on documents in the area of corporate social responsibility 
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rather than policies of its home government (Batruch, 2004). In sum, all the 
companies expressed their commitment to human rights in connection with their 
broader policies on corporate social responsibility. 
7.3 Corporate human rights strategies 
The analysis of the cases suggests that the activities carried out by the companies 
to address human rights issues can be separated into five different strategies: (1) 
direct strategies, (2) indirect strategies, (3) information strategies, (4) leveraging 
strategies, and (5) stakeholder engagement strategies. The strategies are showed in 
Table 7.1 below. The first two of them involve activities that companies carry out 
to have an impact on material conditions that give rise to human rights concerns, 
while the other three are directed at influencing views and perceptions that 
stakeholders have of physical conditions or more abstract ideas relating to human 
rights. The first two strategies are therefore used to address substantial issues as 
defined in the previous chapter, whereas the last three strategies are pursued to 
attend to symbolic issues (see 6.2). 
The strategies also mirror the way in which Mahon and Waddock (1992) divided 
corporate responses to social issues into substantial and symbolic action. As seen 
in the literature review, Mahon and Waddock (1992) defined substantial action as 
"definitive moves that attempt to actually change or deal with the existing 
situation in specific, identifiable ways" (p. 27). In contrast, symbolic action 
pertains to the framing of an issue from the viewpoint of the organisation or its 
key constituents: "this is fundamentally a process of reinterpretation of the 
225 
interpretation of events proposed by other actors" (p. 27). As seen in the literature 
review, the distinction into substantial and symbolic responses resembles the way 
in which other researchers have described responses to issues (e.g., Arcelus and 
Schaefer, 1982; Buchholtz, 1992: 510; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987; Nigh & 
Cochran, 1987; Sethi, 1979; Strand, 1983). Strand (1983), for example, classified 
responses to social demands based on whether they involve changing the 
environment or affecting the constituent demands placed on companies. 
TABLE 7.1. Human rights strategies 
Target I Strategy Focus Description 
Objective Direct strategy Action Affect objective conditions directly 
conditions through concrete action 
(substantial .-
issues) Affect objective conditions through 
Indirect strategy Influence persuading another actor to take 
concrete action 1------.--.-- ._. ____ M __ H_. __ M __ •• ___ • _____ •• , 
Affect stakeholder views through 
Information strategy Information the provision of Information and 
viewpoints 
Stakeholder Affect stakeholder views through 
views and leveraging strategy Authority appeals to authority or verification perceptions 
(symbolic measures 
issues) Affect stakeholder views through 
Stakeholder engagement Rapport two-way communication aimed at Increasing mutual understanding 
strategy between companies and their 
stakeholders 
The proposed strategies do not only reflect the distinction on substantial and 
symbolic action, but also provide new insight on the type of action that companies 
can take to influence social issues. More specifically, the analysis of the cases 
shows that what Waddock and Mahon (1994) called substantial responses can be 
divided further into direct and indirect strategies. Accordingly, direct strategies 
involve activities that have a direct impact on material conditions. For example, 
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all the companies pursued a direct strategy by running a community development 
programme aimed at improving the social and economic conditions in the local 
communities in which they operated in Myanmar and Sudan (see 7.4.1). In 
distinction to direct strategies, indirect strategies involve attempts to influence 
material conditions indirectly through persuading other actors to take direct 
action. For example, the case study companies employed an indirect strategy by 
asking the government to put a stop to the human rights violations perpetrated by 
the government provided security forces (see 7.5.1). 
The analysis of the cases also sheds new insight on symbolic action by identifying 
three strategies that can be carried out under symbolic action: (1) information 
strategies, (2) leveraging strategies, and (3) stakeholder engagement strategies. 
The first two strategies do not necessitate two-way communication between 
companies and other actors. First, information strategies involve attempts to 
influence stakeholder views by providing stakeholders with relevant information 
and viewpoints that can be communicated through channels that do not provide 
any opportunity for response (e.g. corporate reports). Leveraging strategies pertain 
to attempts to increase the trustworthiness of the information and viewpoints 
provided by companies through verification measures or appeals to other actors 
who possess some form of authority. These strategies are pursued to address the 
lack of trust that some actors have in companies that are seen to have a vested 
interest to present situations from their own perspective. Similarly to information 
strategies, leveraging strategies do not require interaction between companies and 
the target audience. Finally, stakeholder engagement strategies involve attempts to 
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increase mutual understanding between companies and their stakeholders through 
two-way communication. In difference to the other strategies, stakeholder 
engagement strategies are relational rather than issue-specific; they aim to create a 
rapport or a sense of understanding between companies and their stakeholders 
with the expectation that this rapport is useful in addressing any human rights 
issues that may arise. 
The analysis of the cases also suggests that the organisational mode of strategies 
varies from internal development to different forms of collaboration, as explained 
in section 7.9 below. For example, Total's socio-economic programme in the 
pipeline region in Myanmar was managed by company staff, whereas Premier Oil 
delivered a similar programme in collaboration with Save the Children US. What 
is more, evidence from the cases shows that the proposed strategies are not 
mutually exclusive; companies can use more than one of them to address a 
particular issue. The interconnectedness of strategies is discussed in section 7.8 
below. 
7.4 Direct strategies 
Direct strategies involve concrete action aimed at having a direct impact on the 
objective conditions that give rise to human rights issues. They therefore represent 
what Mahon and Waddock (1992) called substantial action (see 7.3). The case 
study companies engaged in a number of activities to pursue direct strategies. The 
main ones are listed in table 7.2 below. As can be seen from the table, most of the 
activities addressed one of the substantial issues identified in Chapter 6. The 
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monitoring of the human rights situation in the areas of operations was an 
exception. Unlike the other activities pertaining to direct strategies, the monitoring 
was not aimed at having a direct impact on material conditions, but to gain a 
better understanding of the state of human rights. It is still a direct strategy 
because it is concerned with the actual situation of human rights rather than the 
way in which some stakeholders may perceive the situation. 
In general, the activities that the case study companies carried out under direct 
strategies were relatively similar. For example, all the community programmes set 
up by the companies focused on the areas of health, education, and economic 
development (Lundin, 2000: 14; Talisman, 2000b: 23; Talisman, 2001 b: 22-23; 
Total, 2002d: 16; Total, 2003c: 19). As an exception, the ways in which the 
companies monitored the human rights situation were relatively informal and 
seemed to vary more than the other forms of direct strategy. This informality and 
unusually broad range of practices may have reflected the novelty of the practice 
for companies. Talisman, for example, found that the lack of useful precedents 
made the establishment of a monitoring system challenging (Talisman, 2001 b: 
15). 
In what follows, the activities that the case study companies engaged in to address 
the main human rights issues connected to their operations in Myanmar and Sudan 
are discussed. As will be seen, all the companies set up community programmes 
to improve the quality oflife in local communities. All of them also monitored the 
human rights situation in their areas of operations in some way and most of them 
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engaged in philanthropic activities to attend to specific problems in the area of 
health or unprivileged groups outside their areas of operations. Total and 
Talisman also assisted victims of human rights violations perpetrated by the 
government provided security forces. In addition to these activities described in 
further detail below, the companies pursued a number of other activities that can 
be regarded as direct strategies, but were not linked to the main human rights 
issues as identified in Chapter 6. These activities included measures that were 
aimed at ensuring that people whose land use was affected by the operations were 
appropriately compensated (e.g., Talisman, 2001b: 16). They also included 
policies through which the companies sought to make sure that local inhabitants 
were employed in their projects (e.g., Talisman, 2000b: 26). 
TABLE 7.2. Examples of direct strategies 
Issue addressed 
Quality of life in local 
communities 
Direct strategies 
Community development 
programmes 
Specific actlvltivitles 
• Projects in the area of 
~~~~_~~~iC>.!l.~.I .. pr.9i~<;~s.=~--=-
• Measures to support 
_____ ::--__ -=-__ -+--:---:--:--__ .::-:-__ --:-~_:_-_+_- .. e~911()r:DJ~I:I~\I~19Prn~rlt_ 
Behaviour of security forces Assistance of human rights • Facilitation of a relocation 
victims I--of_iL"illage~:-:---:-:---:--_---1 
• Monetary and in-kind 
contributions to victims of 
forced labour 
-. -skiilstrainingl·-n-re--f-u-g-e-e---l 
1--__________ t-;-;-__ --:--: ________ +-. __ .~ar:Dp~ ___ . ________ . ____ _ 
I 
Human rights monitoring • Human rights monitoring 
_~hr()lJg~_ company $tafL_ 
• Human rights monitoring 
,......·c :1--------------._- throug~ extern~l. actor~. __ _ Social and economic rights Philanthropic projects • Various projects in the 
outside areas of operations area of medical care and 
education 
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7.4.1 Community development programmes 
7.4.1.1 Programme focus and content 
All the companies carried out community programmes that included projects in 
health care, education, economic development, and infrastructure to improve 
social and economic conditions in the local communities in which they operated 
in Myanmar and Sudan (Lundin, 2000: 14; Talisman, 2000b: 23; Talisman, 
2001b: 22-23; Total, 2002d: 16; Total, 2003c: 19). In addition, Talisman and 
Lundin also provided some emergency relief in the vicinity of their concession 
areas in Sudan (Batruch, 2004; Talisman, 2000b: 23). The social and economic 
activities carried out by Total in Myanmar illustrate the content of the socio-
economic programmes. Total's programme comprised four components of 
education, medical and health care, economic development, and improvement of 
infrastructure (Total, 2002d: 16; Total, 2003c: 19). With regard to education, the 
programme enabled the construction or renovation of 50 schools (Total, 2002d: 
16; Total, 2003c: 20). It also provided schools with physical and educational 
material and paid towards the salaries of the teachers (ibid.). In addition, it 
awarded scholarships to young people who wished to continue their studies in the 
capital. In the area of health, the programme renovated a hospital, built health 
centres, recruited doctors, and trained personnel to treat patients in the pipeline 
area (Total, 2002d: 17; Total, 2003c: 21). It also supplied medicine and equipment 
and carried out a series of campaigns on vaccination, hygiene, sanitary education, 
and malaria (ibid.). Some 800 wells were drilled or renovated to improve the 
quality of drinking water in the area (ibid.). In terms of economic development, 
the socio-economic programme financed projects aimed at developing economic 
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activities including animal farming and crop production (Total, 2002d: 17; Total, 
2003c: 21). Some of these activities were supported through a system of micro-
credits (ibid.). Finally, Total constructed, renovated, and maintained roads and 
bridges as well as community facilities such as churches, assembly halls, and 
football fields (Total, 2002d: 17; Total, 2003c: 22). 
The design of the socio-economic programmes was based on studies about the 
conditions in the local communities and consultations with various stakeholders. 
Premier Oil, for example, identified the objectives of its programme on the basis 
of an assessment of the social and economic conditions in the pipeline area, as a 
company manager explains: "we looked at our impact assessment and asked what 
we would like to achieve" (Jones, 2003b). Similarly, Total's programme in 
Myanmar was designed on the basis of two surveys on social, economic, and 
ethnic conditions in southern Myanmar and consultations with local inhabitants 
(Total, 2003c: 16). In the same way, Talisman based its community programme in 
Sudan on three independent needs assessment studies it had commissioned and 
discussions with the representatives of the local communities and development 
partners in Sudan and North America (Talisman, 2000b: 22). Also Lundin 
consulted various local stakeholders to identify areas where it could make a 
contribution through its community programme (Lundin, 2000: 14; Batruch, 
2004). 
Members of the local community played a role in the management of the 
programmes in two main ways. First, most of the teams that were set up to 
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implement the programmes included local inhabitants (Anderson et al., 2002: 8; 
Talisman, 2000b: 23; Total, 2003b: 17). Some of the programmes also had 
structures through which villagers could participate to the design and management 
of individual projects. Total, for example, set up village communication 
committees in each of the villages belonging to its community programme to 
facilitate regular contact with the villagers and to assign responsibility for 
decisions on grants and other aspects of the programme delivery to the village 
level (Anderson et al., 2002: 13-14). Premier Oil's community programme had 
similar structures that enabled local villagers to oversee the delivery of the 
programme in each of the participating villages (Premier Oil, 2001b: 32, 36). The 
management of the community programmes is discussed in more detail in section 
7.9 below. 
7.4.1.2 Criticism of the programmes 
From time to time, human rights activists criticised the community development 
programmes as attempts to restore corporate reputation without addressing the 
main human rights issues associated to the companies' operations in Myanmar 
and Sudan (Christian Aid, 2001: 29; EarthRights International, 2000). The 
community programmes were viewed in a negative light particularly when 
companies were seen to present information about them in response to concerns 
about other types of human rights violations: 
While the companies claim that the development projects are for the local 
people alone, in reality they are motivated by self-interest. [ ... ] A few 
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extra hospitals do little to help the men and women who are raped, 
tortured, and killed, and a few more schools do not stop children from 
being enslaved as laborers and military porters. (EarthRights International, 
2000: 124; see also Christian Aid, 2001: 29) 
The community development programmes set up by Talisman and Lundin in 
Sudan were also criticised because the government prevented the United Nations 
and non-governmental organisations from delivering humanitarian aid in the same 
area where the programmes were run (Christian Aid, 2001: 12-13; United 
Nations, 2001). The UN Special Rapporteur commented the situation in 2001 as 
follows: "In spite of the infrastructures provided by the oil companies to the local 
population in oil-rich areas, oil exploitation has continued to have a negative 
impact on the human rights situation" (United Nations, 2001). Similarly, said an 
interviewee to Christian Aid with regard to Talisman's community development 
programme in Sudan: "It is not a question of how many schools are built or how 
adequate they are. [ ... ] What good are these schools to you when you can be shot, 
burned and killed in the villages?" (Christian Aid, 2001: 29). This criticism 
demonstrates that company efforts to contribute to the realisation of social and 
economic rights can be viewed as futile in a situation where basic physiological 
and safety needs are not being satisfied. It also shows that in order to avoid 
criticism by human rights groups, companies are expected to address the main 
human rights issues associated with their operations in a particular country. 
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The community development programmes run by Talisman and Lundin Oil in 
Sudan were also criticised because the government allegedly used them to back up 
its campaign of discrimination and displacement of southerners (Christian Aid 
2001: 27; Gagnon & Ryle, 2001; Harker, 2000). The Harker commission, for 
example, reported that Arab patients were more welcome than other inhabitants at 
the hospital that Talisman helped to built in Heglig (Harker, 2000). Moreover, 
because the schools, clinics, wells, and other facilities built by the companies 
were located in garrison towns rather than in rural areas, they were argued to 
encourage the patterns of displacement (Gagnon & Ryle, 2001). It was also 
alleged that the programmes enabled northerners to settle in the area in place of 
southerners that had been forced to move, which is why the community 
programmes were sometimes referred to as "programmes of displacement" 
(Christian Aid 2001: 27). 
The criticism presented about the community programmes in Sudan shows that 
the human rights issues faced by companies can be interconnected and that 
company efforts to contribute to the realisation of one set of rights can, or can be 
seen to, exacerbate the violation of other rights even when "the company seem to 
want to do what is right" (Harker, 2000). The criticism also shows the difficulty of 
addressing human rights concerns in a situation where the government is not 
respecting its human rights obligations. In such a situation, company efforts to 
address human rights may become tools in the pursuit of other objectives by the 
host government that is not abiding by international human rights standards. 
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7.4.2 Assistance of human rights victims 
Total and Talisman provided assistance to human rights victims that came from 
their areas of operations. This assistance addressed the behaviour of government 
provided security forces by helping people that had been subjected to human 
rights violations, but it also contributed to the quality of life in the local 
communities. Most of the assistance was provided by Total, but the skills-training 
project that Talisman sponsored in two camps for internally displaced people in 
Khartoum can also be seen as assistance of human rights victims as many of the 
residents in the camps came from the areas in which the companies operations 
were located in Sudan (Talisman, 2001b: 23). 
Total assisted victims of human rights violations in two main ways. First, in 1997, 
it facilitated the relocation of the village of Michaunglaung that the army had 
forcibly moved in the area that later fell inside the pipeline "corridor". Despite the 
fact that Total had not started its operations in the area at the time the village had 
been relocated, the company assisted the return of the villagers by giving 10,000 
kyats to each family that wished to move back to the old village that had been 
destroyed (Commission for Justice and Peace, 1998; du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 
2003c: 15). According to Unocal, a partner in the Yadana project, many families 
still chose to stay in the new village because of its more convenient location 
(Unocal, 2002). 
Around the same time that Total assisted the return of the villagers of 
Michaunglaung to their old village, it also provided assistance to the villagers who 
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had been subjected to forced labour or whose property had been appropriated by 
the Myanmar anny in the pipeline area (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15). This 
assistance involved (i) monetary contributions that were calculated as if the 
concerned individuals had been employed in a normal way and (ii) in-kind 
contributions such as boats and buffalo carts to replace the property requisitioned 
by the Myanmar army (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15,26). As will be seen 
in section 7.8.2 below, the assistance gave rise to new human rights issues 
because the Myanmar army confiscated some of the money that Total had given 
to the villagers. As a result, the company faded out its assistance and requested the 
army to pay compensation to the people that had suffered from human rights 
violations (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15,26). 
The activities carried out by Total to assist victims of human rights violations 
became part of the debate on the role and responsibility of foreign companies in 
Myanmar. On the one hand, organisations critical of foreign investment in the 
country argued that the fact that Total had assisted victims of human rights 
violations proved that the company knew about and was responsible for the 
violations (e.g., EarthRights International, 2000: 82). On the other hand, Total 
denounced that its assistance amounted to assuming responsibility for the 
violations (du Rusquec, 2003). According to the company's general manager in 
Myanmar, the company assisted the victims because it wanted to help people who 
had suffered: 
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Notre filiale s'est trouvee dans une situation difficile et elle a essaye de 
trouver une solution humaine et efficace pour d'une part que cela ne se 
reproduise plus et d'autre part pour aider les gens qui avaient souffert. (du 
Rusquec, 2003) 
Moreover, Total asserted that providing victims of human rights abuses with 
financial support was an act that signalled condemnation rather than 
compensation: 
These humanitarian gestures were not compensation, since neither Total 
nor MOTe [the joint venture for transportation of gas] was even indirectly 
the cause or beneficiary of the forced labour, but were intended to send a 
strong message that forced labour was unacceptable and to oblige the 
Army to change the way it operated (Total, 2003c: 15). 
Nevertheless, the arguments presented by the non-governmental organisations and 
Total demonstrate that the activities carried out by companies can exacerbate the 
controversy surrounding their operations; this is discussed in more detail in 
section 7.8.2 below. 
7.4.3 Human rights monitoring 
All the companies made use of their existing staff to monitor the human rights 
situation in the vicinity of their areas of operations. In addition to their own 
monitoring, some of the companies asked independent organisations and 
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individuals to investigate the human rights situation in their areas of operations. 
Both types of human rights monitoring have a connection to symbolic action as 
explained in section 7.6 below. 
Total began monitoring the human rights situation in the pipeline area in 
Myanmar when it received the first reports about incidents of forced labour in 
1995. Subsequently, it asked the staff of its socio-economic programme to 
"closely monitor relations between the villagers and the Army to prevent abuses, 
[and] to intervene immediately if any occurred [ ... ]" (Total, 2003c: 15). The staff 
of the socio-economic programme was in regular contact with many villagers 
because, unlike other staff who lived in a company compound, the staff of the 
socio-economic programme lived and worked in the villages in the region 
(Anderson et aI., 2002: 14; Total, 2003c: 8; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 9). The 
programme staff also monitored the human rights situation through the 
communication officers who had regular discussions with the committees set up 
by the company at village level (Anderson et aI., 2002: 14; Total, 2003c: 13).10 
The company staff could also make observations about the human rights situation 
in the village-wide meetings that were organised on a monthly basis (Anderson et 
aI., 2002: 13). 
In addition to its own staff, Total asked a number of external organisations and 
individuals to investigate and report about its operations and their impact in 
Myanmar. In 1997, it together with its joint venture partner Unocal invited the 
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Commission for Justice and Peace, an organisation based in Bangladesh, to visit 
the Yadana project (Unocal, 2002). Two persons from the Commission 
subsequently reported about Total's socio-economic programme and the situation 
in the pipeline area after visiting a number of villages in the area (Commission for 
Justice and Peace, 1998). In 2002, Total commissioned Collaboration for 
Development Action, a US based organisation, to examine its operations and their 
impact in Myanmar (du Rusquec, 2004). The consultancy consequently published 
three reports based on field visits and interviews with a significant number of 
people inside and outside the country (Anderson et aI., 2002; Total, 2003c: 28; 
Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004). Moreover, in 2003, Total 
invited Bernard Kouchner, a former French minister and the founder of Doctors 
without Borders, to visit and report about Total's impact in Myanmar (du 
Rusquec, 2004). In his following report, Mr. Kouchner braced Total's socio-
economic programme and recommended constructive engagement with the 
Myanmar government (BK Conseil, 2003). 
Premier Oil observed the situation of human rights in the pipeline area through its 
employees, particularly its doctor who visited villages in the area to "talk to 
people there and find out things from the company point of view" (Jones, 2003b). 
The villagers did not, however, have a direct access to Premier Oil staff at the 
village level because the company's social and economic activities in the local 
communities were run by Save the Children US (Premier Oil, 200tb, 36, 37). 
\0 The use of communication officers has been criticised because they were seconded from the 
state-owned MOGE. Even so, it was in this way that Total fIrst learned about human rights 
violations in the pipeline area (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15). 
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Similarly to Premier Oil, Lundin encouraged some of its employees to report 
about any possible violations they observed (Batruch, 2004). 
In addition to its own monitoring, Premier Oil also collaborated with two external 
organisations to monitor the human rights situation in the pipeline region. First, it 
received information about human rights in specific villages through Save the 
Children that run the company's socio-economic programme in the pipeline area 
(Jones, 2003b). What is more, it collaborated with an internationally recognised 
non-governmental organisation specialised on human rights. This organisation 
regularly visited the pipeline area and consequently made recommendations to the 
company: 
In fact, we have for the last two years that kind of monitoring in place that 
we feel comfortable that they are not using forced labour in this area. [ ... ] 
It is confidential. We have a system in place. As I mentioned earlier, it was 
arranged with a credible international NGO. This was done at no cost to 
us. People typically went to this area. They came down several times a 
year and they went around and talked to whomever they wanted to and 
made recommendations based on their findings. (Jones, 2003b) 
Talisman's system of human rights monitoring was overseen by its human rights 
field coordinator who was responsible for actively searching for information about 
the situation of human rights in the concession area and maintaining a related 
system of records (Talisman, 2000b: 7, 18-19). The field coordinator also 
submitted a monthly report to the general manager in Sudan (ibid.). The incidents 
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that were recorded and investigated ranged from inappropriate dismissal to 
murder and were categorised as to their seriousness and connection to Talisman's 
operations (Talisman, 2001b: 14). Some of the incidents were subsequently raised 
with government authorities (Talisman, 2001b: 15; also see 7.5.1). In addition to 
this monitoring, Talisman carried out some other activities that could be regarded 
as human rights monitoring. For example, it observed the use of the Heglig and 
Unity airstrips because of concerns about their military use. This monitoring 
involved the recording of the number, type, and user of each aircraft using the 
airstrips (Talisman, 2000b: 25). Talisman also monitored the usage of the hospital 
it helped to fund in Heglig against concerns about patient discrimination based on 
ethnicity and religion (ibid.). Finally, it investigated allegations of displacement in 
the concession area by interviewing villagers in the area and commissioning a 
satellite photo study covering the period from 1965 to 2000 in what it considered 
as its main operating areas (Talisman, 2001b: 16). 
7.4.4 Philanthropic projects outside the areas of operations 
Most of the companies engaged in philanthropic activities to improve the 
economic and social conditions outside their areas of operations. These activities 
focused on a specific problem in the area of health or on a particular unprivileged 
group. Total, for example, provided financial support for Helen Keller 
International which carried out blindness prevention programmes in different 
regions in Myanmar while Premier Oil sponsored a week of training in 1999 for 
eye surgeons and other health professionals in the Yangon region (Premier Oil, 
1999a; Total,2004b: 113). In Sudan, Talisman's employees assisted schools and 
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education projects in the capital through employee-sponsored and coordinated 
Project HOPE (Talisman, 2001b: 23). In addition to these projects in the areas of 
health and education, the companies also carried out activities to support the 
social and economic rights of specific unprivileged groups. For example, in 
Myanmar, Total supported a number of orphanages in the Yangon area through 
financial aid and employee volunteering (Total, 2003b: 23). The philanthropic 
projects did not give rise to similar criticism than the community development 
programmes because they were not directly linked to company operations or the 
criticism presented about foreign investment in Myanmar and Sudan. 
7.5 Indirect strategies 
Indirect strategies are concerned with attempts to persuade other actors to take 
direct action regarding some objective circumstances that give rise to human 
rights concerns. Similarly to direct strategies, indirect strategies therefore 
represent what Mahon and Waddock (1992) called substantial action (see 7.3). 
The case study companies mainly pursued indirect strategies to affect government 
policy and behaviour, but indirect strategies can also be employed to influence the 
behaviour of other actors such as business partners and contractors. In what 
follows, the indirect strategies pursued to address the main human rights issues in 
Myanmar and Sudan are described in more detail. 
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7.5.1 Raising human rights concerns with government 
officials 
All the companies raised human rights concerns with government officials in 
order to affect the way in which the security forces behaved while providing 
security for company operations. In this way, the companies employed an indirect 
strategy to influence the behaviour of security forces in the areas of operations. As 
will be seen, the ways in which the companies did this varied to some degree. 
Some used their existing connections to bring particular incidents of human rights 
violations to the knowledge of government officials, while others took a more 
relational approach and sought to sensitise key officials within the government to 
human rights. 
As seen before, Total first learned about incidents of forced labour in the pipeline 
region in late 1995 (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15). At the time, the Yadana 
consortium had not yet started building its pipeline, but Total was informed about 
the incidents of forced labour through the village communication committees that 
it had set up as part of its socio-economic programme (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 
2003c: 15). The manager of Total's subsidiary in Myanmar subsequently 
contacted senior government officials in the capital to insist that if the army 
needed to employ local labour, villagers should be paid and consent to work for 
the army: 
Le responsible de notre filiale a fait savoir au plus haut niveau et par 
l'intermediaire de notre partenaire local, MOGE qui nous a toujours 
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soutenu, qu'il n'etait pas question que l'annee se comporte mal dans la 
zone dans laquelle nour travaillions et que, si elle avait besoin de 
collaborateurs civils, elle devait employer des gens volontaires et 
convenablement payes. (du Rusquec, 2003) 
Following the first incidents of forced labour that Total became aware of, the 
company established a system through which the human rights situation in the 
pipeline area was monitored and possible violations brought to the knowledge of 
the Myanmar authorities. Accordingly, any alleged incident of forced labour or 
other human rights violations were first investigated by the staff of Total's socio-
economic programme. If confirmed, Total's general manager based in Yangon 
brought it up with government authorities by writing a letter to the Minister of 
Energy who liaised with other officials in the capital. At the same time, the site 
manager requested a representative of the state-owned MOGE to raise the issue 
with the commander of the army in the pipeline area. The anny was also asked to 
take corrective action to compensate the human rights victims by, for example, 
paying the villagers that had been forced to work for the army. (Anderson et aI., 
2002: 9-10; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 15.) 
Similarly to Total, Premier Oil raised incidents of human rights violations with 
officials in Yangon and at MOGE, as acknowledged by the Premier Oil CEO, 
Charles Jamieson (Macalister, 2000). Yet, Premier Oil approached relations with 
the Myanmar government somewhat differently from Total. Instead of 
establishing structures through which particular incidents could be brought to the 
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attention of government officials, Premier Oil sought to forge informal and formal 
contacts with government authorities so that it could discuss human rights issues 
with increasing openness (Jones, 2003a). As a result, human rights issues 
gradually become easier to raise and talk about (Jones, 2003a). 
Total was less active than Premier Oil in establishing contacts with Myanmar 
officials outside formal business connections because Total staff tended to view 
the government as "a monolithic entity over which the company has no influence 
so that there is little point to engage positively" (Anderson et aI., 2002: 20). 
Instead, Total highlighted the role of state-owned MOGE in influencing the 
behaviour of the army (e.g., Total, 2003c: 15): 
The credit for this [decreased number of incidents of forced labour 
reported to Total] goes to [ ... ] the ongoing support given to Total by its 
partner MOGE, which fully adhered to the co-venturers' determination to 
respect and promote human rights in the pipeline region and worked 
effectively with the Army to achieve this. (Total, 2003c: 15) 
Similarly to Total and Premier Oil, Talisman raised concerns about human rights 
with government officials in Sudan. These concerns included the bombing of 
civilians, human rights monitoring in the concession area, access to humanitarian 
aid, child soldiers, the peace process, and the use of oilfield infrastructure and 
revenue from oil (Talisman, 2000b: 15-16, 28-29; Talisman, 2001b: 15-17). 
Talisman also encouraged the government to comply with its responsibilities in 
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relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Talisman, 2001 b: 17). The 
human rights issues were raised by Talisman's senior management in discussions 
with government officials that included the president al-Bashir and the ministers 
of energy, foreign affairs, interior and defense (Talisman, 2000b: 16; Talisman, 
2001 b: 25). The CEO of the company personally engaged in some of the 
discussions: 
In the past year I have personally raised the importance of upholding 
international standards for human rights and business conduct as well as 
the need for a more equitable distribution of the benefits of oil 
development to each of these groups (Talisman, 2000b: 7). 
Talisman also corresponded with government officials and was in touch with the 
Sudanese embassies in North America (Talisman, 2001b: 19). Another way in 
which the company raised issues relating to human rights was through an 
agreement that it drafted regarding the provision of security for the GNPOC 
project (Talisman, 2000b: 15). The agreement concerned guidelines on the 
behaviour of security forces and the use of oilfield infrastructure as well as the 
investigation by the GNPOC joint venture of any alleged violations (Talisman, 
2000b: 13, 15). Despite its efforts, Talisman was not able to persuade the 
Sudanese government to sign the agreement because the government viewed the 
provision of security as "the prime responsibility and prerogative of governments" 
and not an issue that was "appropriate to be addressed by a company" (Talisman, 
2001b: 17). 
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Also Lundin raised human rights issues in its discussions with government 
authorities. These discussions focused on the situation in its concession area 
where the Sudanese forces had made attacks on civilians. Representatives of the 
company expressed their discontent with offensive attacks and conveyed the view 
that security could only be achieved with the support of the local community. 
Lundin also advocated unrestricted access for humanitarian organisations, 
particularly the Operation Lifeline Sudan. These views were communicated to 
government authorities including the President, his peace adviser, and several 
ministers as well as the main representative of the local Nuer community by one 
of Lundin's board members, Carl Bildt who was also former Swedish prime 
minister and UN envoy for Balkans. Bildt also met with the representatives of the 
countries that acted as peace mediators. His view was that the mediators should 
help the parties to the conflict to determine their minimum requirements for 
peace. (Batruch, 2004.) 
7.5.2 Human rights training 
In addition to discussing human rights issues with government officials, Premier 
Oil provided human rights training for civil servants, members of the police force, 
and army officials in Myanmar to affect the behaviour of the army in the pipeline 
region. The first human rights seminar took place in 2001 and altogether eight 
seminars were held (Premier Oil, 2001 b; Premier Oil, 2002b: 46). The idea for the 
human rights seminars arose from private discussions with officials representing 
the Australian government in Myanmar: 
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They [the seminars] came about through in a roundabout way from 
conversations with the Australian ambassador who was himself thinking 
about doing something like that. Their audience were the ministerial 
people, people from immigration, home affairs, justice department, etc. 
The audience we were interested in was the military. (Jones, 2003b) 
The aim of the human rights training was to affect government policy and the 
behaviour of the Myanmar army (Premier Oil, 2001 a: 10; Premier Oil, 2000: 22; 
Sorrell, 2003), as described by a Premier Oil manager: 
The Australian government could not train the military because that was 
the government policy. They could not work with the military. We were 
pretty much only interested in the military. (Jones, 2003b) 
Some of the training seminars were specifically targeted at the soldiers that 
provide security for the pipelines: 
We took some of the local people, Red Cross and a Law Professor from 
Yangon University, who went to the course and then became trainers. We 
had a human rights workshop in the pipeline area in Burmese language. 
The same content but in local language. Our need was slightly different 
because we needed to show these soldiers in the pipeline area that these 
are the rules. That was what we were working towards. (Jones, 2003b) 
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We sometimes run workshops on humanitarian law for law enforcement 
officers which had nothing to do with anybody else. (Jones, 2003b) 
Other seminars sponsored by Premier Oil were aimed at improving the awareness 
and knowledge on human rights at a more general level: 
The Burmese government now has a structure of a human rights 
committees with a number of sub-committees. Maybe 8 or 9 sub-
committees. What we tried to do between the two of us was to build 
capacity for each of these sub-committees. (Jones, 2003b) 
Premier Oil also sought to coordinate the seminars with other actors that were 
providing similar training: 
The Australians were supportive. It complemented their own workshops. 
Now they have suspended them. But at one stage we were working closely 
with the Australians where we run a workshop on socio-economic cultural 
rights. Their workshops would benefit from that. They would not have to 
cover this area again. We would have very much the same audience and 
also military people. (Jones, 2003b) 
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The human rights seminars sponsored by Premier Oil were designed and run by 
consultants that had previously been involved in the organisation of similar 
seminars in Myanmar and elsewhere in the world: 
So he [the Australian ambassador] put us in touch with people who run 
their workshops, the Australian human rights commissioner who retired at 
that time. We struck a deal that he would work for us. They mainly 
structured the workshops. They worked around the world, they work in 
Indonesia, Bosnia, and everywhere where there is conflict. They designed 
the workshops. [ ... ]We had very little input into the curriculum. It wasn't 
designed by us. We are not specialists. We just went to them and said this 
is what we need and they went away and designed it. (Jones, 2003b; see 
also Sorrell, 2003) 
In addition to specifying the objectives of the training, Premier Oil also secured 
government's approval for the seminars. 
What we did was we went to the government and got their ok. This is the 
audience we want. We pay for it. (Jones, 2003b) 
7.5.3 Expressions of concern over specific incidents 
In addition to the human rights concerns arising from the behaviour of the anny in 
the areas of operations, Total and Premier Oil were in contact with government 
officials in Myanmar to express their concern over a number of high-profile 
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human rights incidents that took place outside the pipeline area. As seen in 
Chapter 6, these incidents received significant attention outside the country and 
contributed to the negative publicity related to the companies' investments in 
Myanmar. The expressions of concern represent indirect strategies because the 
companies sought to influence human rights issues indirectly through persuading 
the host government to take action on the issues. 
In general, Total was reluctant to engage in any activities that could have been 
seen to compromise its policy of political neutrality (Total, 2002c: 85). As already 
seen in section 7.2.1, this policy changed over time and in 2003, Total expressed 
its concern to government officials over the events that led to the renewed house 
arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi (du Rusquec, 2004; Total, 2003b: 4). Moreover, on a 
separate occasion during the same year, Total's director for exploration and 
production met with the Myanmar prime minister to communicate the importance 
that the company placed on the process of national reconciliation and its hope that 
the process would include all relevant parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi (du 
Rusquec, 2004). 
Also Premier Oil expressed its views to Myanmar government officials on a 
number of issues related to human rights but unconnected to the company's 
operations in the country, as stated by a company manager: 
I wrote dozens of letters to the Burmese government to say there are 
allegations of this and this, I hope they are not true. This would not be 
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acceptable to us. These are allegations that have nothing to do with our 
project. (Jones, 2003b) 
Moreover, Premier Oil allegedly played a role in the release of a British national, 
James Mawdsley, from a Myanmar prison (Premier Oils Wheels of Change, 2001; 
Premier Oil Looks Well Placed, 2002). As seen in the previous chapter, James 
Mawdsley was imprisoned for entering Myanmar illegally to publish and 
distribute anti-government leaflets (Mawdsley, 2002; United Nations, 2000; also 
see 6.3.1.2). 
7.6 Information strategy 
Infonnation strategy involves attempts to influence stakeholders through the 
provision of infonnation or viewpoints. The strategy is similar to Hillman and 
Hitt's (1999) corporate political strategy of the same name which seeks to 
influence political decision-makers by providing them with infonnation that is 
useful in some way. The case study companies presented stakeholders with two 
main types of information to influence their perceptions and views: (i) factual 
information or what was perceived as factual infonnation by the companies, and 
(ii) arguments representing the corporate viewpoint. Examples of infonnation and 
arguments provided by the companies are given in Table 7.3 below. 
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7.6.1 Information types 
As seen before (see 6.4), symbolic issues arise from conflicting views about (i) 
objective conditions and/or (ii) the boundaries of responsibility between 
companies and other actors, particularly the host government. The analysis of the 
cases suggests that companies often presented factual information, or what they 
considered as factual information, to address symbolic issues that were based on 
conflicting views over objective conditions. For example, in order to show that 
allegations of human rights violations in the areas of operations were incorrect, 
the companies provided evidence gained from human rights monitoring (see 
7.4.3). In this connection, the companies also admitted that human rights 
violations had taken place, but then explained how the violations had been 
addressed (see, e.g., Total, 2003b: 27-32). Similarly, in order to show that the 
human rights situation had improved in their areas of operation, the companies 
provided information about the achievements of their community development 
programmes (see Table 7.3). 
Both factual and more abstract arguments and viewpoints were presented to 
address symbolic issues that were based on conflicting views between the 
companies and their stakeholders about the boundaries of responsibility (see 
6.4.3). For example, as seen in Table 7.3 below, Total and Premier Oil often 
referred to extant laws to argue that their investment in Myanmar was legitimate, 
but they also provided arguments about the positive impact of their investment on 
human rights in the country in order to justify their presence. The latter type of 
argument was based on assumptions about the relationship between economic and 
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political development and as such clarified the company viewpoint, but was 
unlikely to affect stakeholder views as the assumption could not be proved right 
or wrong (see Spar, 1999). 
TABLE 7.3. Examples ofinfonnation provided on symbolic issues 
Symbolic Issue Examples of Information and viewpoints provided by companies 
TotalFinaElf has brought a degree of peace and prosperity to around 
Situation of human 43, 000 Myanmar nationals (Total, 2002c: 89). 
rights in the pipeline 
area In Myanmar I do believe that we have made a real difference by way of active 
(see 6.4.2) participation in a range of social programmes within the country 
(Premier 011,2000: 2-3). 
In our opinion, anything that contributes to Myanmar's outward opening 
and to maintaining critical dialogue between the regime and the 
International community is In the interests of human rights and of the 
people of Myanmar (Total, 2002c: 89). 
As you may have read Premier was urged by the UK government in 
April last year to withdraw from Myanmar, although the government 
stressed that any such decision was for the Premier Board. [ ... ] It is our 
Legitimacy of long held belief that constructive engagement and dialogue with all shades of opinion Is more likely to bring progress in that country than investment continued Isolation. (Premier Oil, 2000: 2-3) (see 6.4.3) 
Our first criterion is to respect the position of the United Nations, the 
European Union and the French government. We are prepared to 
operate in a country provided Investment there is authorized by these 
legitimate Institutions. Failing that, we abstain. (Total, 2002d: 4) 
We cannot, as some observers feel, be responsible for actions 
throughout the countries in which we operate, but we do take 
responsibility in our areas of influence (Premier Oil, 2000a: 5). 
7.6.2 Communication channels 
The companies used two main types of communications channels to pursue an 
information strategy. First, they engaged with some specific stakeholder groups to 
communicate information and viewpoints in relation to their operations in 
Myanmar and Sudan. Forms of stakeholder engagement are discussed in more 
detail in section 7.5.3 below. As will be seen, the way in which companies 
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engaged with stakeholders varied from informal contacts to structured 
consultations processes. 
In addition to stakeholder engagement, the case study companies presented 
information and viewpoints through communication channels that offered no or 
little opportunity for interaction, but reached larger audiences. Corporate 
publications played a particularly important role in such communication. All the 
case study companies used annual reports to provide information and viewpoints 
about their investment in Myanmar or Sudan. This was done in special sections 
focused on operations in the two countries (e.g., Lundin, 2000: 14-15; Premier 
Oil, 1998: 15; Premier Oil, 2002a: 11-12; Total, 2003a: 37) or through more 
general statements and policies about corporate social responsibility, local 
communities, and what Total calls "challenging environments" (Total, 2002d: 84, 
see also Premier Oil, 1998: 14; Premier Oil, 2001a: 10; 18, 20). The CEOs of 
Premier Oil, Talisman, and Lundin also referred to the investments in Myanmar or 
Sudan in their contributions to the annual reports (e.g., Lundin, 2000: 3; Premier 
Oil, 2000b: 5). For example, wrote Charles Jamieson, the CEO of Premier Oil in 
2000 when the United Kingdom government had called upon Premier Oil to 
consider withdrawing from Myanmar: 
The Chairman mentioned the request for us to withdraw from Myanmar. 
Our experience, predominantly in developing countries, leads us to 
address our approach to entry and then our 'licence to operate' in such 
countries, in the light of all stakeholders, both internally and externally. 
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[ ... ] We cannot, as some observers feel, be responsible for actions 
throughout the countries in which we operate, but we do take 
responsibility in our areas of influence. (Premier Oil, 2000b: 5) 
Moreover, all the companies with the exception of Lundin started publishing 
corporate social responsibility reports during the period of research. The 
importance of these reports as communication channels was highlighted by the 
fact that Talisman's first report was solely focused on its operations and other 
activities in Sudan (Talisman, 2000b). Most reports, however, sought to provide a 
view of the companies' overall performance in corporate social responsibility. In 
addition to annual and corporate social responsibility reports, some of the 
companies published separate reports on their activities in Myanmar and Sudan 
(Lundin, 2002b; Total, 2002d). Finally, Total set up a web site focusing on its 
investment in Myanmar (http://myanmar.total.com). Through this web site, the 
company sought to "restore balanced debate on whether a responsible 
multinational can contribute positively to the economic and social development of 
a country that faces sharp internal divisions" (Total, 2003b: 3). 
7.7 Leveraging strategy 
Leveraging strategies involve attempts to increase the credibility of the 
information and viewpoints provided by companies. These strategies are pursued 
to enhance the objectivity and authority that companies lack in the eyes of some 
actors. The case study companies used three main measures to address this lack of 
trust: (I) external verification of their statements, (2) appeals to the views of other 
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actors who possessed some form of authority, and (3) reference to regulations, 
guidelines, and laws. 
7.7.1 External verification 
The analysis of the cases shows that companies use external verification to 
increase the credibility of the information presented in their reports. As already 
seen, Total, Premier Oil, and Talisman published corporate social responsibility 
reports to communicate information and views about their investment in Myanmar 
and Sudan (see 7.7.1). All of them were using or considering of using external 
verification to increase the credibility of their reports (Premier Oil: 2001b: 17,63-
72; Talisman, 2000b: 9; Total, 2003b: 15). Talisman, for example, stated that 
verification provides "assurance to our stakeholders that what we are saying is 
reliable and balanced" (Talisman, 2000b: 9). Similarly, Total believed that 
external verification would enhance the reliability of its data collection and 
analysis processes (Total, 2003b: 15). The importance of external verification was 
supported by the results of a survey conducted in 2005 by Pleon. Accordingly, 
53% of the survey respondents regarded external verification as the most 
important factor contributing to the credibility of CSR reporting; this represented 
a rise of 5% from 2003 (Pleon, 2005). 
The case study companies used quite different types of organisations to verify 
their CSR reports. While Talisman commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers to 
verify the information it provided in its CSR reports, Premier Oil used the 
Corporate Citizenship Unit of the Warwick Business School (Premier Oil, 2001b: 
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17; Talisman, 2000b: 9). The use of both types of organisations is typical in the 
external verification of CSR reports. In addition, companies have also used 
smaller, specialised consultancy agencies. However, according to a survey carried 
out in 2005 by Pleon, a clear majority (59%) of stakeholders prefer that CSR 
reports are ''verified by a professional assurance or verification body". Financial 
analysts and investors were most strongly in favour of verification by such 
organisations (Pleon, 2005). 
Verification was particularly used to increase the credibility of the factual 
information provided by the companies. This was expressed by Talisman as 
follows: "We have retained PricewaterhouseCoopers to verify those elements of 
the report which are capable of objective independent verification [ ... ]. Unverified 
portions of this report generally relate to background information or our beliefs, 
opinions or intentions where verification is not always possible" (Talisman, 
2000b: 9). Nevertheless, verification did not mean that information provided by 
the companies was not questioned by other actors. For example, the way in which 
Talisman interpreted the findings of the satellite photo survey it had 
commissioned to study population movements in Sudan was criticised by, for 
example, Human Rights Watch despite the verification provided by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Human Rights Watch, 2003; Talisman 2001b: 16). 
Similarly, several observers criticised the effectiveness of the system of human 
rights monitoring that PricewaterhouseCoopers verified Talisman to have put in 
place (Gagnon & Ryle, 2001: 34-35; HRW, 2003; also see Talisman, 2000b: 18). 
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In sum, external verification can be regarded as a leveraging strategy through 
which companies seek to increase the credibility of the infonnation and 
viewpoints presented in their reports. Verification works best when it is used to 
address symbolic issues that are based on conflicting perceptions of what is really 
happening. Verification is less effective in addressing symbolic issues that are 
based on conflicting beliefs and opinions that are not verifiable in the same way as 
issues of which concrete evidence can exist. 
7.7.2 Appeals to experts or other actors 
One of the ways in which the case study companies sought to increase the 
credibility of their arguments was through appeals to the views and infonnation 
provided by other actors who possessed some fonn of authority or were seen as 
more neutral than the companies. For example, the way in which Total referred to 
the infonnation collected by other organisations and individuals about the 
situation of human rights in the pipeline area in Myanmar can be seen as an 
attempt to appeal to the authority of other actors for arguing that the situation in 
the pipeline area had improved (see, e.g., Total, 2003b: 27-32). As explained in 
section 7.4.3, Total asked Collaborative for Development Action and Bernard 
Kouchner to investigate and report about the situation of human rights in the 
pipeline area. It then published the reports and made reference to them to, in its 
own words, "provide an objective view of the human rights situation in our area 
of activity" (Total, 2002c: 89). 
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In addition to referring to the human rights monitoring conducted by external 
organisations, the case study companies also made reference external actors in 
other ways. Talisman, for example, disclosed the names of the organisations with 
which it collaborated to deliver relief aid in Sudan (Talisman, 2000b: 40). 
Similarly, Premier Oil referred to Amnesty when discussing the legitimacy of its 
investment in Myanmar (Amnesty, 2000). In these two particular cases, the 
organisations that the companies referred to denounced the use of their name. The 
relief organisations that Talisman had mentioned by name felt that their work was 
affected by the information published by Talisman. As a result, Talisman made a 
public apology (Talisman, 2000b: 40). In the case of Amnesty, the organisation 
clarified its relationship with Premier Oil in a public statement: 
Amnesty International is astonished that Premier Oil, in response to a call 
by the UK Government that it withdraw from Myanmar, has reportedly 
said in a news wire story that the company's ongoing dialogue with 
Amnesty International "had made a significant difference in Myanmar." 
The organization does not believe that this is the case. [ ... ] As a part of the 
human rights organization's ongoing policy to engage with all actors in 
society, Amnesty International has contact with Premier Oil, just as it has 
similar contacts with other major international corporations. During these 
meetings, the organization has stressed the sustained, grave human rights 
crisis in Myanmar. [ ... ] Amnesty International calls upon companies such 
as Premier, which believe that their presence in Myanmar can effect 
positive change, to demonstrate what effective improvements their 
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presence has brought about. Amnesty does not endorse such a presence. 
(Amnesty, 2000) 
The two incidents demonstrate the sensitivity of the relationship between 
companies and non-governmental organisations and the concern that the non-
governmental organisations have about the negative consequences of their 
association with companies. 
The analysis of the cases suggests that the effectiveness of appeals to other actors 
depends on the authority and expertise of the actors that are referred to. When the 
two priests belonging to Commission for Justice and Peace from Bangladesh 
visited Total's operations and the pipeline area in Myanmar, their subsequent 
report was criticised by some other non-governmental organisations because the 
priests were not seen to have followed appropriate procedures in human rights 
investigations. Commented EarthRights International: 
A cursory examination of the factfinding methodology in the report 
undermines its credibility completely. Typically, human rights 
investigations are conducted independently of governments and 
corporations, and rely on large numbers of confidential interviews 
conducted in safe environments. The "Timm Report" has none of these 
characteristics; the authors were in the pipeline villages for only two days, 
and their trip was organised and financed by the corporations they purport 
to exonerate. (EarthRights International, 2000: 135) 
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The report written by Bernard Kouchner about the impact of Total's investment in 
Myanmar was criticised by the French media for similar reasons (e.g., Liberation, 
10 December 2003). In contrast, the reports produced by Collaborative for 
Development Action, a respected organisation in the area of business and human 
rights, received little criticism. 
In sum, appeals to other actors can be seen as a leveraging strategy through which 
companies seek to increase the credibility of their arguments and behaviour. The 
companies need to, however, ensure that the organisations they refer to are happy 
to have their name disclosed. Also, the perceived authority of the organisation or 
individual that is appealed to has an impact on the effectiveness of the strategy. 
7.7.3 References to regulation and laws 
The references the case study companies made to extant regulation and laws in 
support of their views can be seen as another form of leveraging strategy. The 
companies referred to existing laws when they sought to justify the legitimacy of 
their presence in Myanmar and Sudan (Premier Oil, 1998: 14; Total, 2002c: 88; 
Talisman, 2001 b: 4). Total, for example, stressed in its first corporate social 
responsibility report that its investment in Myanmar did not violate any regulation 
introduced by the United Nations, the European Union, or the French government 
and was therefore legitimate (Total, 2002c: 88). References to extant laws did not, 
however, satisfy the critics who alleged that the responsibility of companies went 
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beyond the law (e.g., Aung San Suu Kyi, 1997: 169; EarthRights International, 
2000; European Parliament, 1998b; NCGUB, 1995; also see Chapter 3). 
In addition to regulation and laws, the case study companies made reference to 
guidelines and principles on ethical business, corporate social responsibility, and 
human rights to justify their policies and conduct in Myanmar and Sudan. For 
example, Talisman explained in one its corporate social responsibility reports that 
it took measures to ensure that its Sudan Operating Principles were consistent 
with codes of conduct including Amnesty International Guidelines for Companies, 
Social Accountability 8000, the United Nations Global Compact, and the Global 
Sullivan Principles (Talisman, 2000b: 8). In terms of reporting guidelines, several 
of the companies made reference to the Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines, 
which mirrors the importance of the Guidelines in contributing to the credibility 
of corporate social responsibility reports (Pleon, 2005; Premier Oil, 2002b: 76; 
Talisman, 2002b: 4). 
7.8 Stakeholder engagement strategy 
Stakeholder engagement involves attempts to increase mutual understanding 
between companies and their stakeholders through two-way communication. In 
difference to the other symbolic approaches, stakeholder engagement strategy is 
relational rather than issue-specific; it aims to create a rapport or a sense of 
understanding between companies and their stakeholders with the expectation that 
this relationship helps in addressing any human rights issues that may arise. In 
what follows, the main ways in which the case study companies engaged with 
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different stakeholders are first reviewed: (1) discussions, (2) consultation 
structUres, and (3) visits to areas of operations. Engagement with non-
governmental organisations is then explored in more detail because many of the 
symbolic issues encountered by the companies arose from the concerns of non-
governmental organisations. 
7.8.1 Discussions 
The companies held discussions with diverse stakeholder groups to exchange 
information and views about their operations in Myanmar and Sudan (Batruch, 
2004; du Rusquec, 2004; Jones, 2003a; Talisman, 2000b: 10). For example, since 
the early 1990s, representatives of Total met with a number of non-governmental 
organisations and other groups that were concerned about the company's impact 
in Myanmar. The meetings were typically arranged at the request of the other 
organisation rather than Total (e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 2000; du Rusquec, 2003, 
2004; Laroche & Habbard, 1996). Total also discussed its investment in Myanmar 
with the host and home government authorities (Aubert report, 1999: 87; du 
Rusquec, 2004). 
As for Premier Oil, it stated that it was "committed to open dialogue on an 
ongoing basis" with all stakeholders (Premier Oil, 2003: 5). In line with this 
commitment, it initiated discussions with a variety of non-governmental 
organisations including Amnesty International (Premier Oil, 2002a: 11; Premier 
Oil, 2002b: 12; Premier Oil, 2003: 7, 8). Representatives of Premier Oil also met 
with the leader of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, to . 
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discuss their investment in the country (Aubert report, 1999; Premier Oil, 2002b: 
72). Similarly to Total, Premier Oil also held discussions with government 
authorities at home and in Myanmar (Jones, 2003a). 
The Myanmar and Sudan operations were also discussed in annual general 
meetings, which reflected the increasing attention that institutional and other 
investors gave to corporate social responsibility issues. As a result of one of these 
discussions, Talisman's shareholders adopted a resolution to ensure that the 
company complied with the International Code of Ethics of Canadian Business 
(Talisman, 2000b: 6). The Myanmar and Sudan operations were also raised by 
groups that had obtained company shares to be able to attend annual meetings in 
which they expressed their opposition to investment in Myanmar and Sudan (e.g., 
Friends of the Earth, 2002). These groups also organised demonstrations outside 
the buildings where annual meetings were held in order to direct shareholders' 
attention on the companies' role in Myanmar and Sudan (ibid.). 
7.8.2 Consultation structures 
The case study companies also set up structures through which they consulted 
particular stakeholder groups or provided them with an opportunity to interact 
with relevant people from the company. Some of these consultation structures 
were permanent while others were used on a less regular basis. Moreover, as will 
be seen, some of the structures involved just one stakeholder group while others 
could be used by different stakeholders. 
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Several of the case study companies set up structures to consult with the members 
of the local communities in which they operated (Anderson et al., 2002: 14; Total, 
2003c: 16; Premier Oil, 2001 b: 32, 36). Total and Premier Oil, for example, set up 
committees at the village level as part of their community development 
programmes. The committees consisted of local residents elected by the 
inhabitants of each of the villages that took part in the community programmes 
(Total, 2003c: 16; Premier Oil, 200 I b: 32, 36). They were unusual as the 
government was normally suspicious of civil society organisations; it only agreed 
with the establishment of the committees because of their non-political character 
(Anderson et al., 2002: 14). Communication between the committees and Total 
and Save the Children as the organisation that managed Premier Oil's socio-
economic programme took place on a regular basis through informal and formal 
meetings (Anderson et al., 2002: 14; Premier Oil, 2001b: 32, 36). 
In addition to consultation structures that enabled communication with the 
representatives of local communities, Total set up a committee that enabled 
internal and external stakeholders to make inquiries pertaining to ethics (Total, 
2001: 12). This Ethics Committee established in 2001 served several functions. 
One of its purposes was to offer employees an opportunity to request advice in 
confidence (Total, 2005e). In 2004, 54 such requests were investigated. The 
committee was also responsible for preparing communications relating to ethical 
issues, particularly towards international, governmental and non-governmental 
organisations (ibid.). 
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Finally, in 2000 and 2001, Premier Oil consulted a number of stakeholder groups 
about issues relating to corporate social responsibility (Premier Oil, 2001b: 5,44-
49). One of the groups that it particularly sought to engage with was shareholders. 
In order to do this, the company first invited shareholders to take part in a 
dialogue through focus groups (Premier Oil, 2001b: 44). As only a few were 
prepared to do this, it ended up using a questionnaire to collect shareholder views 
(ibid.). Unlike the other consultation structures described above, the focus groups 
or the questionnaire did not become penn anent structures. 
7.8.3 Visits to areas of operations 
The companies also invited selected stakeholders to visit their operations in 
Myanmar and Sudan and thereby engaged these stakeholders in two-way 
communication. The visitors included several non-governmental organisations 
that examined the situation of human rights in the areas of operations (see 7.4.1). 
The visitors also included embassy personnel and parliamentarians from the home 
countries (Aubert, 1999: 92; BBC Radio, 15 May 1998). For example, a French 
Parliamentary Committee visited Myanmar in March 1999 to examine the role of 
Total in the country (Aubert, 1999; 218-9). The companies also facilitated the 
visits of foreign journalists (Batruch, 2004; du Rusquec, 2004; Premier Oils 
Wheels of Change, 2001). Total, for example, hosted several groups of journalists, 
first of which in November 1996 (du Rusquec, 2003). Most recently, in 2003, the 
company organised three separate occasions for journalist to visit the pipeline 
region (du Rusquec, 2004). Finally, the companies also assisted the UN special 
rapporteurs in accessing their operational areas (United Nations, 2002). 
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In general, international coverage on the areas of operations was restricted 
because of the control exercised by the host government authorities 11 (Reporters 
without Borders, 2004). Reports by the journalists who visited company projects 
provided rare insight on the situation in Myanmar and Sudan. Some of these 
reports conveyed a negative view on the role of the companies in the case study 
countries. For example, the French television channel Canal Plus aired a 
documentary entitled "Total en Birmanie: l'autre scandale" (Total in Myanmar: 
another scandal) after its visit to the pipeline area. The programme suggested that 
human rights violations took place near the pipelines and that Total's investment 
in the country was unethical. In contrast, other reports conveyed a more positive 
view on the companies' impact in the country. For example, wrote a journalist in 
The Times after visiting Premier Oil's human rights training in Myanmar: 
"Premier's engagement has some legitimacy. In the conference centre in Rangoon 
and the village schoolroom an attempt is being made to plant the seeds of political 
discussion at a personal level" (The Times, 2001). 
7.8.4 Contact with non-governmental organisations 
As seen in Chapter 6, symbolic human rights issues often arose from the concerns 
expressed by non-governmental organisations, which is why engagement between 
companies and non-governmental organisations is examined in some detail here. 
In general, the relationship between the case study companies and non-
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governmental organisations was sensitive. One reason for this was that some non-
governmental organisations felt that contact with companies would give 
legitimacy to the investments in Myanmar and Sudan, (Total, 2002d: 81; 
observation). Others were wary of the effect that association with companies had 
on their own reputation and activities in Myanmar and Sudan (Talisman, 2000b: 
40; Total, 2002d: 81; observation). As a result, discussions between the 
companies and non-governmental organisations were not always made public 
(Batruch, 2004; observation). 
In the beginning of the research period, non-governmental organisations were 
reluctant to engage with the case study companies. Over time, however, they 
became more willing to have contact with the companies. This development was 
particularly evident in Myanmar. When a French parliamentary commission 
visited the country in 1999, all non-governmental organisations interviewed by 
the commission said that they were unwilling to participate to Total's social and 
economic activities in the country (Aubert report, 1999: 89). A few years later in 
2002, another set of similar type of non-governmental organisations interviewed 
by Collaborative for Development Action expressed their interest in meeting with 
the representatives ofthe company, though they remained somewhat critical about 
the company (Anderson et aI., 2002: 21; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 23; Zandvliet 
& Fraser, 2004: 19). Parallel to this development, Total began to foster contacts 
with humanitarian organisations in order to exchange information relating to the 
II It was difficult for journalists to obtain a press visa and when successful, they were monitored 
throughout their stay in the country. Moreover, Myanmar nationals working for international news 
agencies were subject to close scrutiny by the Myanmar authorities. 
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company's social and economic activities in the country (Anderson et aI., 2002: 
21; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 23). 
The case study companies categorised non-governmental organisations into those 
with which they could have meaningful interaction and those with which 
engagement was unproductive (Batruch, 2004; du Rusquec, 2003; personal 
observation, 2003). For example, Total's general manager in Myanmar divided 
non-governmental organisations into two groups: organisations that were 
interested in a dialogue with the company and organisations for which boycotting 
Myanmar was the raison d'etre (du Rusquec, 2003). Some communication still 
took place between the companies and the organisations of the latter type, but the 
companies often found the engagement futile (Batruch, 2004; du Rusquec, 2003; 
personal observation, 2003). The following quote illustrates the sentiment of the 
company managers: 
Lundin's experience with special-interest NGOs was more difficult. In 
many cases, views about the situation in Sudan were so very different that 
discussions rarely went beyond each side trying to convince the other of 
the correctness of its views. This was particularly true with respect to 
religious-based organisations, which characterised the conflict as an 
attempt by Muslims to eradicate the Christian population in the south of 
Sudan in order to gain access to the oil there. Although the company 
responded to their claims, in discussions and in writing, it felt that not 
much would be gained from this effort. (Batruch, 2004). 
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The case study companies mostly sought to collaborate with international non-
governmental organisations. In Myanmar, this was explained by the fact that there 
were only very few local non-governmental organisations as the government 
discouraged and monitored any gathering of more than a small number of people 
(US Department of State, 2003). There were still some organisations that could be 
regarded as local even though they had to operate underground or from the 
refugee camps close to the Myanmar-Thai border (Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004). 
Total and Premier Oil had little direct contact with these groups until 2004 when 
Collaborative for Development Action, commissioned by Total, visited the camps 
in the border area (ibid.). 
7.9 Interconnectedness of strategies 
7.9.1 Strategy combinations 
The analysis of the cases suggests that companies sometimes combine strategies 
in order to address a particular issue. For example, in order to enable the 
relocation of the village of Michaunglaung, Total first employed an indirect 
strategy by persuading the government officials to let the villagers return to their 
old village. Once the government had agreed to this, Total adopted a direct 
strategy by providing the villagers with financial assistance so that they could 
move and built houses to replace the ones that had been destroyed (see 7.4.1). The 
successive strategies that Total employed to re-establish the village of 
Michaunglaung reflect the control that the company had over the different aspects 
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of the relocation: it first needed to obtain the agreement of the government to 
make the return possible; it could then assume a direct strategy because it could 
make the payments without involving other actors. The role that the degree of 
control plays in the choice of strategy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 (see 
8.3). 
In addition to employing strategies in success lOn, the case study companies 
pursued strategies in parallel. For example, Premier Oil sought to influence the 
behaviour of the army in the pipeline area by employing two types of direct 
strategy: raising human rights issues with government officials and providing 
human rights training to relevant members of the anny and the police (see 7.5.1. 
and 7.5.2). Similarly, when arguing that their investment in Myanmar and Sudan 
was legitimate, the companies typically used different types of leveraging strategy 
including appeals to authority and references to relevant regulation and laws (see 
7.7). 
Finally, the companies combined substantial and symbolic strategies by referring 
to their substantial action in order to address symbolic issues. For example, they 
pursued an information strategy aimed at influencing stakeholder views about 
their impact in Myanmar and Sudan by providing information about their direct 
strategies that were designed to improve the quality of life in the local 
communities (see 7.5.1). As already seen, non-governmental organisations reacted 
negatively when companies did this (ibid.). 
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7.9.2 Activities exacerbate and give rise to new issues 
The experiences of Total in Myanmar show that activities carried out by 
companies to address particular human rights issues can exacerbate the issues they 
were aimed at addressing. For example, some non-governmental organisations 
interpreted the assistance that Total gave to victims of human rights violations as 
compensation and acknowledgement of responsibility for the violations (e.g., 
EarthRights International, 2000:82; also see 7.4.2). Similarly, the relocation of the 
village of Michaunglaung exacerbated the debate over the boundaries of corporate 
responsibility and made Total to provide its view on the motives for the relocation 
and thereby engage in an information strategy. In this case, EarthRights 
International among others argued that the pipeline projects had benefited from 
the forced relocations perpetrated by the Myanmar army and that the companies 
had been aware of the relocations (EarthRights International, 2000: 43). 
According to the organisation, by persuading the government to let the villagers 
return to the original village, Total admitted its knowledge and responsibility for 
the displacement of Michaunglaung: "Total did more than admit their knowledge 
of the relocation. Labeled as remorse, the foreign Total representatives admitted 
responsibility" (ibid.: 43). In contrast, Total presented the facilitation of the return 
of the villagers as an example of the company's positive influence in the pipeline 
region: "No villages were relocated because of Total; on the contrary, in 1997, the 
Group even arranged for the villagers of Michauglang [ ... ] to return to their 
former home" (Total, 2003c: 15). Despite these statements, the relocation of the 
village exacerbated the debate on whether the Myanmar army had violated human 
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rights in furtherance of the Yadana project and if this was the case, whether Total 
bore any responsibility for it. 
In addition to exacerbating existing issues, the analysis of the cases suggests that 
strategies pursued by companies can give rise to new human rights issues. For 
example, according to interviews conducted by EarthRights International, the 
army confiscated all or part of the money that Total gave to the villagers that had 
been victims of forced labour (EarthRights International, 2000: 92, 93, 97). 
Witnessed a displaced person from the pipeline area to EarthRights International: 
The headman told me that I might get 4,000 kyat because I had worked 
three times on the pipeline route and portering. In 1996, I had to go three 
times and it took me about 10 days in total. So he said that I had been 
working on the foreigner'S project. Most of the villagers from every 
household went to Kaleinaung to get their payment. There were about 50 
people from my village. When we were at the place where they would pay 
us, we had to stay separated from the other villagers. The Total employees 
were paying us village by village. [ ... ] So the Burmese employees called 
us one by one. There were no foreigners, only three [Burmese] employees 
and soldiers from LIBs 408 and 407. After we got the payment we could 
not go back yet, but we had to sit down in front of the building and wait 
for the other villages. I got 4,000 kyat, and they took a notice. Then I had 
to sign my name on their paper. [ ... ] After the foreigner's employees went 
back, a major took the registrations and did the same as employees. I mean 
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he made all the villagers come one by one to him and give all the money 
back to him. (EarthRights International, 2000: 92) 
According to a cable sent from the United States Embassy in Yangon to 
Washington and quoted in an EarthRights International report, Total was aware of 
the problems with the payments to the villagers (EarthRights International, 2000: 
96). Indeed, Total asked the staff of its socio-economic programme to ensure that 
the financial and other contributions reached their intended beneficiaries and 
thereby sought to address the new issue that had arisen from the assistance of the 
human rights victims (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15,26). 
7.9.3 Emergent strategies 
Evidence from the cases further suggests that company activities and practice can 
have unintended consequences that develop into new human rights strategies. The 
village communication committees set up by Total are an example of this. They 
were originally established to provide information about the pipeline project and 
to promote trust between the project partners and local communities (Total, 
2003c: 8, 13, 16-17). They also served as a forum for dialogue that guided the 
design of Total's social and economic activities in the pipeline region (ibid.), In 
1995, however, Total learned through the village communication committees 
about incidents of human rights violations committed by the army (see 7.5.1). 
Since then, the company used the committees as a channel through which it 
monitored the human rights situation in the pipeline area (Total, 2003c: 15). The 
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village communication committees therefore gave rise to Total's strategy of 
human rights monitoring. 
7.10 Organisational mode 
The analysis of the cases shows that the organisational mode of strategies varied 
from internal development to different forms of collaboration. Three specific 
modes could be identified from the way in which the companies pursued 
corporate human rights strategies: (1) internal development, (2) sponsorship, and 
(3) collaboration. Internal development refers to the use of existing resources or 
acquisition of new resources for the purpose of carrying out an activity. For 
example, Total hired new people to deliver its community programme in 
Myanmar (Anderson et aI., 2002: 8; Total, 2003b: 17). Sponsorship concerns 
financial contributions to other organisations without any direct involvement from 
companies. Talisman, for example, sponsored development projects that were in 
line with the company's objectives. These included the Kailak Lake Agricultural 
Project managed by D'Tasi Development Technology and Services International 
and Women's Entrepreneurial Project coordinated by the Salesian Sisters 
(Talisman, 2001b: 23). Finally, collaboration refers to activities that companies 
carry out together with other actors. In distinction to sponsorship, collaboration 
involves not only financial, but also some managerial or other type of input from 
the part of companies. For example, in Myanmar, Premier Oil worked in 
collaboration with Save the Children US to run a community programme in the 
pipeline area. The collaboration was initiated by Texaco from which Premier Oil 
obtained the operatorship of the Yetagun project in 1997. Premier Oil 
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subsequently recruited people that had been involved in the planning and setting 
of the activities for Texaco and also went ahead with Texaco's plan to collaborate 
with Save the Children US in designing and managing the social and economic 
activities (Jones, 2003b). 
As seen from Table 7.4 below, internal development was used to pursue all types 
of strategies, but it was particularly typical for carrying out symbolic action. In 
contrast, sponsorship and collaboration were mainly employed to take substantial 
action. One reason for this may be that substantial action is project-like with clear 
roles and tasks, while symbolic action requires detailed knowledge and 
understanding of corporate policy and activity. 
TABLE 7.4. Organisational mode of activities 
a. c 0 
Type of action Strategy Activity ~ :c ;; j i § ~ 
c ! ;S ... 
Community development Y Y Y 1---.----- _.M. __ . 
-'-
1--._. 
Assistance of human rights victims Y N Y 
Direct 
Human rights monitoring Y N Y 
.... -----~ ...... , .. -.-.----..... -.-.. ------.. ---. . .. _--
... _ ... _ .......... 
substantial Philanthropic projects Y Y N 
--
.. ----_ .. _----_._ .. _-----_ .. --_ .. _-_ ... 
'--' 
. .. _ .. ,,_ ... 
Raising human rights Issues with y N N 
Indirect 
1-c!l,JtbQrJtiE:!~. 
-_._----
. __ . ~---. ... _--
Human rights training N N Y 
- ... _--------------!---
Expressions of concern Y N N 
Information --- Y N N 
..... _ ... -_ .. _._-_._ ..... _-_ ......... ... __ .. _--_ ....... _._ .. _-_ ... _ .... _-_ ....... - ..... _- .. .. _ .. _-1------_ . 
---... -.-
External verification N N Y 
- ---- ---
Leveraging Appeals to experts or authority Y N N fo----------... ---------------.-1--- --- ._-
Symbolic References to regulation and law Y N N 
1--- _. -------_ .. _---------_. ._ ... _-_. -._ .. _ .. _-.. 
Discussions Y N N 
Stakeholder Consultation structures Y N Y engagement 
------ ----. ---
._-.. _ ... _., 
Visits Y N N 
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Over time, collaboration with other actors became more common. This reflected 
change within companies and non-governmental organisations that were potential 
partners for collaborations projects. Total, for example, began to foster contacts 
with humanitarian organisations towards the end of the research period (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2002: 21; Batruch, 2004; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 23). In turn, 
the humanitarian organisations acknowledged that Total was trying to find 
solutions to the situation in Myanmar through engagement, although they 
remained somewhat critical about the company (Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 23; 
Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 19). The change in attitudes was also demonstrated by 
the fact the Talisman and Lundin that started their operations in Sudan later than 
Total and Premier Oil in Myanmar sought contact with non-governmental 
organisations and other possible partners from the beginning of their operations 
(Batruch, 2004; Talisman, 2000b: 22). 
7.11 Summary 
This chapter identified the human rights strategies that the case study companies 
pursued in connection with their operations in Myanmar and Sudan. It was first 
argued that the companies' approach to human rights changed over the period of 
research. The change was particularly evident in the policies on government 
relations which shifted from silence on human rights to constructive engagement 
with the host society, but the change was also highlighted by the introduction of 
new policies on corporate social responsibility and human rights. It was then seen 
that the companies adopted two main lines of action to address human rights 
issues with regard to their operations in Myanmar and Sudan: substantial action 
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aimed at altering material circumstances that give rise to human rights concerns 
and symbolic action directed at influencing stakeholder perceptions and views. 
This distinction mirrors the way in which Mahon and Waddock (1992) divided 
corporate responses to social issues into substantial and symbolic responses. Each 
type of action was then divided into further strategies of which a total of five were 
identified: direct and indirect strategies represented substantial action while 
information, leveraging and stakeholder engagement strategies were forms of 
symbolic action. Each of the five strategies was then discussed in more detail. The 
response of non-governmental organisations to some of the activities carried out 
by the companies showed that it is important for companies to focus on the main 
human rights issues associated with their operations in a particular country. It also 
showed that company efforts to contribute to the realisation of social and 
economic rights can be viewed as futile in a situation where basic physiological 
and safety needs are not being satisfied. The chapter concluded with the 
examination of the interconnectedness of strategies and the discussion of 
organisational modes. 
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8 Variables affecting the choice of 
human rights strategy 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter sheds light on the variables that affect the way in which companies 
address human rights concerns. In doing so, it answers the third and last of the 
research questions specified in Chapter 1: What are the factors that explain 
strategy selection? Based on the analysis of the cases and existing literature on 
issues and stakeholder management, seven variables are proposed to influence the 
choice of human rights strategy: (1) the perceived ontological nature of the human 
rights issue, (2) the degree of control the company holds over the issue, (3) the 
company's intrusiveness into its external environment, (4) the power that 
stakeholders hold relative to the company, (5) the size of the company, (6) the 
availability of collaboration partners, and (7) the perceived fit with core activities. 
In the figure below, the proposed strategies are presented in the form of a diagram 
that incorporates the seven variables. 
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FIGURE 8.1. Framework for corporate human rights strategies 
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8.2 Choice between substantial and symbolic action 
As seen in Chapter 7, the activities that the case study companies carried out in 
response to human rights issues can be divided into substantial and symbolic 
action. Substantial action is directed at altering material circumstances that give 
rise to human rights concerns, whereas symbolic action is aimed at influencing 
perceptions and views that stakeholders have of physical conditions or more 
abstract ideas. The categorization of activities into substantial and symbolic action 
reflects the grouping of human rights concerns into substantial and symbolic 
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issues and the way in which Mahon and Waddock (1994) divided responses to 
social issues (see 7.3). 
The analysis of the cases suggests that the choice between substantial and 
symbolic action is affected by the perception that managers have about the 
ontological nature of the issue that they are seeking to address. Accordingly, 
companies employ substantial action to influence issues that the managers view as 
involving material conditions or what were earlier defined as substantial issues 
(see 6.2). For example, Total and Premier Oil employed a substantial approach to 
improve the living conditions in the pipeline area because they regarded the poor 
social and economic situation as a source of discontent that could be exacerbated 
by foreign investment (Premier Oil, 2000: 15; Premier Oil, 2001b: 32; Total, 
2003a: 36). In contrast, the analysis of the cases shows that companies assume a 
symbolic approach to address issues that they see as originating from stakeholder 
perceptions and views. These types of issues were earlier referred to as symbolic 
issues (see 6.2). Total and Premier Oil have, for example, used a symbolic 
approach to respond to the allegations according to which the army continued to 
use forced labour and perpetrate other human rights violations in the pipeline 
region because they perceived these allegations as a symbolic issue pertaining to 
the perception that some stakeholders have about the behaviour of the army rather 
than a substantial concern stemming from the actual way in which the army 
behaved (du Rusquec, 2003; Jones, 2003b; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 3). 
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As seen in the literature review, a number of researchers have already previously 
linked the interpretation of issues to the actions assumed by companies in 
response to issues (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton, 1993; Dutton & Duncan: 
1987a; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). These 
researchers have asserted that there is a multitude of possible interpretations of 
events and conditions. They have also argue that the way in which managers 
perceive and interpret a particular issue has an impact on which organisational 
resources and processes are evoked to respond to the issue. Mitchell, Agle, and 
Wood (1997), for example, argued that managers' perception of stakeholder 
attributes determines which stakeholders are salient for a particular organisation 
and subsequently require managerial attention. The analysis of the cases provides 
support for the significance given to the way in which managers view the external 
environment and further suggests that managers perceive human rights issues 
either as substantial or symbolic issues and consequently deploy substantial or 
symbolic approaches to address them. 
Previous literature therefore provides support for the observation made on the 
basis of the analysis of the cases that it is the perception of managers about issues 
rather than the actual nature of issues that determines whether companies assume 
a substantial or a symbolic approach to human rights issues. Hence, based on the 
analysis of the case studies and previous literature, the following propositions can 
be put forward: 
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Proposition 1. Companies are likely to adopt substantial action to 
influence human rights issues that are perceived to concern objective 
conditions. 
Proposition 2. Companies are likely to adopt symbolic action to influence 
human rights issues that are perceived to involve stakeholder perceptions 
and views. 
8.3 Choice between direct and indirect strategies 
Substantial approaches to human rights can be further divided into direct and 
indirect strategies, as seen in Chapter 7. Direct strategies involve concrete action 
aimed at having a direct impact on some objective conditions giving rise to a 
human rights issue whereas indirect strategies pertain to attempts to persuade 
other actors to take concrete action over the conditions creating the issue. The 
analysis of the activities carried out by the case study companies in Myanmar and 
Sudan suggests that the degree of control that companies hold over human rights 
issues varies and that the approach they employ to address a particular substantial 
issue is affected by their control over the issue. As will be seen below, in 
situations where the companies held a high degree of control over an issue, they 
employed a direct strategy while in situations in which they held a low degree of 
control over the issue, they assumed an indirect strategy. 
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8.3.1 Low degree of control 
In connection with their operations in Myanmar and Sudan, the case study 
companies attended to a number of human rights issues over which they held a 
relatively low degree of control. These issues typically arose from the policies and 
behaviour of actors other than the companies, usually the government or attached 
groups such as the army in Myanmar or the tribal militias in Sudan (see 6.3.1). In 
such situations, the companies persuaded other actors to take action and thereby 
employed an indirect strategy (see 7.5). For example, in order to stop the army 
from perpetrating human rights violations in the pipeline region, Total raised 
particular incidents of human rights violations with government officials and the 
state-owned MOGE to express their dissatisfaction over the events (see 7.5.1). 
Similarly, Premier Oil sponsored human rights training seminars targeted at 
military officials to affect the way in which the army behaved in the pipeline 
region (see 7.5.2). 
The analysis of the case studies therefore suggests that companies are likely to 
address a human rights issue indirectly through other actors when they hold a low 
degree of control over the issue. In Myanmar and Sudan, the companies held a 
low degree of control over issues that arose from the policies and behaviour of 
other actors, particularly the host government and the army. The following 
proposition can thus be formulated: 
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Proposition 3. The lower the control the company holds over a substantial 
human rights issue, the more likely it is to employ an indirect strategy for 
addressing the issue. 
8.3.2 High degree of control 
The case study companies also addressed a number of issues over which they held 
a relatively high degree of control. Such issues included the social and economic 
conditions in the villages near the areas of operations and the financial and 
material situation of the victims of human rights violations. The control that the 
companies held over these issues derived from their ability to mobilise sufficient 
resources to influence the conditions that gave rise to the issues. For example, 
Premier Oil mobilised resources by forming a partnership with Save the Children 
to improve the social and economic situation in the pipeline area in Myanmar (see 
7.4.1). The other companies resorted to internal development to set up similar 
programmes (see 7.9). The analysis of the cases therefore suggests that companies 
are likely to employ a direct approach to attend to issues over which they hold a 
relatively high degree of control: 
Proposition 4. The higher the control the company holds over a substantial 
human rights issue, the more likely it is to assume a direct strategy for 
addressing the issue. 
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8.3.3 Shifts in the degree of control 
The analysis of the cases further suggests that companies can affect the degree of 
control they have over particular issues. More specifically, in order to gain control 
over an issue, companies can approach other parties that are in a position to 
influence the issue. In Myanmar, Total and Premier Oil run socio-economic 
programmes that contributed to the social and economic rights of the villagers 
living near the pipelines (du Rusquec, 2004; Premier Oil, 2000: 15; Premier Oil, 
2001b: 32; Total, 2002d, 16-17; Total, 2003c; see also 7.4). At the time the 
programmes were set up, few similar projects existed in the country as the 
government suspected that they could be used to enhance the power and 
popularity of other than government affiliated organisations (see 7.4). The 
companies therefore sought for the government's approval in order to launch the 
socio-economic programmes. In this way, they increased their control over the 
impact they could have on the social and economic conditions in the local 
communities near their areas of operations. The companies were then able to 
employ a direct strategy by setting up and running socio-economic programmes. 
Another example about increasing control over a particular issue concerns the 
relocation of the village of Michaunglaung. In this case, Total persuaded the 
government and the army that had originally displaced the village to let the 
villagers move back to the old village (du Rusquec, 2003; Total, 2003c: 15; see 
also 7.4.2). The company then assisted the return of the villagers by giving them 
money to build new houses in place of the ones that the army had destroyed 
(ibid.). Total was thus able to assume a direct strategy because it had increased its 
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control over the relocation of the village by obtaining the agreement of the 
government and the anny. 
In the figure below, a human rights issue is presented in relation to the control that 
a company and another party hold over it. In order to assume a direct strategy, 
companies should move the issue from the upper left hand corner where another 
actor holds a relatively high degree of control over the issue towards the lower 
right hand corner where the company has a relatively high degree of control over 
the issue. 
FIGURE 8.2. Strategy and substantial human rights issues 
Control of 
other actor 
over the 
Issue 
HIgh Indirect strategy 
---- _._-_._--
I-------+---
Low 
Control of company over the Issue 
Direct strategy 
High 
8.4 Choice between information/leveraging and 
stakeholder engagement strategies 
Based on the analysis of the cases, companies employ three types of strategies to 
address symbolic human rights issues. These strategies are: information strategy, 
leveraging strategy, and stakeholder engagement. As seen in Chapter 7, 
information and leveraging strategies are similar in that they do not necessitate 
two-way communication between companies and their intended audiences (see 
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7.6 and 7.7). Stakeholder engagement is, in contrast, characterised by attempts to 
exchange views with other actors (see 7.7). 
Researchers in the areas of issues management and stakeholder management have 
previously identified a number of variables that affect the approaches that 
companies assume in response to issues and stakeholder demands. These variables 
were discussed earlier in Chapter 3. Evidence from the case studies suggests that 
two of the variables, organisational intrusiveness and the relative power of 
stakeholders, have an impact on whether companies engage in (i) information and 
leveraging strategies or (ii) stakeholder engagement for addressing symbolic 
human rights issues. 
8.4.1 Organisational intrusiveness 
Daft and Weick (1984) suggested that the company's response to an issue is 
affected by the extent to which it intrudes into its external environment to 
comprehend it. Some organisations actively search information about their 
environment, whereas others accept it as given. Active organisations allocate 
resources for intruding the environment. This can include subscription to 
monitoring services and establishment of departments that are responsible for 
forecasting and research. Passive organisations may have a system for interpreting 
data that they receive about the environment, but they accept the environment as it 
is rather than explore its boundaries. 
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The analysis of the cases suggests that because searching the environment often 
involves two-way communication with diverse actors, stakeholder engagement 
becomes a natural way of addressing human rights issues for companies that 
actively intrude their environment. Premier Oil is an example of this. It forged 
contacts with a variety of actors including non-governmental organisations and 
Aung San Suu Kyi for gaining a better understanding of the general situation in 
Myanmar and the positions and views of different actors towards foreign 
investment (Premier Oil, 2002a: 11; Premier Oil, 2003: 5, 7, 8; Richard Jones, 7 
February 2002). It also used these contacts to communicate its own position on 
operating in Myanmar and in so doing employed a stakeholder engagement 
strategy. 
In contrast, Total was less active than Premier Oil in establishing contacts to 
various groups with regard to its investment in Myanmar and it tended to present 
its views through one-way communication channels (see 7.5.1). Total's approach 
was illustrated by the fact that, until recently, it did not seek to create contacts to 
non-governmental organisations in the country and it still refuses to meet with 
organisations that it considers hostile (Anderson et al., 2002: 20; Total, 2002c: 85; 
Zandvliet & Fraser, 2003: 23; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 19). This approach is 
explained by the head of mission in Myanmar as follows: 
Parmi les ONG, il faut distinguer deux categories: d'une part, les ONG 
humanitaires qui sont interessees au dialogue avec nous. [ ... ] La filiale de 
Total developpe aves eUes un dialogue et a deja fait visiter a certaines 
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d'entre elles la region du gazoduc. D'autre part, les ONG dont la 
campagne pour Ie boycott de la Binnanie est la raison d'etre (du Rusquec, 
2003). 
Thus, based on the analysis of previous literature and the case studies, the 
following propositions regarding organisational intrusiveness and strategy 
towards symbolic human rights issues can be presented: 
Proposition 5. The greater the extent to which the company intrudes into 
its environment to comprehend it, the more likely it is to assume a 
stakeholder engagement strategy to address symbolic issues. 
Proposition 6. The lesser the extent to which the company intrudes into its 
environment to comprehend it, the more likely it is to assume an 
infonnation or leveraging strategy to address symbolic issues. 
8.4.2 Relative power of the stakeholder 
Researchers have previously connected stakeholder power to the way in which 
companies approach stakeholder relationships (Freeman & Gilbert, 1987; Hill & 
Jones, 1992; Mitchell et aI., 1997; Rowley; 1997; Savage et aI., 1991). In line with 
this research, the analysis of the cases suggests that companies employ a 
stakeholder engagement strategy to communicate their views to stakeholders that 
hold some form of power. 
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In general, a stakeholder can be seen to have power to the extent it can impose its 
will on the other actor (see Mitchell et al., 1997). This definition of power derives 
from a reformulation of Dahl's (1957) view of power as "a relationship among 
social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do 
something that B would not otherwise have done" (Pfeffer, 1981: 3). In 
organisational literature, the bases of power have been explained in terms of the 
resources that actors can access to impose their will on others (e.g. Etzioni, 1964; 
French & Haven, 1960). 
Formal power. The case study companies assumed a stakeholder engagement 
strategy towards a number of stakeholders that held what Freeman and Gilbert 
(1987) called formal power. According to Freeman and Gilbert, formal power 
stems from the power of certain stakeholders to affect corporate policies and 
behaviour. Governments have such power because they can regulate corporate 
behaviour. Investors also have formal power because they can, for example, cast 
their vote in the election of corporate directors. The case study companies sought 
to engage with both types of stakeholders to communicate their views on 
operating in Myanmar and Sudan (Aubert, 1999: 87; Batruch, 2004; Jones, 2003a; 
Premier Oil, 2003: 12,59; Talisman, 2000b: 6; Total, 2002d: 9; also see 7.7). 
Social power. The case study companies also sought to engage with stakeholders 
that held what Etzioni (1964: 59) referred to as social power. This type of power 
stems from the ability to influence the perceptions and views that a broad range of 
stakeholders have about some events or situation. Such power is particularly held 
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by journalists and non-governmental organisation that are capable of mobilising 
the attention of the media. Some degree of social power is also held by the local 
communities that have, on occasion, brought their grievances regarding foreign 
investment to the knowledge of the international community (see 7.4.1). As seen 
in Chapter 7, the case study companies sought to engage with all these groups in 
connection with their operations in Myanmar and Sudan (see 7.7). They did this 
by, for example, inviting journalists to visit their areas of operations. All the 
companies also engaged with non-governmental organisations through 
discussions (see 7.7). They also met with some important political actors to 
advance their views. These actors included Aung San Suu Kyi who leads the party 
that won the 1990 elections in Myanmar, but does not hold any formal power (see 
7.7). Similarly, Talisman and Lundin met with political actors, including members 
of the opposition, in connection with their operations Sudan to exchange views 
about their investment in the country (Batruch, 2004; Talisman, 2000b: 22). 
Therefore, based on previous literature and analysis of the cases, companies 
employ a stakeholder engagement strategy in situations where the stakeholder 
holds a relatively high degree of power relative to companies. 
Proposition 7. Companies are likely to assume a stakeholder engagement 
strategy to communicate their views to stakeholders that hold a relatively 
high degree of power over corporate behaviour. 
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8.5 Choice between individual action and 
collaboration 
As seen in the previous chapter, companies can pursue strategies on their own or 
in collaboration with other actors. The analysis of the case studies and previous 
research suggests that three variables affect the choice between individual and 
collaboration strategies: (1) organisation size, (2) availability of partners, and (3) 
perceived fit with core activities. 
8.5.1 Organisation size 
Resource dependency theory proposes that larger organisations have greater 
resources to influence their environments than smaller organisations (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978: 267). This proposition is supported by research in issues 
management. In particular, Greening and Gray (1994) found in their study of 103 
companies that larger companies are more likely to have formal issues 
management structures and to devote more resources to issues management than 
smaller companies. It can be similarly argued that larger organisations are more 
likely to take action on their own in response to human rights issues because they 
have more resources at their disposal than smaller companies. Correspondingly, 
smaller organisations are more likely to pursue strategies in collaboration with 
other actors because they have fewer resources to address human rights issues. 
This argument is supported by the fact that Total, a significantly larger company 
than Premier Oil, employed a direct strategy on its own to run a socio-economic 
programme in the pipeline region, whereas Premier Oil collaborated with Save the 
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Children US to deliver a similar programme (see 7.9). In general, Total began to 
forge contacts with other actors only recently, whilst Premier Oil sought to pursue 
strategies in collaboration with other actors since it became the operator of the 
Yetagun project (see 7.4.3 and 7.5.1). The following propositions can hence be 
put forward: 
Proposition 8. The larger the size of the company, the more likely it is to 
assume individual action to address human rights issues. 
Proposition 9. The smaller the size of the company, the more likely it is to 
assume a strategy in collaboration with other actors to address human 
rights issues. 
8.5.2 Availability of partners 
The analysis of the cases further suggests that the availability of collaboration 
partners affects the choice between individual action and collaboration. 
Availability explains, for example, why Total run its community programme in 
Myanmar through its own staff while Premier Oil collaborated with Save the 
Children (see 7.9). According to Total's Head of Mission in the country, few non-
governmental organisations were interested in collaborating with the company at 
the time it launched its socio-economic programme, which was one of the reasons 
why it decided to recruit new staff to carry out its social and economic activities 
rather than to look for an organisation that would be prepared to collaborate with 
it (du Rusquec, 2004). In contrast, Premier Oil found a partner in Save the 
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Children US because of the contacts that Texaco as the fonner operator of the 
Yetagun project had established with the organisation before Premier took over 
the operatorship (Jones, 2003b). 
The proposition that the availability of collaboration partners affects the choice 
between individual and collaboration strategy is supported by the fact that even 
though Total rarely addressed human rights issues in Myanmar in collaboration 
with other organisations, it took the opportunity to do so when one arose. For 
example, given the opportunity, it asked Mr. Bernard Kouchner to examine its 
socio-economic programme in the country: 
Le contact entre B. Kouchner et Total est un peu Ie fruit du hazard. II avait 
accompagne son epouse qui interviewait Madame Aung San Suu Kyi et 
peu apres i1 a rencontre Ie President de Total qui lui a dit: 'nous sommes 
tres critiques sur la Binnanie, vous ne voulez pas venir sur place ce que 
nous y faisons, notamment sur Ie plan medical' (du Rusquec, 2004). 
The cooperation with Collaborative for Development Action is also an example of 
collaboration that Total engaged in when a suitable partner became available 
(Anderson et aI., 2002: 21; du Rusquec, 2004). 
The availability of collaboration partners can vary over time depending on how 
company operations are perceived by stakeholders, as noted by Lundin: 
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[1]t [Lundin] found that organizations with a humanitarian focus were 
generally supportive of the company's efforts to contribute to the local 
communities in the areas of operations. They were prepared to talk to 
company representatives and even work with them on certain projects. 
When the stigma surrounding oil activities became significant, most chose 
not to be publicly associated with the company and therefore only a few 
cooperative ventures continued, on a confidential basis. (Batruch, 2004). 
The analysis of the case studies therefore gives rise to the following propositions: 
Proposition 10. Unavailability of partners increases the likelihood that a 
company assumes individual action to address human rights issues. 
Proposition 11. Availability of partners increases the likelihood that a 
company assume a strategy in collaboration with other actors to address 
human rights issues. 
8.5.3 Perceived fit with core activities 
The analysis of the cases also suggests that fit with what managers consider as the 
companies' core activities affects the choice between individual action and 
collaboration. According to a Premier Oil manager, one of the reasons why the 
company formed a partnership with Save the Children for delivering a socio-
economic programme in the pipeline region was that the company did not 
consider social and economic activities as its core capability; instead, it preferred 
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to find an organisation specialised in such activities to design and run the 
programme: 
Our approach has been to get the specialist to do their job. [ ... ] They have 
an entire international organisation to draw to. If there is no model in 
South-East Asia that works, then Save the Children can go to South 
America and say we would like that model (Jones, 2003b; see also 
Anderson et aI, 2002: 8). 
In contrast to Premier Oil, the other three companies delivered a community 
programme through their own staff though they also sponsored projects managed 
by non-governmental organisations (see 7.9). Total, for example, was already 
carrying out socio-economic projects in other countries and felt capable of 
running a similar project in Myanmar (du Rusquec, 2004). It also considered the 
socio-economic programme as ''too important to be implemented without direct 
and personal involvement" (Anderson 2002, 8). 
Hence, based on the analysis of the cases, fit with what is considered as the 
company's core activities affects the choice between individual action and 
collaboration: 
Proposition 12. The greater the perceived fit with core activities, the more 
likely a company is to assume a direct strategy to address substantial 
human rights issues. 
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Proposition 13. The lesser the perceived fit with core activities, the more 
likely a company is to assume a strategy in collaboration with other actors 
to address human rights issues. 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter identified variables that were proposed to determine the selection of 
strategies that companies use to address human rights issues. The chapter first 
examined the perceived ontological nature of human rights issues as the variable 
that determines the selection between substantial and symbolic action. It then 
discussed the degree of control companies have over issues as the variable that 
affects the choice between direct and indirect strategies. Another two variables, 
organisational intrusiveness and relative power of stakeholders, were then argued 
to have impact on the choice between information/leveraging strategies and 
. 
stakeholder engagement strategies. Finally, three further variables were identified 
as influencing whether companies pursue strategies on their own or in 
collaboration with other actors: organisation size, availability of partners, and 
perceived fit with core activities. 
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9 The wider context of corporate 
human rights policies and practices 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the relevance of the research findings in the context of 
what companies are generally doing in relation to human rights. The focus will be 
on the extractive sector, but policy and practice across sectors will be reviewed. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the structure of the extractive sector and 
how it may affect corporate approaches to human rights. The most common 
activities that companies carry out to address human rights concerns are then 
reviewed on the basis of available information. As will be seen, little information 
still exists on the topic, particularly on the activities of state-owned companies. 
The chapter ends with a review of the principal voluntary initiatives in the area of 
business and human rights for assessing the significance of the present research in 
relation to the emerging standards and practice. 
9.2 Industry structure and human rights 
Companies in the oil and gas industry are often divided into the majors, national 
companies, and the independents. After a number of mergers between the largest 
companies during the last ten years, the majors now include ExxonMobil, BP, 
Shell, Chevron (merged with Texaco), and Total. These companies or their 
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predecessors played an important role in the development of the oil and gas 
industry and they are still influential due to the scope and geographical spread of 
their activities. In terms of oil, they account for about 13% of world production, 
21% of world refining, and 35% of product sales (Parra, 2004: 329). The national 
companies are state-owned, or partially state-owned, and have control over 
important oil and gas resources. In comparison to the majors, they operate in a 
smaller number of countries and, with the exception of some companies, do not 
have important downstream operations outside their own country. Still, they 
include some of the largest producers of oil and gas in the world and account for 
over one third of world production in crude oil (Parra, 2004: 330, also see Table 
9.1). The rest of the oil and gas companies are referred to as the independents. 
These companies often have operations in more than one country, but in contrast 
to the majors, are focused on a handful of countries and have limited refining and 
marketing operations. 
TABLE 9.1. Largest national companies by country of origin (as of January 1, 
2006) 
Reserves Reserves Country (billion barrels) (%ofworld Main national companies 
reserves) 
Saudi Arabia 264.3 20.4 Saudi Aramco 
Canada 178.8 13.8 Petro Canada 
Iran 132.5 10.3 National Iranian Oil Co. 
Iraq 115.0 8.9 nfa 
Kuwait 101.5 7.9 Kuwait Petroleum Corp. 
UAE 97.8 7.6 Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. 
Venezuela 79.7 6.2 Petroleos de Venezuela 
Russia 60.0 4.6 Gazprom 
Libya 39.1 3.0 Libya National Oil Corp. 
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Nigeria 35.9 2.7 Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. 
United States 21.4 1.7 nla 
China 18.3 1.4 China National Petroleum Corp., China National Offshore Oil Co. 
Qatar 15.2 1.2 Qatar Petroleum Corp. 
Mexico 12.9 1.0 Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) 
Algeria 11.4 0.8 Sonatrach 
Brazil 11.2 0.8 Petrobras 
Kazakhstan 9.0 0.7 KazGerMunai, KazMunayGas 
Norway 7.7 0.6 Statoil, Norsk Hydro 
. ______ ~_. __ ._M .. _. ____ M_._ 
Azerbaijan 7.0 0.5 Socar 
---------- .----.. --.--.. ------.---.---.... --..... --.-~.-.-
India 5.8 0.4 Oil and Natural Gas Corp. Ltd 
. --------.--.------.... ~.-
Rest of world 68.1 
TOTAL 1.292.5 
Source: Adjusted from Worldwide Look at ReseNes and Production, Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 103, No. 47, 24-25. 
Some recent developments suggest that the structure of the oil and gas industry 
may be changing in a way that affects human rights. The national companies have 
showed an increasing interest in diversifying their portfolio by investing abroad 
(see Marcel, 2006: 228). For example, in 2005, Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Company (CNOOC), the parent of which is controlled by the Chinese 
government, made a bid for a major US independent, Unocal, but withdrew its 
offer when faced with strong political opposition in the US. More importantly for 
human rights, the national companies have acquired interests in projects that have 
been abandoned by Western companies as a result of the depressing effect of 
human rights concerns on their share price. For example, as seen earlier in 
Chapter 5, Petronas purchased Premier Oil's share in the Yetagun project in 
Myanmar in 2002 and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India acquired 
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Talisman's interest in the Greater Nile Oil Project in Sudan in 2003. These types 
of acquisitions have negative consequences for human rights because the state-
owned companies, with the exception of some, have not taken similar measures to 
the majors and Western independents for protecting and promoting human rights 
(see 9.4 below). The acquisitions also show that the lack of pressure placed on 
national companies with regard to human rights improves their competitive 
position in comparison to Western companies. 
Companies and their approach to human rights may also be affected by their home 
government. It is rare for governments to prioritise human rights to economic and 
security interests in their foreign policy, particularly with regard to countries that 
have control over considerable oil reserves as identified in Table 9.1 (also see 
Donnelly, 2003: 178). Instead, governments may put pressure on companies to 
take action in response to human rights concerns. For example, as seen in Chapter 
6, the UK government requested Premier Oil to consider withdrawing from 
Myanmar, even though no official sanctions had been introduced against 
investment in the country's oil and gas sector. In contrast, other governments 
provide financial and political support for their companies operating abroad. 
France, for example, has been supportive of Total's investments in Myanmar (see 
Chapter 5). 
9.3 What are companies generally doing? 
The case studies examined for the present research were purposefully selected to 
develop a model for corporate human rights strategies. They concerned one major 
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and three independents headquartered in North America or Western Europe and 
centred on situations where a company was seeking to address human rights 
concerns in a particular country. The research findings are therefore not 
representative of what companies are generally doing in relation to human rights. 
In what follows, the research findings are discussed in the wider context of 
corporate approaches to human rights. The focus will be on the largest publicly 
listed companies of mostly US or Western European origin as little information 
can be found about the policies and practices of other types of oil and gas 
companies in this area. Based on the existing evidence, the most commonly used 
approaches to human rights include the adoption of human rights policies, human 
rights impact assessments, monitoring of human rights, and partnership projects. 
These activities are briefly reviewed below. 
Human rights policies. Companies are increasingly stating their commitment to 
human rights in their general business principles or specific human rights policies. 
An OECD survey carried out in 2002 found that human rights were addressed by 
35% of the 59 oil and gas companies included in the survey (OEeD, 2002b: 9). 
Preliminary results of a study conducted four years later in 2006 found that nearly 
80% of the Fortune Global 500 companies had incorporated human rights 
principles into their policies or management practice (United Nations, 2006). The 
results of the two surveys are not directly comparable as the sample of the 
companies studied was different, but they suggest that an increasing number of 
companies are making an explicit commitment to human rights. Because the 
second survey was based on the Fortune Global 500 which includes companies 
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from both DECD and non-DECD countries, the results also suggest that the 
inclusion of human rights considerations into company policies and practice is not 
exclusive to companies incorporated in North America or Western Europe. No 
conclusions can however be made about state-owned companies as the Fortune 
Global 500 only includes a small number of them (Petrobras, Petroleos 
Mexicanos, and some Asian companies; see Fortune, 2006). 
Human rights impact assessment. Human rights impact assessments are typically 
carried out before final investment decisions are made. The present research did 
not examine impact assessments as the focus of the research was on the action 
taken by companies once they had already decided to invest in a particular 
country. Nevertheless, human rights impact assessments have received 
considerable attention during the last few years. Notably, they were included in 
the mandate of the UN secretary general's special representative who was asked 
to "develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human rights impact 
assessments" (United Nations, 2006). Also, a significant number of companies are 
already assessing the impact of their operations on human rights. According to the 
preliminary results of the survey of the Fortune Global 500, 40% of the largest 
500 companies in the world routinely conduct human rights impact assessments 
and a slightly higher number do so occasionally (United Nations, 2006). These 
findings are evidence of the attention and resources that companies are allocating 
to human rights. 
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Human rights monitoring. There is evidence to suggest that many companies 
engage in internal and external human rights monitoring. All the companies 
examined for the present research were monitoring the human rights situation in 
the countries studied. This monitoring was carried out in sync with other activities 
aimed at addressing human rights concerns and often involved external 
organisations. Moreover, according to the Fortune Global 500 survey, nearly 90% 
of the companies that have adopted human rights policies have an internal system 
of monitoring and reporting in place (United Nations, 2006). Anecdotal evidence 
also suggests that companies do not only engage in internal monitoring, but also 
employ external organisations for the monitoring or use a combination of internal 
and external monitors. British Petroleum, for example, set up a committee 
consisting of both internal and external actors to monitor the human rights 
performance of the Colombian military units that provide security for the 
company's operations in Colombia (Human Rights Watch, 1999). 
Partnership projects. Evidence from several studies suggests that companies are 
engaging with external stakeholders to develop human rights policies and to 
address human rights concerns. Based on the survey of the Fortune Global 500, 
almost 90% of companies work with external stakeholders in developing and 
implementing their human rights policies (United Nations, 2006). Another study 
found that partnerships projects are the most common form of action taken for 
implementing the human rights principles of the Global Compact (McKinsey, 
2004; also see 9.4.1 below). Many of such projects have had the objective of 
improving social and economic conditions in host societies (Human Rights 
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Watch, 1999; OECD, 2002a). Moreover, based on the survey of the Fortune 
Global 500, non-governmental organisations are the most popular partner in 
collaboration projects, followed by industry associations, the UN and other 
international organisations, labour unions, and finally the governments (United 
Nations, 2006). Existing evidence does not allow for conclusions to be made 
about the commonalty of partnership projects across different types of oil and gas 
companies. It does, however, suggest that companies are pursuing human rights 
strategies in collaboration with other actors rather than on an individual basis (see 
7.9). 
9.4 Voluntary initiatives 
A large number of voluntary initiatives including principles, certification 
schemes, and financial indices making reference to human rights have been 
launched during the last 15 years. The United Nations High-Commissioner on 
Human Rights identified over 200 such initiatives in 2005 (United Nations, 2005). 
The emergence and significant number of these initiatives demonstrates that 
companies are increasingly expected to consider the impact of their operations on 
human rights and abide by internationally recognised human rights standards. The 
initiatives are relevant for discussing the significance of the present research 
because they shed light on the emerging standards and practice in the area of 
business and human rights. They are here reviewed in two parts: (1) general 
initiatives applying to all companies and (2) initiatives specific to extractive 
companIes. 
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9.4.1 General initiatives 
Many of the voluntary initiatives applying to all companies set forth principles on 
corporate behaviour. They typically involve a broad range of stakeholders 
including companies, governments, labour unions, and civil society groups and 
cover a variety of issues, not only human rights (United Nations, 2006). The 
substance of the initiatives frequently overlaps. For example, the Global Compact 
and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises both include principles on the fundamental labour standards as 
identified in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(1998). Moreover, even though the initiatives often specify procedures for 
implementation, they rather express what is expected from companies than focus 
on strict monitoring of compliance. 
Only the main general initiatives are reviewed here: the Global Compact, the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises. Out of the three 
initiatives, the Global Compact will be discussed in more detail than the others 
because comparisons between different types of extractive companies can be 
made on the basis of the information available on the Compact. The three 
initiatives carry considerable authority because of the intergovernmental character 
of the organisations that are behind them (United Nations, 2005). They also have 
a spill-over effect as a number of financial indices and certification schemes 
require companies to make a statement of commitment to at least one of them. For 
example, in order to be listed in the FTSE4Good index, companies are expected to 
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state their commitment to all core ILO labour standards or, alternatively, the 
Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines, or the SA8000 (FTSE4Good, undated). 
The Global Compact Office has deliberately sought to enhance the spill-over 
effect by engaging stock markets and financial market analysts in their efforts 
(McKinsey, 2004). 
The United Nations Global Compact is the most popular voluntary initiative in 
the area of business and human rights with nearly 3,000 company participants. It 
is designed for promoting and sharing good practice in relation to ten principles 
derived from international treaties and declarations in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment, and anti-corruption. The Global Compact was 
launched in 2000 by Kofi Annan, secretary-general of the United Nations, and has 
enjoyed the support and authority of his office. It encourages companies to 
improve their practices in relation to the ten principles through direct interaction 
with managers, policy dialogue, web-based information sharing, and local 
network creation and support. Participation in the Global Compact therefore 
signals a commitment to the improvement of performance over time rather than a 
full realisation of the ten principles. 
The participating companies are expected to report on their progress in 
implementing the ten principles. Failure to do so results in the company being 
listed as a "non-communicating company". Companies are therefore pressured 
through the power of public transparency and the watchdog role of the media and 
non-governmental organisations to report on the steps that they have taken in 
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support of the Compact. This has not satisfied critics who allege that some of the 
participants join the Compact to "bluewash,,12 their image without a serious 
commitment to human rights (for this and other criticism of the Global Compact, 
see Williams, 2004). The Compact has also been criticised for the lack of an 
effective monitoring system; the current system makes it possible for companies 
to report on the issues of their own choice even if they are performing poorly in 
another area of the Compact (see Williams, 2004). 
The Global Compact brought attention on the concept of complicity through its 
Principle 2 that asks companies to "make sure that they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses". The discussion on complicity has focused on situations 
where companies have assisted in, benefited from, or failed to use their power to 
oppose the human rights violations carried out by host government authorities. It 
has also involved the boundaries of responsibility between companies and their 
sub-contractors or suppliers. In general, the inclusion of the concept of complicity 
in the Global Compact principles demonstrates that corporate responsibility for 
human rights is increasingly considered to extend beyond the immediate acts of 
companies to the behaviour of other connected actors. 
The Compact brings together companies and other actors from OECD and non-
OECD countries. In 2005, more than half of the participating companies were 
from developing countries (United Nations, 2006). Companies from OECD and 
non-OECD countries have, however, joined the Compact for somewhat different 
12 The tenn refers to the colour of the UN logo. 
311 
reasons. According to a survey carried out by McKinsey in 200413, for companies 
from OECD countries, the Compact is a sign of continued engagement with 
corporate social responsibility, whereas for companies from non-OECD countries, 
the Compact is a way to become more familiar with corporate social responsibility 
(McKinsey, 2004). Still, only 9% of the respondents to the McKinsey survey 
reported that joining the Compact was a way to introduce change in the company. 
Slightly more than half of the respondents said that changes would have happened 
anyway though participation made change easier. Another 40% of the companies 
stated that participation had no significant impact on what the company was doing 
(McKinsey, 2004). These findings suggests that many of the companies that have 
signed up for the Global Compact, irrespective of whether they come from OECD 
or non-DECD countries, have already decided to incorporate human rights 
considerations into their policy and practice. 
Nevertheless, only half of the companies that responded to the McKinsey (2004) 
survey had taken action to implement the ten Global Compact principles. The 
most common form of action among all the companies were partnership projects. 
This finding suggests that companies are addressing human rights concerns in 
collaboration with other actors as discussed in Chapter 7. Most other action taken 
by companies to implement the Compact principles involved changes in internal 
policies and practices. For example, 39% of the respondents had discussed or 
incorporated human rights considerations into company policies and 25% had 
revised human resources policies to eliminate discrimination. Also, 35% of the 
13 The McKinsey survey was based on 288 questionnaires filled by individuals from organisations 
on the Global Compact email database. This represented a response rate of nearly 30%. 
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compames from outside the DECO had changed their health and safety 
procedures. The only external actions that companies reported to have taken, In 
addition to partnership projects, concerned the introduction of policies against the 
use of child and forced labour among suppliers and the change of suppliers or 
business partners because of human rights concerns. The companies examined for 
the present research have therefore carried out a significantly broader variety of 
external activities as described in Chapter 7, which may be explained by the 
attention that the operations of these companies have attracted. 
CHART 9.1 . Participant actions in support of Global Compact goals 
PARTICIPANT ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF GL.OBAL. COMPACT GOAL.S 
Percent of company respondents (of the 58% that report taking at least one action) 
Tolal DECO Non-OECD 
Actions taken 
Developed partnership projects thot relate 
o the Principles 
Discussed andlor incorporated hun n rights 
considerations con pany policies 
RevISed human reso\Jrces po'icies to elimanate 
areas 0 posSlble discrim nation 
Changed he::!, and safety proced es (e.g., 
provided better proactive clothing tor worke~) 
Created or revised policies 00 your 5UPplie~ 
using child andlof forced labour 
C anged production processes or inputs 
(e g .• to use tess palMing c emicals) 
Taken Bny other action to align ihelf better 
With the Compact's Principles 
Changed suppliers or other business partners 
due to concerns over h an rights, 
environmental or labour standards 
Developed programs for · pact as!oessmenl 
or nsk management of cen ·ct (e·9·, civil 'Nar) 
Source: Survey of GC pariicipDnts 
23 
21 
2 1 
2 1 
15 
13 
47 47 
42 
21 
9 3S 
23 17 
21 23 
21 21 
5 14 
12 
47 
Partnership projects are most common act ion companies have taken to support Compact' , goals . DECO-based companie 
focused more on closing human ri ghts gap while developing country companies emphasize basic health and tlllfety . 
Source: McKinsey 2004 
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Overall, more than half of the oil and gas companies participating to the Compact 
come from outside Europe or North America. 14 Participation is still concentrated 
in Europe with 38% of the companies being of European origin. The 
representation of companies from Asia (24%) and South America (21 %) is also 
significant. Smaller numbers of companies have signed up for the Compact from 
North America (9%), Africa (6%), and the Middle East (2%). Most of the 
participating companies from North America are from Canada or Mexico. Only 
one US oil and gas company, Amerada Hess, has joined the Compact. rn general, 
only a few US companies have signed up for the Compact despite the efforts of 
the Global Compact office to strengthen support among them (see McKinsey, 
2004). The Compact remains unattractive for the US companies because of their 
concerns about the legal risks and a lack of perceived benefits that would incur 
from association with the United Nations (McKinsey, 2004; Williams, 2004). 
CHART 9.2. Participation of oil and gas companies by region 
Middle East 
2% 
Africa 
6% 
South America 
21% 
North America 
9% 
Europe 
38% 
The country of origin of the companies participating to the Compact reflects the 
structure of the oil and gas industry. Three out of the five majors have joined the 
14 Research on the participating oil and gas companies was carried out on the basis of infonnation 
that was available on the Global Compact website (see Appendix) . 
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Compact. Only Chevron and ExxonMobil have stayed outside the Compact, 
which echoes the generally low take-up of the Compact by US companies. The 
national companies have also signed up for the Compact; they account for 18% of 
the participating companies. Also independents from both OECD (33%) and non-
OECD (23%) countries are well represented. The rest of the participating 
companies are subsidiaries of different types of companies. This balanced 
participation of different types of oil and gas companies suggests that human 
rights are embraced by all types of companies. 
CHART 9.3. Type of participating oil and gas companies 
Subsidiary 
22% 
National 
18% 
Major 
4% 
OECD 
independent 
33% 
Non-OECD 
independent 
23% 
A closer inspection of the national companies participating to the Compact reveals 
that nearly half of them are from Asia. None of the national companies from the 
Middle East have joined the Compact. Of the important South American national 
companies, only Petrobras is participating to the Compact. The relative number of 
European and North American companies is low because most oil and gas 
companies from these regions are public with the exception of Norwegian and 
some Eastern European companies. The number of African companies is also low, 
even though many resource-rich African countries have state-owned oil and gas 
companles. 
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CHART 9.4. Origin of participating national oil and gas companies 
11% 
Europe 
17% 
South America 
17% 
6% 
No trends can be identified in the number of oil and gas companies joining the 
Compact over time (see Chart 9.5). Instead, sign-ups have spiked in the run-up or 
aftermath of activities carried out by the Global Compact Office to recruit new 
participants in different regions and countries (McKinsey, 2004). Also, sign-ups 
increasingly result from peer recruitment and general interest (ibid.). 
CHART 9.5. Number of oil and gas companies joining the Global Compact annually 
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The OEeD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recommendations by 
governments to multinational companies. The Guidelines were first launched in 
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1976, but reviewed and re-Iaunched in 2000 with significant changes. They 
encompass a broad range of issues from competition to sustainable development. 
In terms of human rights, they require companies to "respect the human rights of 
those affected by their activities consistent with the host government's 
international obligations and commitments". They also include a chapter on 
employment and industrial relations which makes reference to a number of human 
rights including the freedom of association and the abolition of child labour. 
Chapters on combating bribery and protecting consumers were added to the 
Guidelines in 2000. 
The coverage of the Guidelines was expanded in the review carried out in 2000 in 
two ways. First, the scope of the Guidelines was extended from companies 
operating in OECD countries to also include companies operating from OECD 
countries. Also, companies were asked to encourage their business partners and 
sub-contractors to observe the Guidelines. The renewed Guidelines therefore have 
coverage beyond the 38 adhering OECD countries and apply to state-owned and 
other companies from non-OECD countries when these companies are working in 
collaboration with companies from OECD countries. Such collaboration is typical 
in the extractive sector where joint ventures often include a range of companies 
from different countries. 
The promotion of the Guidelines takes place through National Contact Points that 
are also responsible for gathering information on experiences with the Guidelines, 
discussing related matters, assisting in solving problems that may arise, and 
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dealing with enquiries relating to the Guidelines. Moreover, any individual or 
organisation can ask the National Contact Points to investigate "specific 
instances" relating to the behaviour of companies in relation to the Guidelines. By 
2004, the National Contact Points had considered 79 such instances. Critics have 
however complained that the National Contact Points do not provide sufficient 
information on the investigation of specific instances to build confidence in the 
implementation of the Guidelines (OECD Watch, 2003). Critics have also alleged 
that few of the National Contact Points are actively promoting the Guidelines 
(ibid.). 
The inclusion of new human rights principles and the expanding coverage of the 
Guidelines demonstrate that companies are increasingly expected to consider the 
impact of their operations on human rights and abide by human rights standards. 
Even though the Guidelines are not focused on human rights, they provide some 
clarification on what is expected from companies in terms of human rights and 
make available a channel for enquiring the behaviour of companies from the 
perspective of human rights. 
The fLO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises is addressed to multinational enterprises and all three types of ILO 
members including governments and employer's and worker's organisations. It 
makes specific reference to the Universal Declaration: "All the parties concerned 
by this Declaration ... should respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the corresponding international Covenants adopted by the General Assembly 
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ofthe United Nations" (para 8). Its main body covers the four fundamental labour 
rights identified in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (1998): (1) freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, (2) 
the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, (3) the abolition of child labour, 
and (4) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. 
The implementation procedure consists of three elements: a periodic survey 
whereby the permanent members of the ILO provide information on their 
experiences in implementing the Declaration, a clarification procedure for 
interpreting the Declaration, and promotional and research activities. It therefore 
enables the permanent members of the ILO, including worker's organisations, to 
scrutinise and document the behaviour of companies with regard to key labour 
standards. These reports are made publicly available but only after the names of 
companies have been taken out. 
Like the OEeD Guidelines, the ILO Declaration is a normative instrument that 
shows that companies are expected to abide by internationally recognised human 
rights standards. Focused on labour rights, it is a more specialised initiative than 
the OEeD Guidelines, but covers a wider number of countries and other actors 
including employer's and worker's organisations. Overall, it has attracted less 
attention than the OEeD Guidelines, which may reflect the exclusion of other 
than the permanent members from the implementation procedures. 
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9.4.2 Sector specific initiatives 
Several voluntary initiatives are specific to the extractive sector. Each of these 
initiatives covers a particular issue that gives rise to human rights concerns for 
extractive companies. As will be seen below, governments have played a 
particularly important role as the convenors of the initiatives, but some companies 
have also actively participated in the development and design of the initiatives. 
The number of participating companies has increased over time, but the initiatives 
are still only endorsed by a minority of extractive companies. They therefore 
provide a benchmark of best practice developed by the first-movers in this area 
rather than a set of standards that most companies comply with. 
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2005), launched in 
2000, are a set of principles designed to ensure that human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are respected when security of company operations is maintained. The 
Voluntary Principles were developed by a small number of extractive industry 
companies and non-governmental organisations together with the United States 
and United Kingdom governments in response to incidents where multinational 
companies were criticised for alleged human rights violations committed by 
public security forces. The Principles provide clear responsibilities for the 
participant companies. For example, companies are expected to record and report 
allegations of human rights abuses by security forces in their areas of operation to 
appropriate host government authorities and ''urge investigation and that action be 
taken to prevent any recurrence". 
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As of July 2006, the number of participants to the Voluntary Principles had grown 
from the initial six companies, two governments, and seven non-governmental 
organisations to sixteen companies, four governments, and a slightly different set 
of non-governmental organisations. All the oil majors are endorsing the Voluntary 
Principles, but the initiative does not currently include any companies from 
outside OECD countries and therefore provides support for the ar!,rument that 
Western companies are more likely to address hwnan rights concerns than 
companies from developing countries. The number of governments and 
comparues endorsing the Principles should however grow in the future as 
participation was opened in 2006 for new governments and companies. Even 
though the number of participating companies is still low, the initiative shows that 
the behaviour of security forces gives rise to human rights concerns as discussed 
in Chapter 6. 
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (2006) encourages governments 
and companies to publish information about the taxes, royalties, and fees paid by 
oil, gas, and mining companies to host governments in developing countries. It is 
aimed at preventing corruption through the promotion of transparency of 
payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining operations. 
Disclosure of similar information is already common practice in developed 
countries. The Transparency Initiative was launched by Tony Blair in 2002 and 
can be seen as an effort of the international donor community to promote 
transparency and good governance in resource-rich countries and level the playing 
field between companies of which some may have gained unfair advantage 
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through bribes and facilitation payments. It is supported by a secretariat based in 
the UK's Department for International Development and a team in the World 
Bank. 
The Transparency Initiative is based on the willingness of governments to join the 
Initiative, although it is supported by a variety of actors including donors, some of 
the largest oil and mining companies in the world, investors in these companies, 
and civil society groups. As of July 2006, more than twenty governments had 
endorsed or were actively implementing the Initiative. The number of companies 
concerned was much higher because once a government joins the Initiative, 
companies are required to make available information on their payments to this 
government, irrespective of the home government or ownership structure of the 
companies. The Initiative therefore covers all types of companies in the extractive 
sector, including the majors, independents based in OECD and non-OECD 
countries, and state-owned companies. 
Corruption did not occur as one of the human rights related concerns addressed by 
the companies studied for the present research. The Transparency Initiative 
however shows that corruption has been a concern in the extractive sector. More 
generally, corruption has been seen to infringe on many of the human rights 
enumerated in the Universal Declaration. For example, it hinders the realisation of 
the right to the equal protection of the law as the application of law can be 
affected through bribes. The increasing international efforts to fight corruption 
were highlighted by the adoption of the United Nations Convention against 
322 
Corruption in Merida, Mexico, in December 2003. The United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights had already earlier recognised the link between 
good governance and the enjoyment of human rights in its resolution 2000/64. 
The role of business in the prevention of corruption was emphasised when anti-
corruption was included as the tenth principle in the Global Compact in 2004. 
Other initiatives in the extractive sector include the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme which is designed to control the origin of rough diamonds 
to prevent the trade of conflict diamonds. The participants consist of countries, the 
international diamond industry, and civil society organisations. Because the 
Kimberley Scheme is not directly related to human rights, but the financing of 
conflict, it is not discussed here in more detail. 
9.5 Conclusion 
The analysis of what companies are generally doing in relation to human rights 
sheds further light on the human rights strategies presented in Chapter 7. In 
particular, it shows that companies frequently pursue different types of human 
rights strategies in collaboration with other actors. The collaboration takes two 
main forms. First, companies form partnerships with non-governmental 
organisations to address human rights concerns (McKinsey, 2004; United Nations, 
2006). Second, companies engage in voluntary initiatives to show their 
commitment to human rights and to deal with specific human rights issues. In this 
way, companies gain more leverage and level the playing field between 
competitors. 
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Evidence also shows that an increasing number of different types of extractive 
companies give consideration to human rights. All the majors in the oil and gas 
sector have adopted human rights policies and taken measures to address human 
rights concerns. They have also participated in the launch and development of 
important sector-specific initiatives, particularly the Voluntary Principles, and 
thereby showed leadership in the area. The US companies have, however, been 
less willing than their European counterparts to participate in voluntary initiatives 
such as the Global Compact because of the general concern among US companies 
about litigation. 
Relatively little information is available about the national companies than other 
types of companies in the oil and gas sector. However, the fact that a number of 
national companies, including Petrobras and Petroloes de Mexicanos, have signed 
up for the Global Compact shows that also national companies give consideration 
to human rights. Nevertheless, the important national companies from the Middle 
East and Africa show little signs of acknowledging that companies are 
increasingly expected to abide by human rights standards. This reflects the fact 
that the companies are controlled by governments that are frequently criticised for 
human rights violations. In fact, it is the behaviour of some of these governments 
that has brought attention on the role of companies in human rights violations. 
The independents from both GECD and non-GECD countries have showed signs 
of taking human rights into consideration. Both types of companies have, for 
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example, joined the Global Compact (see Chart 9.2). However, based on the 
survey on the impact of Global Compact, the independents coming from non-
OECD countries are only starting to take action in relation to human rights 
whereas companies coming from OECD countries have already taken measures to 
incorporate human rights into company policies and practice (McKinsey, 2004). 
In general, companies have not engaged in the same variety and extent of actions 
as the companies studied for the present research. However, given that companies 
are increasingly recognising their commitment to human rights and showing their 
willingness to take action, the measures taken by the case study companies shed 
light on how a more important number of companies may be addressing human 
rights in the future. They also provide a repertoire of strategies that companies can 
pursue in the area of human rights. 
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10 Summary and discussion of the 
findings 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the research findings and discusses them in the context 
of earlier research. The chapter consists of two main parts. In the first part (10.2), 
the research findings and their contribution to extant literature are discussed at a 
general level and in relation to each of the three research questions. In the second 
part (10.3), the research findings are discussed at a more general level in terms of 
the limits of the power of companies and the role of non-governmental 
organisations with regard to human rights. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the directions for future research (10.4) and implications for policy 
and practice (10.5). 
10.2 Summary of findings in the context of earlier 
research 
10.2.1 Relevance for extant literature 
This thesis shed light on the range of strategies that companies can pursue in order 
to deal with human rights concerns in countries where the host government is 
responsible for systematic human rights violations. As seen in the literature 
review, little research exists on the ways in which companies address human 
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rights issues in such situations or in general. Previous research has focussed on 
examining the impact of foreign investment on human rights, even though one 
author admits that because of the complexity of human rights concerns and the 
factors that affect them, "[ w]e do not know what really happens to human rights 
as multinationals invest abroad" (Spar, 1999: 56). Given the lack of research on 
the specific behaviours that companies use to impact human rights, the present 
thesis makes a contribution to the literature on business and human rights in three 
main ways: first, it explores the nature of the human rights issues addressed by 
companies; second, it identifies a set of human rights strategies through which 
companies have influenced human rights issues, and finally, it proposes a number 
of variables that affect the choice of human rights strategy. These three elements 
form a holistic framework for addressing human rights concerns. 
Corporate approaches to human rights were examined in the context of corporate 
social responsibility defined as voluntary activity aimed at accommodating 
corporate behaviour to society's values and expectations. Because human rights 
concerns were assumed to embody a set of society's values, corporate human 
rights strategies were viewed as a way to implement corporate social 
responsibility. The present research therefore draws on and contributes to three 
main areas of research that have investigated how corporate behaviour is adapted 
to society's norms, values, and expectations: (1) social responsiveness (Carroll, 
1979; Sethi, 1975; Wartick & Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991), (2) issues 
management (Arrington & Sawaya, 1984; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b; Dutton & 
Ottensmeyer, 1987; Greening & Gray, 1994; King, 1982; Mahon & Wartick, 
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2003; Wartick & Rude, 1986), and (3) stakeholder management (Clarkson, 1995; 
Hillman & Keirn, 2001; Mitchell et al., 1997; Post et aI., 2000; Savage et aI., 
1991). 
The present research contributes to the literature on social responsiveness by 
identifying a set of strategies and attached activities that companies carry out to 
address human rights concerns. As pointed out by Clarkson (1995), there has been 
a lack of knowledge about actual activities pertaining to responsiveness. Previous 
research in the area has provided general categories of responsiveness rather than 
examined particular behaviours that companies adopt to accommodate their 
behaviour to society's values and expectations (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Wartick & 
Cochran, 1985). Carroll (1979), for example, suggested that corporate action can 
be described on a continuum from "doing nothing" to "doing much" without 
elaborating on the specific activities that can be carried out under these categories. 
The analysis of the cases also provides support for the extended view of corporate 
citizenship. Accordingly, companies protect, facilitate, and enable rights 
particularly when governments fail to do so (Crane & Matten, 2004). 
Nevertheless, as was seen in Chapter 2, the ultimate responsibility and authority 
still rests on states as the main duty-bearers of human rights obligations under 
international law . 
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10.2.2 Contribution to stakeholder theory and models of issues 
management 
Issues management. The corporate human rights strategies identified through the 
analysis of the cases make an important contribution to the literature on issues 
management by providing a new way of classifying corporate responses to social 
concerns. Previous research in the area has focused on the identification and 
evolution of issues. Relatively little is therefore known about the strategies and 
activities that companies employ to address issues. As Wartick and Rude (1986) 
found in their study of issues management in eight companies, responses to issues 
vary to such a degree that commonalties between them are not always recognised. 
More theory and testable hypothesis building has therefore been called for on 
responses to issues for improving the predictive and explanatory power of issues 
management theory (Wartick & Mahon, 1994). 
The present research also provides support for the view that the process of issues 
management should be divided into separate phases (see 3.5.2). More specifically, 
it shows that the characteristics that are important in identifying issues from other 
developments in the business environment are not equally important in describing 
and explaining how companies respond to issues. For example, only one of the 
elements of the issue construct was found relevant for categorising responses to 
issues (see Table 3.13 and 7.3). This suggests that even though there are 
connections between the different phases and practical activities pertaining to the 
process of issues management, they are affected by a different set of factors and 
should therefore be examined separately. 
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Stakeholder theory. The proposed strategies also contribute to a better 
understanding of the ways in which companies can address stakeholder demands. 
In contrast to previous research on stakeholder management strategies (see 3.5 
and 3.6), the present findings are based on a detailed examination of four separate 
cases rather than on theoretical reasoning without empirical basis. They also differ 
from the stakeholder management strategies put forward by previous researchers 
in that they establish issues rather than stakeholders as the target of action. 
Overall, the model of corporate human rights strategies goes beyond a nonnative 
approach to stakeholder theory by seeking to describe and explain the way in 
which stakeholders are part of issues and responses to issues. It therefore 
challenges the argument that the fundamental basis of stakeholder theory is 
nonnative by showing that explanatory research can be carried out in this area (for 
a discussion on the theoretical nature of stakeholder theory, see Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). 
Integrating stakeholder theory and issues management. The model of 
corporate human rights strategies also makes a contribution by providing new 
insight on the relationship between issues and stakeholders. Such exploration of 
links between research in issues management and stakeholder management has 
been called for by, for example, Wartick and Heugens (2003). Taken as a whole, 
the analysis of the activities that the companies carried out in Myanmar and Sudan 
provides support for the view that issues management and stakeholder 
management are complementary rather than conflicting ways of conceptualising 
the way in which companies accommodate to society's values and expectations 
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(Carroll & Buchholtz, 1999: 616-617; Wood, 1991). It therefore takes a different 
view to Clarkson (1995) who argued that managing corporate social responsibility 
equals to managing stakeholder groups. In contrast to Clarkson, the analysis of the 
cases shows that the concept of issues is useful in interpreting and organising 
stakeholder expectations because it brings together the perceptions and views that 
different stakeholders have about some circumstances or developments and 
thereby provides a link between various stakeholder groups and makes their 
management more efficient. 
More specifically, the model of corporate human rights strategies brings together 
stakeholder theory and issues management by building on some distinctions and 
variables previously explored in these two areas of research. Most importantly, it 
draws on the distinction made by Mahon and Waddock (1992) between 
'substantial' and 'symbolic' and makes it a basis that defines all corporate 
behaviour taken in response to issues or stakeholder demands and, in this way, 
links the concepts of issues and stakeholders. The distinction between action that 
seeks to impact the issue in question and action that is geared at influencing 
stakeholder perceptions and expectations has been previously made by researchers 
in the area of issues management and was discussed as the 'response target' in the 
literature review (see 3.5.4.2). In the present research, the distinction forms a key 
element of the model of corporate human rights strategies through the separation 
of substantial from symbolic action. Strategies are therefore defined as to their 
purpose rather than their magnitude (Ansoff, 1975; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; 
Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987), organisational focus (Buchholtz, 1992: 508, 510; 
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Dutton & Jackson, 1987b; Nigh & Cochran, 1987}, or degree of involvement with 
stakeholders (Friedman & Miles, 2002; Harrison & st. John, 1996; Rowley, 1997; 
Savage et aI., 1991). Framing action in this way provides a useful way of 
conceptual ising corporate behaviour because, first, it sheds light on the 
characteristics of activities and, second, it provides a basis for assessing behaviour 
based on how well the behaviour succeeds in achieving its aims. 
The model also corroborates the relevance of some of the variables that have been 
argued to affect the way in which companies deal with their external environment 
including organisational intrusiveness (Daft & Weick, 1984), stakeholder power 
(Freeman & Gilbert, 1987; Frooman, 1999; Hill & Jones, 1992; Mitchell et aI., 
1997; Rowley; 1997; Savage et at., 1991), and company size (Greening & Gray, 
1994). At the same time, it shows that some of the variables discussed in previous 
literature have little relevance for strategy selection as defined in the present 
research. It seems that the variables lack relevance because strategies have been 
previously defined as to their magnitude rather than essence. For example, top 
management commitment may have an effect on the extent of action taken by 
companies in response to issues and stakeholder demands (Greening & Gray, 
1994), but the findings of the present research suggest that top management 
commitment has little impact on the nature of the activities carried out by 
companIes. 
In addition to integrating research in the areas of stakeholder theory and issues 
management, the present research proposes a number of new ways to combine the 
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concepts of issues and stakeholders. First, it was argued that the perceived degree 
of power a company has over an issue in comparison to other actors affects the 
way in which the issue is addressed (see 8.3). The analysis of the cases suggested 
that the relevant stakeholder in this respect is often the host government. Second, 
the construct of 'organisational mode' was presented as part of the model of 
corporate human rights strategies to acknowledge that stakeholders mayor may 
not play an active role in the delivery of activities that are targeted at addressing 
issues. More specifically, it was argued that the organisational mode of strategies 
is affected by a number of variables including the availability of stakeholders that 
are able and willing to collaborate with companies (7.10 and 8.5). Taken as a 
whole, the two constructs show that stakeholders affect the way in which 
companies seek to influence their environment even when the environment is 
framed as issues. 
10.2.3 Characteristics of human rights issues 
10.2.3.1 Ontological nature 
The analysis of the human rights issues addressed by the case study companies in 
Myanmar and Sudan shed new light on the way in which issues can be 
characterised. Evidence from the cases suggested that human rights issues can be 
divided into substantial and symbolic issues on the basis of their ontological 
nature. Substantial issues concern material or physical circumstances that affect 
the enjoyment of human rights or constitute a direct violation of the entitlements 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In Myanmar and Sudan, 
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the case study companies addressed two major substantial issues: the behaviour of 
security forces in the areas of operations and the quality of life in local 
communities. They also addressed a number of other substantial issues that were 
not directly connected to their operations (see 6.2). In distinction to substantial 
issues, symbolic issues involve conflicting views and interpretations between 
companies and their stakeholders about policies, behaviours, or conditions related 
to the entitlements enlisted in the Universal Declaration. One such issue addressed 
by the case study companies involved the inconsistent views that the companies 
and some other actors had about the legitimacy of investment in Myanmar and 
Sudan. As showed by this example, symbolic issues are a result of the different 
ways in which companies and their stakeholders interpret events and situations. 
The role of interpretation in the emergence of issues has been previously 
highlighted by researchers who have studied the development of social problems 
(Daft & Weick, 1984; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) and corporate issues (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Lamertz, Martens, & Heugens, 2003). These researchers have 
argued that the same phenomenon may be perceived in a different way by 
different actors because individuals make specific interpretations of conditions 
and events from a multiplicity of possibilities. 
The distinction into substantial and symbolic issues reflects the way in which 
Mahon and Waddock (1992) divided responses to issues into substantial and 
symbolic responses. The fact that the ontological nature of issues has not been 
previously extended to issues may be explained by the focus of the present 
research. Earlier research has centred on the identification of issues from other 
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conditions and developments in society (see 3.5.2), whereas the present research 
examined those issue characteristics that affect the way in which companies 
respond to issues. The research findings therefore suggest that the characteristics 
that distinguish issues from other phenomena in society differ from the 
characteristics that determine the way in which companies respond to issues (see 
10.2.2.). 
The distinction into substantial and symbolic issues emerged from the analysis of 
data and is therefore a second order concept as defined by van Maanen (1979). In 
an empirical context, the ontological nature of issues is not always immediately 
clear. For example, the sometimes vivid discussion surrounding the socio-
economic programmes set up by the case study companies in Myanmar and Sudan 
seemed to suggest that the economic and social situation in the local communities 
was a symbolic issue over which the different actors disagreed. Instead, the 
programmes were conceptualised as a substantial issue because they were only 
referred to in connection with discussions on other issues that gave rise to 
disagreements including, for example, the impact of investment on the overall 
situation of human rights in the two countries. The separation of substantial from 
symbolic issues therefore requires a careful analysis of the points of disagreement 
surrounding a company's operations in a country. 
10.2.3.2 Factors underpinning symbolic issues 
A further analysis of symbolic issues revealed that they are underpinned by 
conflicting views about (i) perceptions of reality and/or (ii) boundaries of 
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responsibility between companies and other actors. Many of the symbolic issues 
addressed by the case study companies were based on both types of 
incongruencies. For example, the conflicting views about whether forced 
displacements had taken place near the oil fields in Sudan stemmed from 
incompatible views on whether forced displacements had taken place in the first 
place as well as on the boundaries of responsibility between companies and the 
Sudanese government (see 6.4.1.3). 
Symbolic issues and perceptions of reality. The analysis of the cases suggested 
that symbolic issues are often underpinned by conflicting perceptions of objective 
conditions or what Wartick and Mahon (1994) referred to as factual gaps between 
views about "what is". According to Wartick and Mahon, factual gaps arise from 
incompatible perceptions of corporate behaviour. Evidence from the cases shows 
that factual gaps may also arise from differing perceptions of some state of affairs. 
For example, Total and Premier maintained that human rights violations had 
become increasingly rare as a result of their presence in the pipeline area (e.g., 
Jones, 2003b; Total, 2003c: 15), whereas a number of non-governmental 
organisations alleged that the army still perpetrated systematic human rights 
violations in the area (e.g., EarthRights International, 2002; EarthRights 
International, 2003; Zandvliet & Fraser, 2004: 19). The analysis of the cases also 
showed that symbolic issues are exacerbated by mistrust and animosity between 
companies and non-governmental organisations. Total's head of mission in 
Myanmar, for example, believed that activist groups connected the company's 
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operations to unrelated incidents of forced labour and other human rights 
violations (du Rusquec, 2003). 
Symbolic issues and boundaries of responsibility. Evidence from the cases also 
suggested that in addition to inconsistent perceptions of objective conditions, 
symbolic issues may be underpinned by conflicting views about the boundaries of 
responsibility between companies and other actors. Such inconsistencies resemble 
what Wartick and Mahon (1994) called ideals gaps emerging from incongruent 
arguments about ''what should be". A further analysis of the cases showed that 
ideals gaps emerge when companies and their stakeholders have differing views 
about boundaries of responsibility relating to (i) geography, (ii) time, and/or (iii) 
legitimate role of different actors. First, symbolic issues based on ideals gaps arise 
when other actors question the way in which companies define the physical or 
geographical boundaries of their responsibility. For example, in Sudan, Talisman 
and Lundin denied responsibility for forced displacements on the basis of their 
investigations in the immediate vicinity of their infrastructure, while human rights 
groups argued that the companies bore responsibility for forced relocations in a 
much wider geographical area affected by their operations. Symbolic issues also 
emerge when companies and their stakeholders have conflicting views over the 
temporal limits of responsibility. For example, some human rights groups kept 
Total and Premier Oil responsible for the human rights violations that the 
Myanmar army had perpetrated in what became the pipeline area even before the 
companies started their operations in the country. The companies denied their 
responsibility, but the disagreement shows that the temporal proximity of human 
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rights violations can give rise to conflicting views about the boundaries of 
corporate responsibility. Finally, symbolic issues emerge when companies and 
their stakeholders hold a different view on the legitimate role of companies and 
other actors, particularly the host government. The debate on whether the case 
study companies should have continued their operations in Myanmar and Sudan 
illustrates how incongruent views over the legitimate role of companies can give 
rise to symbolic issues. 
10.2.3.3 Families of rights 
The analysis of the cases suggested that the companies were initially reluctant to 
address issues involving civil and political rights (see 7.2). This reluctance was 
highlighted by the companies' policies on political neutrality and non-
interference. Over time, however, all the companies modified their policies or 
made exceptions in relation to the circumstances in Myanmar and Sudan. Still, 
most of the issues addressed by the case study companies pertained to either 
security rights or economic and social rights. The high-level human rights 
incidents addressed by Total and Premier Oil in Myanmar were the only issues 
pertaining to civil and political rights. These incidents, which included the arrest 
of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2003 and the national reconciliation process, were some 
of the key issues underpinning the criticism presented against foreign investment 
in Myanmar (see 6.3.1.2). The companies therefore seemed to address civil and 
political rights only when it was essential for their "social licence" to operate. In 
general, they refrained from taking action on issues that were seen as "political", 
particularly if these issues were not directly relevant to their operations on the 
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ground. However, as expectations on the role of companies in the protection of 
human rights grow, companies may begin to take more action towards the 
realisation of civil and political rights. 
10.2.3.4 Issue focus 
The response of non-governmental organisations to some of the activities that the 
companies carried out showed that it is important for companies to focus on the 
main human issues associated to their operations in a particular country. For 
example, said an interviewee to Christian Aid with regard to Talisman's 
community development programme in Sudan: "It is not a question of how many 
schools are built or how adequate they are. [ ... ] What good are these schools to 
you when you can be shot, burned and killed in the villages?" (Christian Aid, 
2001: 29). This quote demonstrates that in order to avoid criticism by human 
rights groups, companies are expected to address the main human rights issues 
connected to their operations. It also shows that company efforts to contribute to 
the realisation of social and economic rights can be viewed as futile in a situation 
where basic physiological and safety needs are not satisfied. 
10.2.4 Activities assumed to address human rights issues· 
The analysis of the cases suggested that the activities carried out by the companies 
to address human rights issues can be separated into five different strategies: (1) 
direct strategies involving concrete action that companies take to influence the 
objective conditions that give rise to human rights issues, (2) indirect strategies 
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pertaining to attempts to persuade other actors to take action over the conditions 
that give rise to issues, (3) information strategies involving attempts to affect 
stakeholder views through the provision of information, (4) leveraging strategies 
aimed at affecting stakeholder views through verification measures or appeals to 
authority, and (5) stakeholder engagement strategies concerned with attempts to 
affect stakeholder views by increasing mutual understanding between companies 
and their stakeholders through two-way communication. The strategies are 
summarised in Table 10.1 below. 
TABLE 10.1. Corporate human rights strategies 
Target Strategy Description 
Direct strategy Affect objective conditions directly through concrete I Substantial action 
Issues 
Indirect strategy Affect objective conditions through persuading another actor to take concrete action 
Information strategy Affect stakeholder views through the provision of information and viewpoints 
leveraging strategy Affect stakeholder views through appeals to 
Symbolic authority or verification measures 
Issues 
Affect stakeholder views through two-way 
Stakeholder engagement communication aimed at increasing mutual 
strategy understanding between companies and their 
stakeholders 
The proposed strategies mirror the way in which Mahon and Waddock (1992) 
divided corporate responses to social issues into substantial and symbolic action. 
The first two of them involve activities that companies carry out to have an impact 
on material conditions that give rise to human rights concerns. They therefore 
represent what Mahon and Waddock called substantial action. As seen in the 
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literature review, Mahon and Waddock (1992) defined substantial action as 
"definitive moves that attempt to actually change or deal with the existing 
situation in specific, identifiable ways" (p. 27). The other three strategies are 
directed at influencing views and perceptions that stakeholders have of physical 
conditions or more abstract ideas relating to human rights. They correspond to 
what Mahon and Waddock (1992) referred to as symbolic action which pertains to 
the framing of an issue from the viewpoint of the organisation or its key 
constituents. As seen in the literature review, the distinction into substantial and 
symbolic responses resembles the way in which other researchers have described 
responses to issues (e.g., Arcelus and Schaefer, 1982; Buchholtz, 1992: 510; 
Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987; Nigh & Cochran, 1987; Sethi, 1979; Strand, 1983). 
Strand (1983), for example, classified responses to social demands based on 
whether they involve changing the environment or affecting the constituent 
demands placed on companies. 
The proposed strategies do not only reflect the distinction on substantial and 
symbolic action, but also provide new insight on the nature of symbolic and 
substantial action as defined by Mahon and Waddock (1994). The analysis of the 
cases shows that what Mahon and Waddock called substantial responses can be 
divided further into direct and indirect strategies. Accordingly, direct strategies 
involve activities that have a direct impact on material conditions. For example, 
all the companies pursued a direct strategy by running a community development 
programme aimed at improving the social and economic conditions in the 
communities in which they operated in Myanmar and Sudan. In distinction to 
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direct strategies, indirect strategies involve attempts to influence material 
conditions indirectly through persuading other actors to take direct action. For 
example, the case study companies employed an indirect strategy by 
communicating their concern over the behaviour of security forces to relevant 
government authorities with the expectation that the government would take 
appropriate action. 
The analysis of the cases also sheds new insight on symbolic action by identifying 
three strategies that can be carried out under symbolic action: (1) information 
strategies, (2) leveraging strategies, and (3) stakeholder engagement strategies. 
Information strategies involve attempts to influence stakeholder views by 
providing stakeholders with relevant information and viewpoints. The strategy is 
similar to Hillman and Hitt's (1999) corporate political strategy of the same name 
which seeks to influence political decision-makers by providing them with 
information that is useful in some way. Leveraging strategies involve attempts to 
increase the trustworthiness of the information and viewpoints provided by 
companies through verification measures or appeals to other actors who possess 
some form of authority. These strategies are pursued to address the lack of trust in 
companies that are seen to have a vested interest in presenting situations from 
their own perspective. Finally, stakeholder engagement strategies involve attempts 
to increase mutual understanding between companies and their stakeholders 
through two-way communication. In difference to the other strategies, stakeholder 
engagement strategy is relational rather than issue-specific; it aims to create a 
rapport or a sense of understanding between companies and their stakeholders 
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with the expectation that this relationship helps in addressing any issues that may 
arise. 
The analysis of the cases also shows that the organisational mode of strategies 
varies from internal development to different forms of collaboration (see 7.9). For 
example, Total's socio-economic programme in the pipeline region in Myanmar 
was managed by company staff, whereas Premier Oil delivered a similar 
programme in collaboration with Save the Children US. What is more, the 
strategies are not mutually exclusive; companies can use more than one of them to 
address a particular issue. The interconnectedness of strategies was discussed in 
more detail in section 7.8. 
To summarise, five strategies were identified on the basis of the analysis of the 
activities that the case study companies carried out in response to human rights 
issues. The proposed strategies reflect the way in which Mahon and Waddock 
(1994) divided corporate responses to social issues into substantial and symbolic 
action and shed new light on the nature of substantial and symbolic action by 
identifying several strategies that can be pursued under each type of action. 
10.2.5 Variables affecting the selection of the strategies 
The present research also made a contribution by identifying variables that affect 
the selection of human rights strategy. The variables and related proposition are 
listed in Table 10.2 below. They are based on the analysis of the cases and the 
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review of previous literature. In what follows, they are discussed in relation to 
extant literature. 
Perceived ontological nature of a human rights issue. The analysis of the 
activities carried out by the case study companies in Myanmar and Sudan 
suggested that the choice between substantial and symbolic action is affected by 
the perception that managers have about the ontological nature of the issue that 
they are seeking to address. A number of researchers have already previously 
linked the interpretation of issues to the actions assumed by companies in 
response to issues (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton, 1993; Dutton & Duncan: 
1987a; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). These 
researchers assert that there is a multitude of possible interpretations of events and 
conditions. They also argue that the way in which managers perceive and interpret 
a particular issue has an impact on which organisational resources and processes 
are evoked to respond to the issue. Previous literature therefore provides support 
for the observation made based on the cases that it is the perception of managers 
about issues rather than the actual nature of issues that determines whether 
companies assume a substantial or a symbolic approach to human rights issues. 
Degree of control. The analysis of the cases further suggested that human rights 
issues vary according to the degree of control that a company holds over them and 
that the choice between direct and indirect strategies is affected by the company's 
control over the issue. In Myanmar and Sudan, the companies held a high degree 
of control over the issues underpinned by conditions that they were able to 
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influence through the mobilisation of appropriate resources. In contrast, the 
companies held a low degree of control over the issues that arose from the policies 
and behaviour of other actors, particularly the host government and the army. It 
was also seen in this connection that companies could affect the degree of control 
they had over particular issues (see 8.3.3). 
Company's intrusiveness into its external environment. Evidence from the 
cases also showed that in line with Daft and Weick (1984), the choice between (i) 
information and leveraging strategy and (ii) stakeholder engagement strategy is 
affected by the extent to which companies intrude into their external environment 
to comprehend it. In the context of Myanmar, it was argued that Premier Oil was 
an example of an organisation that actively searched information about its 
environment, whereas Total tended to accept it as given (see 8.4.1). 
Power that stakeholders hold relative to the company. The analysis of the 
cases also showed that companies employ stakeholder engagement strategies to 
communicate their views to stakeholders that have formal or social power as 
defined by Freeman and Gilbert (1987) and Etzioni (1964). For example, 
journalists have what Etzioni called social power because they are in a position to 
affect the prestige and esteem of companies. In Myanmar and Sudan, the case 
study companies sought to engage with journalists by inviting them to visit their 
areas of operations in Myanmar and Sudan (see 8.4.2). 
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Company size. What is more, evidence from the cases suggested that 
organisational size affects whether companies pursue strategies on their own or in 
collaboration with other actors. Researchers in the area of issues management 
have already previously proposed that a connection exists between company size 
and issues management (Greening & Gray, 1994). This proposition was supported 
by the fact that Total, a significantly larger company than Premier Oil, employed 
a direct strategy on its own to run a socio-economic programme in the pipeline 
region, whereas Premier Oil collaborated with Save the Children US to deliver a 
similar programme (see 8.5.1). 
Availability of collaboration partners. The analysis of the cases also suggested 
that the availability of collaboration partners affects the choice between individual 
action and collaboration. For example, even though few organisations were 
willing to collaborate with Total in Myanmar, the company ceased the opportunity 
for collaboration when one emerged. For example, given the opportunity, it asked 
Mr. Bernard Kouchner to examine its socio-economic programme in the country 
(see 8.5.2). Evidence from the case also showed that the availability of 
collaboration partners can vary over time depending on how company operations 
are perceived by stakeholders {ibid.}. 
Perceived fit with core activities. Finally, the analysis of the cases suggested that 
fit with what managers consider as the companies' core activities also affects the 
choice between individual action and collaboration. This was particularly evident 
with Premier Oil that formed a partnership with Save the Children for delivering a 
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socio-economic programme in the pipeline region because the company did not 
consider social and economic activities as its core capability; instead, it preferred 
to find an organisation specialised in such activities to design and run the 
programme (Jones, 2003b; see also Anderson et ai, 2002: 8). 
TABLE 1 0.2. Variables affecting strategy selection 
Variable Proposition 
Ontological nature of the Proposition 1. Companies are likely to adopt a substantial 
human rights issue approach to influence human rights Issues that are perceived to 
concern objective conditions. 
Proposition 2. Companies are likely to adopt a symbolic 
approach to Influence human rights Issues that are perceived to 
Involve stakeholder perceptions and views. 
--.------~ .... --.---.---, 
Degree of control over the Proposition 3. The lower the control the company holds over a 
issue substantial human rights Issue, the more likely it Is to employ an 
indirect strategy for addressing the Issue. 
--- ,--
Proposition 4. The higher the control the company holds over a 
substantial human rights Issue, the more likely It Is to assume a 
direct strategy for addressing the Issue. 
Proposition 5. The greater the extent to which the company 
Organisational intrusiveness Intrudes Into its environment to comprehend It, the more likely It 
Is to assume a stakeholder engagement strategy to address 
symbolic Issues. 
Proposition if The lesser the extent to which' the company 
Intrudes Into Its environment to comprehend It, the more likely It 
is to assume an Information/leveraging strategy to address 
sYr.:D.!:19UfJ~~lJ_~~· 
Proposition 7. Companies are likely to assume a stakeholder 
Stakeholder power engagement strategy to communicate their views to 
stakeholders that hold a relatively high degree of power over 
corporate behaviour. 
Proposition 8. The larger the size of the company, the more 
Company size likely it Is to assume individual action to address human rights 
issues. 
-
Proposition 9. The smaller the size of the company, the more 
likely it is to assume a strategy in collaboration with other actors 
to address human rights Issues. 
Availability of partners Proposition 10. Unavailability of partners Increases the likelihood that a company assumes individual action to address human 
rights issues. 
Proposition 11. Availability of partners increases the likelihood 
that a company assumes a strategy In collaboration with other 
actors to address human rights issues. 
Perceived fit with core Proposition 12. The greater the perceived fit with core activities, 
activities the more likely a company is to assume individual action to 
address substantial human rights issues. 
Proposition 13. The lesser the perceived fit with core activities, 
the more likely a company is to assume a strategy in 
collaboration with other actors to address human rights issues. 
347 
10.3 Limits of the power of companies 
The analysis of the cases showed that many of the human rights issues addressed 
by extractive companies are caused by the policies and behaviour of the host 
government. The present research hence highlighted one of the main dilemmas 
and weaknesses of international human rights law: it is states that are the main 
guarantors and violators of human rights. It also drew attention to the fact the 
there are no formal mechanisms through which companies can seek to put 
pressure on governments to respect their human rights obligations. This lack of 
formal power shows the limits of the power of companies that still operate in an 
inter-state system underpinned by the principle of sovereignty. Even though 
globalisation may have increased the power of companies in terms of their size, 
territorial coverage, and geographical flexibility, the analysis of the cases showed 
that once a state refuses to behave in a certain way, companies have relatively 
little clout to persuade them to do so. As seen in Chapter 7, company efforts to 
address human rights may even give rise to other human rights concerns or 
become tools in the pursuit of other objectives by the host government (see 7.8). 
Evidence from the cases further suggested that companies have two types of 
action available when seeking to influence the government approach to human 
rights. First, they can attempt to persuade the host government to change its 
behaviour through informal and formal lobbying. Such attempts were discussed in 
Chapter 7 as indirect strategies through which companies seek to persuade other 
actors to take action with regard to particular human rights issues. Alternatively, 
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companies can attempt to increase their control over the relevant issue in order to 
deal with it themselves. For example, the case study companies asked for a 
government permission to deliver community programmes in the areas in which 
they operated for ensuring that some of the benefits of their projects were directed 
at local communities. 
10.4 Role of non-governmental organisations 
Non-governmental organisations have played an important role in the emergence 
and development of corporate human rights strategies. Not only have they been 
the principal actors pressuring companies to operate in line with internationally 
recognised human rights standards, they have also been popular partners in 
projects through which companies have sought to address human rights concerns. 
Accordingly, relationships between companies and non-governmental 
organisations have varied from adversial to mutually beneficial. 
As seen in Chapter 6, human rights concerns encountered by companies are not 
always concrete issues; they may also emerge from the perceptions and views 
held by different stakeholders. When faced with such symbolic issues, it was 
found that there is a lack of neutral communication channels through which 
companies can engage with their stakeholders, particularly non-governmental 
organisations. Without such channels viewed impartial by all the parties, symbolic 
issues are difficult to resolve as companies and non-governmental organisations 
have little trust in the information and arguments provided by the other. 
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The United Nations, which offers various procedures through which the 
realisation and violation of human rights by individual states can be considered, 
does not currently provide similar fora for discussing the behaviour of companies. 
The issue of business and human rights has still been elaborated upon within a 
variety of UN bodies. As seen in Chapters 2 and 9, it has been considered by the 
inter-governmental UN Commission on Human Rights which asked the UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to develop the 
"Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights". However, when considering the 
Norms in 2004, the Commission decided to call for more studies on the topic 
instead of recommending their endorsement. The Norms have also attracted 
criticism from the business community and the secretary-general's special 
representative (see Chapter 2). In addition to the Norms, the learning networks 
and policy dialogues of the Global Compact have offered a venue for interested 
parties to debate the issue of business and human rights. Unlike the Norms, the 
Global Compact has had appeal within the business community and is currently 
the most popular voluntary initiative in the area of corporate social responsibility. 
As seen in Chapter 9, a number of well-known human rights organisations have 
also participated to the work and events organised by the Global Compact office. 
The Compact is however unlikely to be able to offer a forum that is perceived as 
neutral by all the parties as far as there are non-governmental organisations that, 
in the absence of effective implementation criteria, criticise the Compact for 
providing a vehicle for "bluewashing". So, even though the UN has sought to 
offer opportunities for interested parties to discuss the issue of business and 
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human rights, no pennanent structure through which the behaviour of companies 
with regard to specific human rights standards could be raised has yet been 
established. 
As seen in Chapter 9, in addition to the UN, the behaviour of companies with 
regard to human rights can be raised through the "special instances" procedure of 
the OECD Guidelines and the reports of the permanent ILO members on the 
implementation of the ILO Tripartite Declaration. Nevertheless, neither of these 
procedures is sufficiently transparent for providing a forum that would be 
perceived as neutral by non-governmental organisations (for a critical review of 
the procedures, see Clapham, 2006: 201-218). The OECD Guidelines are also too 
narrow in scope as they only involve companies operating in or from OECD 
countries. 
There are therefore some channels through which companies and non-
governmental organisations have been able to express their views on business and 
human rights. None of them, however, provide a regular and transparent forum for 
discussing the behaviour of specific companies in relation to human rights. The 
establishment of such a forum has also proved difficult because the business 
community is generally against the introduction of a mechanism through which 
their behaviour would be scrutinised on a regular and formal way and many 
NGOs, disappointed with voluntary initiatives, are advocating for the introduction 
of binding regulation on companies. At the moment, only the Global Compact 
seems to have realistic potential for developing into an instrument through which 
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corporate behaviour could be discussed in an impartial and constructive 
atmosphere. 
10.5 Implications for policy and practice 
The present thesis showed that not only are there increasing pressures placed on 
companies to comply with international human rights standards, but companies 
are also taking concrete action to address human rights concerns. The review of 
what companies are generally doing in relation to human rights revealed that an 
increasing number of companies give consideration to human rights (see Chapter 
9). In 2006, almost 80% of the largest companies in the world had included 
human rights principles into their policies or management practice (United 
Nations, 2006). Nevertheless, companies have not engaged in the same variety of 
activities than the companies studied for the present research. However, given that 
companies are increasingly recognising their commitment to human rights, the 
measures taken by the case study companies shed light on how human rights 
concerns can be addressed. 
The present research provides a repertoire of strategies and activities that 
companies can pursue in response to human rights concerns. This repertoire is 
based on the observation that human rights issues do not only involve material 
conditions that prevent people from enjoying human rights or constitute a direct 
violation of their rights. Human rights issues may also pertain to the way in which 
stakeholders perceive or view a particular situation. For example, the conflicting 
views about whether the Myanmar army perpetrated human rights violations in 
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the pipeline area shared by Total and Premier Oil in Myanmar are a human rights 
related concern that had important consequences for the reputation of the two 
companies. The nature of the human rights issue is important because it affects the 
way in which the issue can be addressed. 
The present research proposed that human rights issues relating to material 
conditions can be addressed through direct and indirect strategies that seek to alter 
the conditions that give rise to the issues. Such strategies include community 
development programmes, assistance of human rights victims, and human rights 
monitoring. Issues underpinned by conflicting perceptions and/or views between 
companies and their stakeholders can be addressed through three types of 
strategies that attempt to influence the way in which stakeholders interpret 
particular circumstances or more abstract ideas: information strategies, leveraging 
strategies, and stakeholder engagement strategies. The strategies are not mutually 
exclusive; more than one of them can be used to address a particular issue. The 
content of the strategies is explained in Table 10.1 above. 
10.6 Suggestions for future research 
Out of the four companies studied, three pulled out as a result of the effect that 
association with human rights violations had on their profitability. The 
divestments by Premier Oil, Talisman Energy, and Lundin Oil show that 
companies may prefer withdrawal to the development of policies and practices 
that deal with human rights concerns, particularly in situations where their 
financial performance is being affected by investment in a country where the 
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government is involved in human rights violations or unable to secure the respect 
for human rights. The probability of withdrawals merits further investigation. 
As seen in the literature review, previous research in the area of business and 
human rights has focussed on investigating the impact that foreign investment has 
on the condition of human rights (see 3.2). The present research did not directly 
contribute to this research, but the effectiveness of the proposed human rights 
strategies could be examined to shed light on how companies influence the state 
of human rights in a particular country. 
A number of suggestions for future research also arise from the delimitations of 
the present thesis as identified in Chapter 1. More specifically, the generalisability 
of the research findings to a larger population could be tested by investigating a 
larger number of companies. The relevance of the research findings could also be 
examined in other than the extractive industries. Moreover, it is possible that there 
are other variables than the ones put forward in Chapter 8 that influence the 
choice of human rights strategy. In particular, it is possible that country specific 
factors that were excluded from this research affect strategy selection. 
10.7 Summary 
This chapter summarised and discussed the research findings in the context of 
previous research. It first argued that relatively little is known about the strategies 
and specific behaviours that companies use to address issues and stakeholder 
demands of which human rights are an example. The research findings were then 
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discussed in relation to each research question. In this connection, it was seen that 
the thesis sheds light on the way in which issues can be characterised by 
distinguishing substantial issues from symbolic issues. It was also seen that the 
thesis makes an important contribution by providing a new way of classifying 
corporate responses to social concerns by identifying five strategies that 
companies can pursue to address human rights concerns. The proposed strategies 
provide new light on the nature of substantial and symbolic action as defined by 
Mahon and Waddock (1994). Moreover, the thesis makes a contribution by 
proposing that a number of variables affect the selection of human rights strategy. 
The power of companies with regard to human rights was then seen to be limited 
by the central role of states in international human rights law. Next, the lack of 
communication channels between companies and non-governmental organisations 
was discussed as a challenge for companies that are seeking to address human 
rights concerns. The chapter concluded with a discussion of implications for 
policy and practice and directions for future research. 
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Appendix: Global Compact participants in the oil and gas sector 
As of 19 July 2006 
Company Type Country Region Joined 
Total Major France Europe 07/03/2002 
BPPlc Major United Europe 26/07/2000 Kingdom 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group Major United Europe 26/07/2000 Kingdom 
China Petroleum and Chemical National China Asia 01/01/2001 Corporation 
Chennai Petroleum Corporation National India Asia 22111/2000 limited 
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. National India Asia 21/04/2001 
Oil India Limited National India Asia 06/07/2001 
Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. National India Asia 23/08/2001 
Oil & Natural Gas Corporation National India Asia 17/09/2003 
National Company 'KazMunayGas' National Kazakstan Asia 07/02/2006 
Pakistan Petroleum limited National· Pakistan Asia 04/04/2006 
Sui Southem Gas Company Ltd National· Pakistan Asia 04/04/2006 (SSGC) 
AB Mazeikiu Nafta (PCl) National lithuania Europe 14/06/2005 
Norsk Hydro ASA National Norway Europe 26/07/2000 
Statoil ASA National Norway Europe 2610712000 
Petroleos Mexicanos National Mexico North America 24/01/2006 
Petro bras SA National Brazil South America 26111/2003 
Petrolera Nacional (ACCEL) National Panama South America 30/08/2001 
Vidagas Non- Mozambique Africa 11/05/2006 OECD 
B.H.I Holdings Nigeria Ltd. Non- Nigeria Africa 10/08/2005 OECD 
Superpower Nigeria Limited Non- Nigeria Africa 25/08/2005 OECD 
Sino Union Petroleum & Chemical Non- China Asia 09/1112004 Intemational Ltd. OECD 
Petrovis Non- Mongolia Asia 17/02/2006 OECD 
Bosicor Pakistan Limited Non- Pakistan Asia 05/04/2006 OECD 
TGT Tehnogas a.d Laktasl Non- Bosnia And Europe 16/05/2005 OECD Herzegovina 
Macedonia, 
Makpetrol A.D. Non- The Former Europe 21/10/2004 OECD Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Yukos Oil Non- Russian Europe 15/08/2001 OECD Federation 
Aerofuels Group Non- Russian Europe 22/06/2006 OECD Federation 
Mannai Corporation QSC Non- Qatar Middle East 27/0212003 OECD 
Qatari Group and Sister Group of Non- Qatar Middle East 06/03/2003 Companies OECD 
Grupo Hidrosina Non- Mexico North America 30/06/2006 OECD 
Camuzzi Gas Pampeana SA y Non- Argentina South America 27/07/2004 Camuzzi Gas del Sur SA OECD 
CAPSA (Companias Asociadas Non- Argentina South America Petroleras SA) 1 CAPEX SA OECD 12/10/2004 
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Gasnor SA Non- Argentina South America 14/10/2004 OECD 
Sintaryc SAI.C. Non- Argentina South America 14/10/2004 OECD 
Empresa Petrolera Chaco SA Non- Bolivia South America 03/02/2006 OECD 
Copagaz Distribuidora de Gas ltda- Non- Brazil South America 19/10/2001 Grupo Zahran OECD 
Nova Gas SA Non- Peru South America 20/04/2004 OECD 
Japan Energy Corporation OECD Japan Asia 23/09/2002 
Cosmo Oil Co., ltd. OECD Japan Asia 06/02/2006 
OMV Aktiengesellschaft OECD Austria Europe 22101/2003 
Technip OECD France Europe 14/10/2002 
Gaz de France OECD France Europe 10/04/2003 
Oil Recovery Services OECD France Europe 27/0812003 
ILF Beratende Ingenieure GmbH OECD Germany Europe 05/04/2006 
MOL Group OECD Hungary Europe 14/07/2005 
ENI OECD Italy Europe 01/07/2001 
Edison Spa OECD Italy Europe 07/07/2005 
Saybolt International OECD Netherlands Europe 12/11/2002 
PKN Orlen SA OECD Poland Europe 0210312004 
Catalana de Tractament D'Olis OECD Spain Europe 24/06/2002 Residuals SA 
Gas Natural SDG, SA OECD Spain Europe 24/06/2002 
Repsol YPF OECD Spain Europe 01/11/2002 
Elcogas, SA OECD Spain Europe 02/10/2003 
Cepsa (Compania Espanola de OECD Spain Europe 22/03/2005 Petroleos) 
Petrolin Group OECD Switzerland Europe 17/06/2005 
Premier Oil Pic OECD United Europe 13/05(2003 Kingdom 
BG Group pic OECD United Europe 11/01(2005 Kingdom 
Centrica pic OECD United Europe 15(0212006 Kingdom 
Nexen Inc. OECD Canada North America 01/03/2001 
Petro-Canada OECD Canada North America 31/08/2001 
Enbridge OECD Canada North America 16(1212003 
Talisman Energy Inc. OECD Canada North America 10/0212004 
Amerada Hess Corporation OECD United States North America 31/08/2002 of America 
The Shell Petroleum Development Subsidiary Nigeria Africa 12(06(2006 Company of Nigeria, Limited 
Total Zambia ltd Subsidiary Zambia Africa 10/06(2004 
Jiangyin Tianli Gas Co" ltd. Subsidiary China Asia 21/02/2006 
Bongaigaon Refinery and Subsidiary India Asia 07111/2001 Petrochemicals ltd. 
Pakistan Refinery Limited Subsidiary Pakistan Asia 17109(2004 
Pakistan Oilfields Limited Subsidiary Pakistan Asia 07/07/2005 
National Refinery Limited Subsidiary Pakistan Asia 07(04(2006 
Petronas Energy Philippines, Inc. Subsidiary Philippines Asia 20/06(2002 
Opet Aygaz Bulgaria EAD Subsidiary Bulgaria Europe 12105/2004 
Limited Liability Company TNK-BP Subsidiary Ukraine Europe 08/05(2006 Ukraine 
Metrogas SA Subsidiary Argentina South America 19/07/2004 
Total Gas y Electricidad Argentina Subsidiary Argentina South America 19/07/2004 
Transportadora de Gas del Norte SA Subsidiary Argentina South America 19/07/2004 
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Pan American Energy LLC Subsidiary Argentina South America 21/07/2004 
Gas Natural SA ESP Subsidiary Colombia South America 11/02/2005 
Gas Natural Del Centro SA Esp Subsidiary Colombia South America 26/06/2006 
Petroleos Delta, SA Subsidiary Panama South America 09/09/2003 
Aguaytia Energy del Peru S.R.L. Subsidiary Peru South America 21/10/2004 
-Being privatised in 2006. 
Source: Global Compact Participant Search available from http://www.unglobalcon1pact Org, accessed 19 July 
2006. 
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